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"When / use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful
tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor
less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words
mean so many different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master
- that's all."
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass
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This thesis investigates the effects of contextual change on conceptual
representation, and in particular the changes involved when concepts combine. In
Chapter 1 an overview of the Classical Approach, the Probabilistic Approaches and
the Exemplar Approach to category representation is given. Each approach is
examined with regard to four conceptual functions: stability, representation of
ontological and linguistic meaning, simple categorization and complex
categorization. It is concluded that these theories vary in the extent to which they
can fulfil the first three functions, but that none can adequately address complex
categorization. This highlighted the need to understand concept combination more
fully.
In the second chapter a normative study of conceptual stability is reported. It was
found that changes in context cause a complete change in the goodness of
example of instances. In Chapter 3 two experiments are reported which investigate
adjectival qualification of noun meaning while reading. Results suggest that
context immediately affects the retrieval of nouns, casting doubt on the role of
category prototypes.
In Chapter 4 four experiments are reported which investigate noun-noun
combination. In particular, the question of whether nouns combine according to a
Boolean model is assessed. It is concluded that subjects do not use Boolean
combination, but tend to overextend conjunctive concepts. Implications of this
finding are discussed with reference to Hampton's Inheritance of Attributes model.
In the fifth chapter an alternative explanation for overextension is introduced and
tested empirically. The results of this experiment clearly demonstrate that the
more categories subjects have to combine the greater their tendency to
overextend. This finding, consonant with the proposed hypothesis that subjects
use a best fit strategy for deciding category membership, is compared to the
Inheritance of Attributes model.
In the final chapter traditional theories of conceptual representation are
reassessed. It is proposed that the localist nature of these theories, where
concepts are conceived of as isolable units, is inappropriate for adequately
capturing the knowledge-centred nature of concepts. A globalist position where
concepts are generated on-line is outlined, and possibilities for distinguishing the
two approaches are discussed. Globalism is seen as an appropriate theoretical




A THEORETICAL RESUME OF CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIZATION
1.1. Towards a Definition of Concepts
A concept in very general terms might be construed as a stored representation of
an object, action, or notion, which can be grasped or considered by the mind and
is manifested in the language system. This description, however, is not sufficiently
precise as a basis for experimental investigation. How can it be decided if
someone has a given concept or not; which concept a person is using in a given
situation; and which level of language (e.g. words, typologies) reflects conceptual
representation? A more precise definition of this important psychological notion is
unavailable for good reason, as Kendler aptly put it:
After all, a concept is not a single thing or event whose
attributes and functions can be simply listed and described. A
concept is a complicated psychological phenomenon, a complete
description of which will be contained someday in a theory capable
of explaining the numerous empirical laws involving the term
concept.
Kendler, 1964) p 226.
Given the understanding that the notion of a concept must be a complex one, and
indeed one which cannot yet be fully defined, it is nevertheless necessary to adopt
a pertinent working definition if the acquisition of meaning is to be studied at all.
In practice, concepts are taken to be "the general idea or meaning which is
associated with a word or symbol in a person's mind... the abstract meanings
which words and other linguistic terms represent" (Longman Dictionary of Applied
Linguistics). Different researchers and different disciplines expect concepts to fill
different roles. Rey (1983) has highlighted four roles concepts have been invoked
to perform. Not everyone agrees that in an adequate theory of cognition, concepts
will fill all four roles. What is clear, is that every conceptual theory will have to
take each role into account. In order to clarify the explanatory scope, and possible
adequacy, of several conceptual theories, they will be assessed with regard to
Rey's four conceptual functions.
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Rey's Four Conceptual Functions
1. Stability Functions : Concepts enable the formation of stable
cognitive states in response to particular stimuli. This is a
necessary prerequisite for communicating with oneself and
others.
2. Representation of Ontological / Linguistic Meaning : Concepts
represent the whole meaning of a term including some
relational information (for example, semantic equivalence and
antonymy relations). A concept also provides information on
which logical inference is based. The concept BACHELOR (Note
1) necessitates being unmarried because of the information
contained in the concept. It is also this information which
allows us to draw semantic implications. For example, if we
know the statement "Jane likes apples" is false, then that
implies the statement "Jane likes all fruit" must also be false,
because of what we know about apples and fruit.
3. Simple Metaphysical and Epistemological Function (Note 2):
Concepts are the representation of the information which
allows us to make simple categorization judgements. Concepts
also contain information about how such judgements are
carried out.
4. Complex Metaphysical and Epistemological Function : Concepts
(or complex concepts) are representations of the information
which allows complex categorization judgements (e.g. is
"haddock" a PET FISH?), and the means by which such
categorization is carried out (e.g. comparison with the
prototype of a complex concept PET FISH).
It is apparent that the primary role of concepts is one of representing the world to
oneself and others. The other functions concepts serve are subsidiary means to
this final end, but subsidiary means have proved easier to investigate. Thus, an
overwhelming proportion of researchers have chosen to study the third conceptual
function listed, that of simple categorization processes. I will discuss the findings
and implications of this research in some detail. This chapter is devoted to
assessing which of Rey's conceptual functions current theories of concepts
address. In section 1:3 I will consider whether complex categorization can be
explained by models which have developed from phenomena associated with
simple categorization. Problems associated with the second conceptual function
listed - the representation of whole meaning - will arise throughout the course of
the discussion but will be highlighted in section 1:4. The posited stability of
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concepts will be seen to vary somewhat with the particular view of concepts one
adopts; the question of whether the onus of providing stability should be placed
on concepts will be raised later in the thesis (see Section 3:1).
Three cognitive theories: the Classical View, the Probabilistic Views and the
Exemplar View, represent the basic ideas underlying individual conceptual theories.
I will assess the strengths and weaknesses of each approach with regard to the
four roles concepts might play. Simple categorization has been studied in the hope
that some knowledge about what criteria are brought to bear in categorization
decisions, will lead to a greater understanding of conceptual representation.
Categorization will be examined through the eyes of each cognitive theory, and in
turn these cognitive theories will face the test of categorization phenomena. In
particular, the inability of current theories to address themselves adequately to
complex categorization decisions will be highlighted. This chapter concludes with a
discussion of conceptual combination.
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1.2. The Classical View of Concepts
Assumptions
What has come to be called the Classical View of concepts has been handed down
to psychologists from philosophy, and is notably Aristotelian in origin. This view is
primarily concerned with what has been called the intension, core meaning, or
metaphysical aspect of concepts. Firstly, the Classical View assumes a unitary,
summary representation of an entire class, where the summary assumption is
justified on the grounds of limited processing capacity. The second, and
distinguishing assumption of the Classical View states that the features which
make up the summary representation are defining for the concept; that is to say,
they are singly necessary and jointly sufficient to define the concept. Thus, in any
given categorization task the summary representation will be retrieved, then
compared with the item in question. If the summary representation maps on to the
item it is deemed a member of the category, otherwise it is rejected. Adopting the
notion of defining features, leads to the prediction that the summary
representation of a category must, by definition, contain fewer features than any
given category instance because it is the common denominator of the category.
The third basic assumption of the Classical View is logically implied by the first
two: namely, a concept which is a subset of another concept will have the defining
features of the superordinate concept nested within it.
e.g. CONCEPT HYPOTHETICAL DEFINING FEATURES
Quadrilateral A polygon, Four sides
Parallelogram A polygon, Four sides, Opposite sides
parallel, Opposite sides equal
Rectangle A polygon, Four sides, Opposite sides
parallel, Opposite sides equal, Four
right angles
Square A polygon, Four sides, Opposite sides
parallel, Opposite sides equal, Four
right angles, Four equal sides
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The implication that superordinate categories should have fewer defining features
than subordinate categories has some experimental parallels e.g. Rosch, Simon &
Miller (1976) found that subjects could list fewer features of superordinates than
basic-level instances.
A CLASSICAL PERSPECTIVE ON REY'S CONCEPTUAL FUNCTIONS
Endorsing the basic assumptions of the Classical View leads to specific predictions
about conceptual attainment and usage in a wide variety of semantic tasks. In
order to convey an impression of the applicability of the theory as a whole, I will
summarize its basic assumptions, and the arguments levelled against them, with
respect to Rey's four conceptual functions. I will then consider more severe
challenges to the basic tenets of the theory.
1. Stability
The Classical View implies the complete stability of concepts once they are
formed. That is to say, when presented with a breed of dog one has never
encountered before it will never be necessary to change one's representation of
dog since the novel dog must, by definition, already match the summary
representation of the class. The Classical View thus provides a basis for
interpersonal and intrapersonal stability since each concept has a definition, and is
thus the same on all occasions of use. In this way Classicalists can also expect
concepts to be productive. That is, a few stable, basic units should be able to join
together predictably to produce new stable concepts, in much the same way as
the same words can join together to form sentences with different meanings.
Some developmental flexibility is, of course, allowed, and the Classical approach to
concept acquisition is worth briefly outlining here. Eve Clark (1973a) has taken
such an approach, namely, that children acquire stable concepts through a process
of "component by component" acquisition. That is to say, the defining featural
properties by which adults represent words (according to the Classical View) are
acquired one-by-one by the child. Thus, a child's lexical entry for a word will be
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an incomplete version of an adult's lexical entry for the same word. Eve Clark
supported this claim with developmental evidence showing the apparent synonymy
of antonyms like "more" and "less" at a stage in concept attainment. Moreover, the
meaning assigned to both these words was the meaning of, what was claimed to
be, the less featurally complex, unmarked item. This work has since been criticized
methodologically and experimentally by Susan Carey (1982). Carey pointed out that
these effects were found to reduce if the data for individual children was analysed
separately. She also suggested that error rates may be an immature reflection of
adults' increased reaction times, hence children may have been making the same
distinctions between positive and negative terms as adults. Lastly, Eve Clark
(1973b) also found that the concepts "in", "on" and "under" were used
synonymously. In this case, however, the selection of which word was learned first,
and which meaning was dominant, could not be explained in terms of featural
simplicity. Thus, it would seem that children do not simply learn adult concepts
feature by feature. Susan Carey has suggested that children form their own
concepts and theories about what words mean, rather than partial adult concepts.
If this is the case, then a Classical explanation of interpersonal and intrapersonal
stability is difficult to achieve. It seems that the Classical approach no longer has
the explanatory edge when describing the developmental growth of stability.
2. Representation of Ontological/Linguistic Meaning
The second function which concepts are invoked to perform is the representation
of the whole meaning of a term. Prima facie, the Classical View can cope easily
with phenomena that cause problems for other theories. For example, the fact that
being unmarried is entailed by being a bachelor is because <-married> is one of
the features of BACHELOR. Similarly, semantic implication can be explained with
recourse to the semantic features of a word. We know that if the statement "Tom's
wife has died" is true, it implies that the statement "Tom never married" is false
because the feature <+married> is present in the antecedent. Is this, in fact, a
satisfactory explanation of semantic implication?
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Granted, the Classical View can explain some semantic implication at the word
level in terms of features: for instance, it might be inferred that sickness or death
would result from drinking poison since poison contains the feature <-potable>.
In general, however, this strategy merely displaces the problem to a featural level:
the question "Why can't men drink poison?" is replaced with questions like "Why
does <+male> imply <+animate>, and the combination of <-potable> and
<+animate> spell disaster"? What recourse has a Classicalist in this case?
Perhaps it would simply be argued that today's features are merely postulates, and
not the indivisible primitives which really constitute conceptual building blocks. I
would like to offer two comments on this point. Firstly, the existence of semantic
primitives was originally proposed in response to the limited processing capacity
of the brain (Johnson-Laird, 1983) it now seems they are creating the burden of a
huge analysis for each word. Secondly, it is difficult to conceive of a more
primitive level for features such as <+male> and <+animate> that could have
any discriminatory value. It seems a more parsimonious suggestion that we use
words (rather than features or primitives) to communicate precisely because they
are pitched at an optimum level for our cognitive processes (a point conceded by
Miller (1978) by asserting that normal processing uses a gestalt).
Explanations resorting to features can often seem inadequate: for example,
explaining antonymy in terms of featural analysis may lead one to posit features in
each antonym which are positive and negative poles of a dimension. This is, on
reflection, no more an explanation of the relations between words as it would be
to say that words are antonyms because they are dimensionally opposed! In
conclusion, featural explanations of connections between words are ad hoc, they
merely displace the problem to another level rather than addressing it directly.
3. Simple Categorization
The Classical View states that categorization is achieved by comparing the item to
be categorized with the summary representation of the class. Therefore, it should
be possible to categorize all the instances of the concept once it has been fully
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obtained (hence there should be no ambiguous instances like "tomato" (fruit),
"rhubarb" (vegetable) and "lightshade" (furniture)). It should also be as easy to
categorize a common instance as a novel instance, the process being the same in
each case. These predictions have been repeatedly contradicted by people
demonstrating the effects of 'goodness of example' on categorization tasks (e.g.
Rosch, 1975a, 1978; - see Medin & Smith, 1984 for a review). This criticism is
partly redressed by Rey who claims that concepts have a metaphysical role,
therefore data relating to epistemological classification is irrelevant to the internal
structure of the concept - see section 1:5.
4, Complex Categorization
Accepting a definitional view of concepts lends itself to Boolean descriptions of
conceptual combination like those found in natural set theory, where membership
is all-or-none. Such a theory predicts that similarity relations between concepts
will be symmetrical. Rosch (1975b) showed, however, that good rather than poorer
category members were used as 'cognitive reference points'. Hence, people find it
natural to say: "A zebra is like a horse" not "A horse is like a zebra". Zadeh (1965)
has emphasized that natural class concepts are not accurately described by the
all-or-none membership characterized in natural set theory.
The inability of the Classical View to provide an account of complex concepts
points uncomfortably to its limited scope as a conceptual theory. It may be that
many of the Classical View's apparent problems with complex categorization could
be avoided by taking Rey's insistence on the metaphysical/epistemological
distinction seriously. It implies that we should expect Boolean combination to be
intensional not extensional. That is, membership in a complex concept should be a
Boolean combination of the conceptual criteria for membership in the constituent
categories, not the intersection of the sets of members of those categories. The
necessity of adopting an intensional approach to combination has been argued by
James Hampton (Hampton, 1987a) - see also section 4.6. One problem with such a
view is that the theoretical notion of intensional combination is untestable while
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there is no way of discerning the features present in a concept.
Criticism of the Basic Assumptions of the Classical View
The three basic assumptions of the Classical View as outlined above will be
discussed with respect to data obtained from simple categorization studies. Firstly,
the assumption "a concept which is a subset of another concept will have the
defining features of the first nested within it", implies that ROBIN and CHICKEN
should be equally easy to verify as instances of BIRD, both having the defining
features of BIRD nested within them, and being at the same level of abstraction.
Yet it has been consistently found that CHICKEN and other non-typical examples
take longer to verify. Similarly, the statement "A canary is a bird" can be verified
more quickly than "An ostrich is a bird". In order to get round this problem, Rips,
Shoben & Smith (1973) and Smith, Shoben & Rips (1974) have proposed that
concepts contain defining features and characteristic features. Initially, the total
number of features for CANARY would be accessed and globally compared with
the features of BIRD enabling a rapid response if the degree of featural overlap
was great. In the case of judging "ostrich" as a member of "bird", the total number
of shared features would be less (since OSTRICH does not share many
characteristic features with BIRD), hence necessitating a second stage defining
feature analysis. This view, however, is tantamount to rejecting that "all instances
possessing the criterial attributes [of a category] have a full and equal degree of
membership" which is the basis of the Classical View (Rosch, 1975a). The
remaining question is why it is necessary to propose a complicated two stage
analysis, when comparing only the defining features would give completely
accurate results?
A second way to solve the problem of some categorization decisions being easier
than others, is to endorse the ad hoc assumption that good examples of
categories have fewer features than poor examples. Thus, a good example will be
more quickly verified as a category member because fewer features have to be
searched before finding the defining features mapping the summary representation.
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This approach also runs into problems, however, when forced to explain the
priming effects found by Rosch (1975a). Rosch asked subjects to decide whether
two instances were members of the same category. In one condition the subjects
were warned of the onset of the pair, by a signal. In a second condition, subjects
were primed with the category name. Rosch found that priming facilitated decision
speeds for good examples like "apple-apple", and hindered decision speed for poor
examples like "marrow-marrow" with respect to the signal control. The postulated
larger number of features in the poor examples does not provide any explanation
of why the decision process should actually be slowed down when a prime, rather
than a signal, was used. What is quite clear is that without major theoretical
changes the Classical View cannot account for the prototypical structure that so
many have reported (Wittgenstein, 1953; Rosch, 1973, 1975a, 1978; Rosch & Mervis,
1975; Glass 8t Holyoak, 1975; Garrod & Sanford, 1977; Tversky & Gati, 1978;
McCloskey 8i Glucksberg, 1979; Roth 8i Shoben, 1983).
Simple categorization also provides a more fundamental challenge to the Classical
View: a challenge to the notion of any defining features. If there are defining
features, given enough time subjects should be able to correctly classify items; yet
many ambiguous items remain. A Classicalist may well respond that these people
could not have fully attained the given concepts, if this is true it merely points to
the idealized nature of the Classical theory of categorization! Finally, as
Wittgenstein (1953) illustrated in his games example, it is not know, nor is it
apparent how it could be discovered, what the features, and defining features in
particular, of concepts are.
The Classical View is thus forced to amend two of its basic assumptions, and
propose that the summary representation of the class may contain the defining
features of the class plus some typical characteristic features of the category. This
altered position bears a remarkable family resemblance to the probabilistic
approaches outlined in the next section. The remaining assumption of the Classical
View is that categories are represented by a unitary summary representation. This
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assumption has not been directly challenged by work on simple categorization, and
is also adopted by most of the Probabilistic Views of conceptual representation. It
has not been left totally unchallenged, however, as shall be seen in section 1:4.
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1.3. The Probabilistic Views
The alternative theories which grew out of the categorization findings have been
classified as the Probabilistic Views. They have in common the replacement of the
problematic notion of defining features, with a probabilistic membership criterion.
As a result, the summary representation of the class is conceived of as being
more complex than it appears to be in the Classical View. The summary
representation of a class incorporates a number of salient characteristic properties
previously excluded because of a few outliers e.g. penguins cannot fly hence
<+fly> cannot be a necessary feature of BIRD. According to the Probabilistic
Views, categorization of an instance is accomplished by exceeding a critical
probabilistic similarity weighting. There are two major variations of the
Probabilistic perspective: the Featural approach and the Dimensional approach.
The Featural Approach
The assumptions of this view as characterized by Smith & Medin (1981) are: (i)
concepts are represented by a summary description of the class, and (ii) the
features which make up that summary description are salient ones, with a high
probability of occurring in instances of the concept. Note that this summary
description may not equal, or even map on to, any particular instance of the
concept, but it will be more similar to some instances than to others. It is this
latter factor that is taken to account for typicality findings. The general assumption
about the criterion for categorization is:
}-x: x £ Y < = > F(x) > C(Y)
Where x and Y are concepts, F(x) is a featural
weighting function on x, and C(Y) is a
critical weighting for the concept Y.
Many researchers have adopted a general featural approach to categorization
(Collins & Loftus, 1975; Flampton, 1979; McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1979; Flayes-Roth
& Flayes-Roth, 1977). The approach gives an increased role to discriminatory, but
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non-universal category features; this change legitimizes the over-generalization so
typical of human thinking e.g. "fruit is sweet". There are also problems with the
approach, the Probabilistic Featural account, like the Classical View, is dogged by
the immense problem of reliance on unknown features. When the total explanatory
power of a theory is based on the distribution of features within a class, it is
obvious that that theory is weak while we know neither that distribution nor the
features from which it is composed.
The Dimensional Approach
The Dimensional approach discards the traditional notion of featural components
entirely. Instead it proposes that concepts are characterized by values along a
number of dimensions For example, APPLE is said to be closer to the concept
FRUIT than GRAPE because its salient dimensional characteristics (like <size>) are
closer to the category mean. The fact that the Dimensional Approach relies on
quantitative rather than qualitative features (Garner, 1978) may not seem an
important difference, but the quantitative approach has led to a new way of
describing concepts. It has been argued that concepts containing the same
relevant dimensions can be represented in a multidimensional metric space
(Shepard, 1962, 1974; Henley, 1969; Carroll & Wish, 1974; Homa &. Silver, 1976). A
metric space is defined as a set M together with a function 6:MxM -> R where 6
exhibits minimality, symmetry and triangular inequality i.e. for any a and b
members of M:
- (i) S(a,b) >6(a,a) = 0
- (ii) 6(a,b) = 6(b,a)
- (iii) S(a,b) + 6(b,c) >6(a,c).
In this approach "semantic distance" across the metric space is analogous to
degree of similarity between words, and is therefore a useful way of representing
the categorization process;
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H\ x e Y < = > D(p_x) < S(Y)
Where x and Y are concepts, D represents
semantic distance, p is the central
tendency of the concept, and S(Y) is a
critical semantic distance for the
concept Y).
Thus, in the Dimensional approach, there was an adoption of Boolean models, the
assumptions underlying which proved such a problem for the Classical View. The
assumption that conceptual space must be metric has no empirical base; a
growing number of researchers found experimental justification for its rebuff
(Beals, Krantz & Tversky, 1968; Tversky 81 Krantz, 1970; Krantz Tversky, 1975;
Boyd, 1972). For instance Tversky & Gati (1978) showed that similarity judgements
are not associative (contradicting point (ii) above), and Arnold (1971) showed that
dissimilarity judgements are not Euclidean (contradicting point (iii) above). These
problems have to some extent been recognized and multidimensional scaling
techniques are increasingly being used in non-metric spaces.
Dimensions Versus Features
Although the Dimensional approach may be an adequate way to represent colour,
size, and other intuitively quantitative concepts, it does not seem appropriate for
all concepts. As Smith & Medin (1981) have pointed out "many properties lack
dimensional aspects like continuity and betweenness". It seems certain that some
concepts, for example those of faces, are better represented featurally. More
evidence for a Featural account is provided by Goldman & Floma (1977) who argue
that normal summary representation is most likely to be modal in nature, whereas
it seems most likely that dimensions are represented by averages. This is because
it is unlikely that a dimensional quantity, such as size, will cluster on a specific
value such as 5'9". Rosch & Mervis (1975) pointed out that subject reports of word
constituents support a Featural over a Dimensional representation. Finally, Smith 8i
Medin (1981) have pointed out that dimensions can always be represented
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featurally (quantitative changes can be perceived as qualitative changes) but not
vice versa. Hence, if given a list of women's heights, heights up to 5'3" could be
represented by the feature <short>, from 5'3" to 57" by cmedium height>, and
over 57" by <tall>. If given these three features, however, they could not be
recoded dimensionally.
A PROBABILISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON REY'S CONCEPTUAL
FUNCTIONS
Having thus outlined the nature of the Featural and Dimensional approaches to
conceptual representation, it is important to assess the merits of the Probabilistic
View as a whole. In particular, I will discuss the View's explanatory capability with
respect to Rey's conceptual functions.
1. Stability
The Probabilistic View depicts concepts as flexible. Thus, a person will never reach
a stage of "conceptual attainment" where classification errors will be zero. The
nature of the approach characterizes concepts which change and develop as
experience changes and develops. From a developmental perspective, it can be
predicted that children's concepts should be more variable than those of adults
because children encounter more novel, incompatible instances to elicit such
changes. It is also implied that children do not have "incomplete versions of adult
concepts" but that they form their own concepts according to experience.
Although it cannot be said that adults have complete conceptual stability, in the
sense that their concepts are lexically frozen, it is certainly thought that adults
reach conceptual maturity or competence.
An important distinction between the Probabilistic and the Classical View with
respect to stability, is that the Probabilistic approach looks for stability outside
conceptual definitions. Firstly, stability results from experience of conceptual usage.
Thus, by simple virtue of the fact that the more often you encounter a concept
being used, and interpret its meaning successfully, the less likely you will be to
encounter a novel use which causes you to alter your concept. Secondly, stability
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results from the perception of a structured world, or innate cognitions which
impose structure on our environment. This assumption is not as dramatic a
difference from the Classical View as it might at first seem. The Classicalist avoids
this philosophical debate only by referring to an intermediate cause of stability viz
defining features. If pressed for a more complete explanation of stability many
Classicalists would propose that the terms of definitions, or primitive features, are
innate (Fodor, 1981).
2. Linguistic
The Dimensional and Featural accounts deal differently with the linguistic functions
of concepts. The Dimensional account explains relations of synonymy in terms of
minimal separation in semantic space. Although sufficient for synonymy this type
of explanation does not suffice for antonymy because it cannot account for the
relationship that distinguishes antonyms from other dissimilar words. That is to
say, postulating that antonyms are maximally dissimilar does not account for the
psychological connection between opposites. Semantic implication is also
inadequately captured by referring to semantic distance alone: it does not seem
feasible to suggest that all words that can be involved in a process of semantic
implication are located together in semantic space e.g. the feature <+animate> is
involved in hundreds of different semantic implications between word pairs.
Therefore it seems necessary to posit a relationship between words that is not
solely dependent on similarity: that, by definition, is outwith the scope of this
approach. The Featural account explains linguistic function in a similar way to the
Classical View: that is, synonymy and semantic implication can be explained in
terms of underlying conceptual features. The difference with the Featural account
is that the underlying features are not defining, but characteristic. Antonymy is
also accounted for in terms of features, that is a concept X exceeds some critical
value of dissimilarity for a concept Y. Yet again the explanation of antonymy is
couched in terms of maximal dissimilarity - an explanation which fails to capture
the salience of this relationship.
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3. Simple Categorization
As the Probabilistic View was formulated in response to simple categorization data,
it explains typicality very well. For the Featural account, the closer an instance is
to the modal summary representation of the class, the easier it is to categorize.
For the Dimensional account, the closer an instance is in semantic space to the
average summary representation of the class the easier it is to classify. Similarly,
because membership is not "all or none" some instances have unreliable
classifications. This explanation of poor members relies on criterial membership
judgements, is this tantamount to specifying a category boundary by the back
door? I would argue that it is not: a criterion for category membership is
comparable to a judgement confidence level which will vary from individual to
individual, and in the same individual, over time. The criterion level is subject to
the same kind of influences as described in Signal Detection Theory (Egan & Clarke
(1964)). For example, rewards for positive classification will cause subjects to be
more lenient when applying membership criteria, whereas punishment for false
inclusions will cause them to become stricter.
4, Complex Categorization
Until around 10 years ago, work on concepts and categorization had largely
excluded complex categorization from serious study. The remark: "what holds for
simple categorization... need not hold for other functions" made by Smith & Medin
(1981) has proved to be prophetic. The probabilistic models can provide no clear
idea as to how the concept PET FISH is derived (if it is) from the concepts PET and
FISH. To examine this problem more thoroughly I will look at the most developed
theory Probabilists adopted as a way of answering these questions: that of Fuzzy
Set Theory.
Fuzzy Set Theory was originally proposed by Zadeh (1965). It provided a theory
capable of representing relations between sets that were not all-or-none. The
Fuzzy Set approach was adopted by a number of researchers (Lakoff, 1973; Oden,
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1977; McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978) but it has since been criticized as an
inadequate expression of complex concepts (Osherson & Smith, 1981; Roth &
Mervis, 1983). Osherson's argument is aimed at highlighting the inadequacy of the
"prototype" view (a general term for either of the Probabilistic approaches or the
Exemplar View).
Osherson defines complex concepts as the resultant concept when "one or more
concepts combine together to form another whenever the latter has the former as
constituents". Usually this is reflected grammatically in the forming of a word pair
e.g. "pet" and "fish" combine to form the complex concept PET FISH. What is of
interest is the relationship between a complex concept and its simpler
constituents. Osherson describes Fuzzy Set Theory's representation of conceptual
combination as the intersection F such that:
Vx.(x £ F)(Cstriped apple(x) ~ ^'^(^striped(^)'
^appleM)
That is, if an instance "striped apple" was rated a good example of APPLE and a
bad example of STRIPED, it would be rated a bad example of STRIPED APPLE, as an
instance is never more representative of a complex concept than it is of any of its
constituents. Fuzzy Set theory, then, does not capture the intuitive interaction
between constituents when they form complex concepts. It seems to me that the
term "complex concepts" may subsume two kinds of word combination, each of
which could be expected to bear a different kind of relationship to its constituents.
That is, when two words join together interactively to form a new concept, Fuzzy
Set Theory cannot describe the relations between the constituents. Hence:
^red fox(^) ^ ttlin(Crecj(x), Cfox(x))
Membership in the category "Red fox" does not equal minimum membership in the
constituent categories because "fox" alters our understanding of "red". Similarly:
^dark horse(^) ^ rnin(Cc|ar)<(x), Chorse(x))
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Membership in the category "dark horse" is not the minimum membership of the
constituents as "dark horse" in this context has a specific new meaning. One could
think of many such examples. However, if the word pair "red car" is considered
then the interaction intuitively no longer exists, thus:
^red carM — hlin(Crecj(x), Ccar(x))
Even in this case where there is no intuitive interaction between RED and CAR,
there is no reason to suppose the minimality rule will hold out. Subjects might be
likely to say that a "red car" is a better member of the conjunct than of either
constituent simply because it meets the membership criteria for both concepts.
Thus, it may be the case, that some concepts are compositional while other
concepts are interactive. This distinction is certainly intuitively appealing, and one
that merits some investigation.
Roth & Mervis (1983) provide an excellent empirical refutation of the
appropriateness of Fuzzy Set Theory. Two predictions other than the intersection
prediction, dealt with by Osherson, are those of containment and union. Both of
these predictions are challenged by Roth & Mervis. Union is defined as the
function on a member x such that:
fC(x) = Max[fA(x), fB(x)]
Where C is the fuzzy set resulting from
the union of the sets A and B, and f(x)
is a membership function on each set.
Hence the membership of an instance in category C (an A or a B) is equal to its
best membership rating in a constituent category. This formulation seems
intuitively correct, and from it we can see how the fuzzy set notion of containment
arises. The set called C which is the union of A and B can be used to demonstrate
the special case of containment, that is the union of the sets A and B, when A is a
subset of B. In normal set theory it is obvious that in this case C is equal to
B. Similarly, this is the case in fuzzy set theory and so containment is defined as
22
the function on a member x such that:
Vx fA(x) < fB(x) < = > A c B
Where A and B are sets and f(x) is a
membership function on each set.
So, whenever A is a subset of B, instances of A will have at least as high a
membership value in B as in A. Thus we can predict "robin" should be at least as
good an example of ANIMAL as it is of BIRD. Roth & Mervis found that this kind of
prediction does not always hold, which implies that either our characterization of
containment is inappropriate, or the set A in question cannot be a subset of
B. Roth & Mervis collected goodness of example ratings of superordinate (animal)
and subordinate (e.g. mammal, bird, fish) categories. Each exemplar was rated once
as a member of its close superordinate category (e.g. fish) and once as a member
of its distant superordinate category animal. Containment predicts that an exemplar
should be at least as good an example of its distant superordinate as its close
one; union predicts that an exemplar's representativeness in the distant
superordinate will equal its representativeness in the close superordinate of which
it is most typical.
Roth & Mervis found that these predictions did not generally hold. The level of
representativeness varied among superordinates, but it was often the case that
instances were more representative of close superordinates than distant ones; but
in some cases the opposite was true. This means that the predictions of Fuzzy Set
Theory are not upheld, unless it is true that close superordinates are not in fact
subsets of distant ones. This demonstrates that the relationship between different
levels in the conceptual hierarchy is not a simple one. Their study led Roth &
Mervis to conclude that: "the Goodness of Example of an exemplar in categories at
different levels within a taxonomy is determined independently". Such a conclusion
suggests that the Fuzzy Set model of conceptual combination is not
psychologically valid.
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In conclusion, it can be seen that Probabilistic theories provide a more satisfying
account of the data relating to simple categorization processes than the Classical
View. However, the extension of a Fuzzy Set approach to complex categorization
has been unsuccessful, and complex categorization remains a major problem for
Probabilistic theories of concepts.
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1.4. The Exemplar View
The Exemplar View is a major alternative to the Probabilistic Views, as it also
provides an account of categorization which incorporates typicality effects. The
factor which distinguishes the Exemplar View from the Classical and Probabilistic
Views is its holistic nature. The Exemplar approach does not require the
postulation of underlying features or dimensions in order to explain typicality
effects. It is this view, in my opinion, that is closest to the notion of a prototype
as first described by Elenor Rosch (Rosch, 1975a). Crucial to this view is the
hypothesis that categorization is achieved by comparing the instance in question
with the prototype, or best example, of that class (see Medin & Schaffer, 1978).
The greater the similarity between the prototype and the instance the more easily
that instance can be classified as a member of the category (Note 3). It is not
necessary that the prototype be a single category member, it may well consist of
a small group of best instances e.g. apple, orange and pear may be the
prototypes for the category "fruit". This view has a number of theoretical
advantages over alternative approaches. Firstly, it does not require the postulation
of a category concept that is somehow abstracted from the members of that
category: the category is mentally represented in terms of its most typical
referents (Note 4). Secondly, the Exemplar View provides a simple explanation of
why subjects remember individual instances, rather than the summary
representation of the class. This is reported to be so even in tasks where the
subject is only required to learn the criteria for categorization into a small number
of groups (Smith & Medin, 1981). In a recent paper, Brooks (1987) has reported
findings supporting the relevance of storing exemplars. He argues:
our conceptual resources are considerably more decentralized
than is usually portrayed, consisting in routine analogy to prior
interpreted episodes as well as to more abstract principles and
models.
Brooks, 1987 p. 142
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Thirdly, the holistic approach of the Exemplar View provides good theoretical
convergence on the salience of the basic level (Rosch, 1978).
A HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON REY'S CONCEPTUAL FUNCTIONS
The Exemplar View provides a challenge to more traditional views of concepts.
During the process of assessing the validity of such a challenge, I will look in turn
at each of Rey's conceptual functions.
1. Stability
The Exemplar approach predicts a high level of conceptual stability because typical
(good) exemplars are the most frequently encountered, and usually the first to be
acquired. The approach also allows for the fact that the extension of concepts may
vary, and that this would be particularly relevant to poor members. Deciding
criteria for membership is a learning process which develops to maximize
similarity within categories and dissimilarity between categories: i.e. under the
rules of family resemblance (Rosch 8t Mervis, 1975). In this case, developmental
variability is not due to conceptual change as such, but change in the criteria for
acceptance and rejection. Thus, children's concepts should be basically the same
as adult concepts, that is to say they should have the same central tendency,
although their extensions will be different. That children's extensions are different
from that of adults has been widely documented. At an early stage children's
extensions are extremely wide e.g. "daddy" may be used to refer to every male. At
a later stage children's extensions are too narrow, excluding bad examples from
their categories (e.g. excluding "penguin" from BIRD). Stability between individuals
in the same culture should be reasonably strong as, like the probabilistic views,
concepts are formed in relation to a structured world. In particular, typical category
examples should be highly correlated across subjects. Barsalou (1987) has reported
that interpersonal and intrapersonal stability in graded structure is less high than
was previously thought, although higher concordance is found for typical
instances. He has also suggested that the Exemplar View can provide a reasonable
account of this level of stability:
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Although this approach has not yet been oriented towards
accounting for the instability of graded structure, it has potential for
doing so. For example, between-subject instability could result from
different individuals experiencing different exemplars over time... In
general, what seems typical to a particular person on a particular
occasion may reflect the exemplars that are readily available.
Barsalou, 1987 p. 132
2. Linguistic Function
This is the conceptual function for which the Exemplar View provides the weakest
account. It has no adequate way of explaining semantic implication, synonymy or
antonymy. A possible linguistic role for concepts seems, as yet, excluded from this
holistic approach.
3. Simple Categorization
The Exemplar View provides an excellent account of typicality effects, referring to
the fact that some examples will be closer to the prototype than others. In a
strong version of the Exemplar View any notion of definitions is ruled out (Note 5).
It simply makes no sense to say that FRUIT has APPLE and PEAR as its definitions;
in this case all fruits would be apples and pears! Flence, this view finds it
problematic to account for typicality effects in categories that are intuitively
well-defined. Armstrong, Gleitman & Gleitman (1983) have shown that the
categories odd and even number (which are intuitively defined e.g. "divisible by 2
leaving a remainder 1" and "divisible by 2 leaving no remainder" respectively) show
typicality effects. It is difficult to see how a complete understanding of "odd"
number could be grasped if this category is organized around comparison with the
prototype "7".
4. Complex Categorization
Although I know of no-one who has actually proposed an uncompromised
Exemplar account of complex categorization, it seems to me that a logical
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extension of the Exemplar View leads to some surprising predictions about
complex concepts. Namely, that complex concepts must be independent from the
similarity distributions of their constituents. Consider the example "pet fish", the
constituent "pet" is, according to the Exemplar View, represented by a prototype,
let it be DOG. The second constituent "fish" is similarly represented, let it be by
the concept HADDOCK. By what possible means could these concepts combine to
from a prototype for the complex concept PET FISH? Thus, because the Exemplar
View, in its stronger form, does not include abstract information it must predict
that complex concepts have whole new goodness of example distributions. Only
this would allow the prototype for PET FISH to be something like "goldfish".
Hence, it seems that the Exemplar View must abandon any notion of
compositionality.
Given this state of affairs, it is now pertinent to ask what allowed the formation of
the complex concept PET FISH at all? What is to stop the emergence of concepts
like PET CHAIR or CHAIR FRUIT i.e. how are complex concepts to be constrained?
An Exemplar theorist would argue that constraints are inherent in the environment.
Thus, PET LOG is a meaningful conjunction because Yukka plant offshoots are sold
with accompanying "names" and "characters" - some even sport stuck on plastic
eyes for effect! So, conjunctions could be constrained by the non-existance of
obvious referents in the environment. It seems that in addition to this, some
general lexical knowledge is often brought to bear. For instance, even in
noun-noun combinations a head-modifier relationship between the constituents is
still recognized - see Chapter 4. Hence, even if the Exemplar View provides a good
account of categorization procedure, its lack of reference to linguistic information
casts doubt on its completeness as a theory of concepts.
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FIGURE 1
A SUMMARY OF THE ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THREE THEORIES
OF CATEGORIZATION
Adapted from Smith & Medin, 1981
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1.5. Towards A Theory of Concepts
Summary
In summary, it can be stated that there is, to date, no adequate theory of concepts.
The three views summarized here each account for specific conceptual roles
without reference to how Rey's other functions might be achieved. The Classical
View fails to account for the categorization data, in particular typicality effects. On
the other hand, it provides good explanations of linguistic function, and captures
our intuition that words have definitions, by hypothesizing that concepts contain
necessary and sufficient features. The Probabilistic approaches provide a good
account of simple categorization phenomena, but cannot stretch to an explanation
of complex concepts. The Exemplar View gives a holistic approach to
categorization which agrees with the findings on basic level dominance. It also
copes well with simple categorization, but provides no explanation of the linguistic
function of concepts. The Exemplar View predicts that complex concepts will be
represented separately from their constituents; but overall seems inadequate as a
theory of concepts because it indicates no way of incorporating linguistic
information. The differences in assumptions between these three approaches are
outlined in Figure 1. Below, the criticism that none of these theories can be
considered a theory of concepts will be examined, and an assessment made of
what theoretical base does exist on which future research into the nature of
concepts can be grounded. I will look again at the problem of complex concepts
and suggest that they may provide an appropriate experimental field through which
to expand our knowledge of concepts and how they operate. I will examine three
main criticisms which have been raised against the work to date on concepts and
categorization.
1. Epistemological / Metaphysical Distinction
Rey (1983) attacks the validity of much empirically based categorization theories,
when he criticizes the theoretical account given of them by Smith & Medin (1981).
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A similar argument has also been advanced more recently by Lakoff (1987). Rey
asserts that the Probabilistic and Exemplar approaches are epistemological in
nature, that is to say they address the means by which subjects classify things,
not the conceptual representation of the things they classify. Rey does not
question the value of knowing access patterns, he simply asserts that this
knowledge does not constitute a theory of concepts.
If Rey's point is that observing behaviour (categorization) is not synonymous with
observing cognition then what he says is accurate, if not entirely new. (It would be
a shock indeed if we had not learned the lessons of behaviourism). Rey's criticism
is, however, a timely reminder not to let our rhetoric or thought patterns slip into
that error. On the other hand, Rey seems to completely ignore the fact that there
are good reasons to hypothesize that changes underlying representations may
have some bearing on categorization decisions. Prototype theory (Probabilistic and
Exemplar theories) was originally developed as a possible explanation of the data
of typicality effects. A theory is, after all, a proposed explanation for a
phenomenon. Moreover, prototype theory generates predictions, and can therefore
be falsified. Thus, I do not think that classification data can be rejected out of hand
as irrelevant to theories of representation. It is particularly difficult to discount
Rosch's findings that priming with a category name facilitates "same" judgements
for identical typical category pairs, but hinders "same" judgements for identical
atypical pairs. It would be very difficult to provide an alternative explanation for
this finding without recourse to underlying representations. In the final analysis,
Rey highlights the fact that an adequate theory of concepts has not yet been
developed. It is my reply that the study of conceptual usage, particularly complex
categorization decisions, is the most promising road towards one.
2. The Problem with Levels
Smith & Medin (1981) have drawn attention to an important problem facing anyone
trying to develop a theory of concepts: that is, at what level does conceptual
representation occur? The confusability of "E" and "F" in letter list experiments may
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be explained by referring to shared line features, for instance. At another level "E"
itself might be a feature used to explain the confusability of the words "BED" and
"RED". At yet another level "BED" might be one of the features used to explain the
confusability of the sentences "The boy went to bed" and "The boy went to sleep".
And so on. Smith & Medin simply assert that there are empirical grounds for
distinguishing between features and concepts: thus they argue that it is empirically
valid to conclude that "E" is a feature in the "BED", "RED" example. Smith & Medin
conclude that: "what is a concept at level 'n' is best thought of as a feature at
level 'n+1'".
Smith & Medin's treatment of this issue seems rather flippant. They are, in effect,
drawing attention to the fact that current theories of concepts imply huge
conceptual networks for different conceptual levels. If this is true, it may also be
true that conceptual representation is concentrated in a "basic" most salient level,
somewhere in the middle of such a taxonomy. This idea is not a popular one, and
the notion that there exist conceptual primitives, features that are themselves
indivisible, is preferred. These problems are as yet unanswered, but a complete
theory of concepts will have to take them into account.
3. Well-Defined Categories
Armstrong et al (1983) have shown that typicality effects occur in categories that
are well-defined. Thus, they argue that finding typicality effects in natural
categories where defining features are unknown, is not evidence to suggest that
they do not exist. While this is true it is important to note that the opposite is just
as true. That is, even if definitions can be provided for a category, that does not
mean that people actually represent the category in terms of that definition.
It is being increasingly felt that the Classical View may still have a lot to offer a
theory of concepts. Some researchers are combining the notion of defining
features and characteristic features in concepts to form fuzzy concepts with
defining "cores". In particular, the Classical View may be pertinent to the
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understanding of verbal concepts (Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976). Again, the
conceptual core may be used to explain the linguistic function of concepts
(Armstrong et al, 1983), whereas characteristic features may be more fully involved
in the identification procedure of items. For example, Barsalou (1982) has
suggested that it is only the characteristic features of concepts that are subject to
contextual change. The core aspect of concepts may also play a particularly vital
role in placing constraints on possible concepts. How these postulated constraints
could operate in the formation of complex concepts, however, is unclear. Recently,
James Hampton has proposed an account of how complex concepts might be
formed when the core and characteristic functions of the two constituent concepts
combine (Hampton, 1987). He makes use of an "inheritance of attributes" rule
where usually a complex concept is formed by the union of the intensional
representations of the constituent concepts. (This emphasis on intensional
combination avoids some of the problems of the Classical View - see section 1:2).
Hampton also provides a number of alternative approaches when the inheritance of
attributes from both constituents conflict. While this theory is hopeful in that it
addresses some of the complexities of conceptual combination, it is open to the
criticisms levelled against all featural approaches. Namely, that this approach is
untestable while there is no way of knowing the particular features which make up
the concepts involved - see section 4:6.
In conclusion, theories of concepts which have developed in response to
categorization phenomena are a valid step towards a complete conceptual theory.
If the problem of levels is taken seriously, what we have learned about natural kind
taxonomies may also be pertinent to the mental organization of concepts. Finally,
the Classical View may still have a role to play in meaning; a role that may
develop as different kinds of words and categories are studied.
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1.6. Concept Combination
It has been argued in this Chapter that current theories of concepts do not appear
to provide an adequate account of how concepts combine. The Classical View
predicts that concepts will combine according to a Boolean model. That is, a
complex concept will have only those attributes which belong to both constituent
concepts. As discussed earlier (see Section 1.2:4) these criteria do not hold for
many combination cases. A posible solution to this problem is to propose that
concepts are combined intensionally, rather than extensionally. In this case, the
extensional set for the complex concept need not necessarily have a predictable
relationship with the extensional sets of the constituent concepts. The problem
with this solution is that an empirical demonstration of intensional combination
seems impossible.
The Probabilistic views attempt to incorporate graded membership into a model of
conceptual combination, suggesting that two "fuzzy sets" combine to form a third.
This view fails to account for the fact that it is not always the most typical
aspects of the constituent concept that are included in the conjunction. In contrast,
it seems that the particular concepts combined, highlight in some way certain
features, making them more salient, in that context. Thus, a Fuzzy Set model fails
to capture the interactive nature of conceptual combination (see Section 1.3:4).
The third theory considered was that of the Exemplar view, which in its strongest
form suggested that concepts do not combine (Section 1.4:4). Rather, new
concepts are continually being learned which might then be associated with one or
more words to which a meaning is already ascribed. This theory has the practical
problem of being non-productive when human processing capacities are limited. In
addition, it has the theoretical problem of providing no constraints on concept
formation. On the other hand, it may be true that conceptual combination can lead
to the permenant formation of new concepts. That is, there seems to exist a stage
where a conceptual combination becomes so common that it has an identity
34
distinct from that of its constituents (e.g. "ashtray" is not usually thought of as a
conjunction of "ash" and "tray"). Such combinations subsequently develop
independently of their constituent concepts, and after some time only their
etymologies may show they have arisen from conceptual combination. It should be
expected that in a language at any given time there will exist many words and
combinations in various stages of this "lexicalization" process. Thus, any given
word pair may represent a different relationship with the constituent concepts of
the combination.
Despite these difficulties, conceptual combination is a crucial issue for conceptual
theorists. This is because meeting concepts in different sorts of contexts and in
different sorts of combinations is the rule of language, rather than the exception.
Complex concepts can be construed as a special sort of context effect. When a
complex concept is presented in isolation each word can be said to act as a
context for the other. Thus, when presented with the complex concept "pet fish",
"pet" provides a context in which to interpret "fish", and "fish" provides a context
in which to interpret "pet". Further, Barsalou (1987) has argued that context effects
in general can be described and understood as the results of routine conceptual
combination. Thus, complex concepts need not even be linguistically marked by a
word pairing like "pet fish", but may be contained within a sentence: "His fish made
a good pet".
In order to investigate the processes of contextual change and conceptual
combination, processes which may be intrinsically linked, I will make use of what
is already known about the structure of noun categories. I will study how category
structure changes in different contexts and also how noun categories combine. In
this way I hope to be able to discover principles of conceptual change which are
applicable to conceptual representations in general. That is not to say that all
concepts are represented in the same way, but rather that discovering something




CONTEXT EFFECTS ON CATEGORY CONCEPTS
2.1. Context and Similarity to a Prototype
In Chapter 1 several skeleton models of conceptual theories were studied. The only
application of those theories considered were one-off simple or complex
categorization judgements. This was primarily because, as difficulties in explaining
complex categorization may have indicated, none of these theories seem able to
cope with the knowledge rich environment in which people normally categorize.
When categorization is investigated in such an environment, it becomes apparent
that all categorization decisions are very context sensitive. This means that, for
example, while in the context of international competitions, "chess" might be
judged to be a member of the category "sport", it might be judged to be a
non-member in the context of a school P.E. lesson. Context does not only affect
the likelihood of atypical instances being included in the category, it also affects
typical instances. For example, the prototypical referent of "fruit" is "apple" or
"orange" but the prototypical referent of "fruit" in the context of "fruit for making
jam" is "raspberry", "strawberry" or "blackcurrant".
These contextual changes are relevant to the stability function of concepts. The
Classical View asserts that all contextual changes in goodness of example (GOE),
can be explained with reference to the procedural aspects of classification. Or, that
contextual effects can be explained in terms of changes in the characteristic
features of concepts. Thus, it is argued that context does not alter the
metaphysical aspect of concepts nor undermine conceptual stability per sa If this
is so, how is it that in some contexts a person will consider an item to be a
category member and in other contexts a non-member? If this does not challenge
conceptual stability it is unclear what could. It is also unclear how a Classicalist
could explain the occurrence of contradictory membership judgements in the same
individual at the same time. A possible explanation would be the assertion that the
characteristic features accessed in a given context have as much of a role in
determining the categorization decision as core features (such a position seems to
be proposed by Barsalou e.g. Barsalou, 1983). In this case, the Classical and
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prototype views seem difficult to distinguish, since the Classical View is effectively
abandoning the idea that membership is calculated on properties that are true of
all members. (Barsalou, 1982) has gone further than this, describing cases where
context independent (core) features can be "inhibited").
For the prototype views (Probabilistic and Exemplar Views), the problem of stability
is not so difficult to explain. The prototype views have always placed the onus of
accounting for stability outside the conceptual domain and rather, for example, in
the structure of the environment. In the case of context effects, the environment
has in some sense altered, and thus concepts reflect that change. As the
environment only changes in largely predictable and limited ways, boundaries are
set on conceptual change too, thus solving problems of conceptual constraints.
This argument, that the environment constrains concepts, while prima facie true, is
oversimplistic. As Quine has demonstrated in his famous "translation argument"
(Quine, 1960) any perceived event is highly complicated, and it remains a mystery
how people correctly select salient episodes as relevant. For example, the scene of
a dog rushing into a room to greet his master, carrying a toy in its mouth,
provides a context which could be said to constrain the the category concept
"TOY". Flow the relevant constraining information is selected from this complex
environmental scene is unknown. What seems certain, however, is that information
will be selected only after the scene has been "simplified" and interpreted through
our current conceptual structures (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Thus, to argue for
environmental constraints entails a certain circularity since the perception of that
environment is itself constrained by the concepts held.
Another problem for prototype theories is in explaining how contextual changes
are organized and represented. Given that we do have some knowledge of word
meaning out of context, and that contextually appropriate meanings can be quickly
supplied, there is clearly a great deal of information available. The simple
representational idea of computing similarity to a prototype may have to be altered
to deal with contextual change.
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The questions of context and conceptual representation seem inextricably bound
together. In this chapter I will consider the extent to which context effects dictate
a change in prototype theory. In section 2.2 possible explanations for contextual
change in GOE distributions are discussed, and a study of GOE in sentence
contexts reported. The implications of this study are discussed with reference to
the issue of conceptual representation. Section 2.3 concludes the chapter with a
discussion of the issues raised.
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2.2. Experiment 1
The Effect of Context on Reported Goodness
of Example in 11 Noun Categories
One of the biggest challenges to the adequacy of prototype theories as theories of
concepts is the well-attested fact that the perceived goodness of example of an
instance changes with context. What is not clear is the extent of variation in the
prototypicality distributions for the same category name in different contexts. It is
possible, for instance, that it is only the prototype of the category which changes
in context. As GOE is calculated with respect to how similar an instance is to the
prototype, then it should be possible to change the prototype of the category
while maintaining the stability of the GOE distribution. If this "refocusing"
hypothesis were accurate it would predict that contexts yielding the same
prototype would also yield the same GOE distributions: as GOE is, by definition,
computed relative to the prototype. The alternative hypothesis is that the whole
GOE distribution is generated anew in different contexts. In this case, contexts
having the same prototype need not have the same GOE distribution, as the whole
distribution is computed relative to the context.
Roth & Shoben (1983) report a number of experiments which address the question
of how context alters the GOE distribution. Firstly, they rule out the refocusing
explanation of context effects by showing that categories which have the same
prototype do not necessarily have the same GOE structure. Roth & Shoben devised
pairs of sentences which suggested the same prototypes but different second-best
examples. One context sentence suggested a typical instance as second-best
example, and the other an atypical instance as second-best example. As they had
predicted Roth & Shoben found that subjects would rate an instance as more
typical than another instance in one context, and less typical than that instance in
another. For example, subjects were presented with the sentences: (1) During the
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midmorning break the two secretaries gossiped as they drank the beverage; and
(2) Before starting his day the truck driver had the beverage and a donut at the
truck shop. Both sentences suggest "coffee" as the prototypical referent. Subjects
rate "tea" as more typical than "milk" for sentence (1), but, for sentence (2), "milk"
(a normally atypical example of "beverage") is rated as more typical than "tea".
Thus Roth & Shoben found that even when sentences suggest the same prototype
they do not necessarily have the same GOE distributions, in this way they were
able to rule out the refocusing hypothesis as an explanation of context effects.
Their findings also contradict an amended form of the refocusing hypothesis which
suggests that context alters the category prototype and also imposes a selection
restriction on a static GOE distribution. For example, the GOE norms in Rosch
(1975a) for the category "fruit" give the most typical exemplars as: "orange, apple,
banana, peach, pear...". The selection restriction hypothesis predicts that subjects
would report the same GOE distribution as that generated in a 'neutral' context
excluding misfitting exemplars. (Or, if it was appropriate in the context, subjects
would alter their prototype for the category before applying the selection
restriction). So for a context such as "The boy had to peel the fruit before he could
eat it" the selection restriction hypothesis predicts that subjects should give
"orange and banana" as the most typical exemplars (simply omitting "apple",
"peach" and "pear"). As Roth & Shoben have shown, however, it is not merely the
case that some contexts cause exemplars to be excluded, exemplars also change
places in the typicality distribution. In the "beverage" example, "tea" and "milk"
were both possible referents of the two context sentences, but their
representativeness was reversed from sentence 1 to sentence 2. Thus Roth &
Shoben have demonstrated that it is not only the focus, or the prototype, of a
category which alters with context, but the GOE distribution itself.
However, Roth & Shoben only studied the effect of context on category prototypes
and one typical and atypical exemplar. Could it be the case that the GOE
distribution is, in fact, relatively stable across contexts with only a few context
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relevant exemplars shifting in representativeness? In Experiment 1 the effect of
context on the entire GOE distribution will be considered.
In a recent paper Barsalou (1987) has suggested that a possible explanation of the
context effects demonstrated by Roth 81 Shoben is that a complex concept is being
formed during processing. Barsalou suggests it is this fact that makes the
distribution of the simple concept appear so unstable. So, for example, in
understanding sentences like "Wendy loved to ride the animal" and "Wendy loved
to milk the animal" subjects could be forming complex concepts of ride+animal and
milk+animal, respectively. Since the complex concepts formed in these instances
are different it is hardly surprising that the typicality of exemplars is also different.
If Barsalou's suggestion is correct and complex concepts are routinely made when
processing sentences of this type then a clear prediction follows. It should make
no difference to typicality ratings if key context words are presented as complex
concepts, or are presented as modifiers in other parts of the context sentence,
providing that the meaning of the two sentences does not change. Thus, if
Barsalou's suggestion is correct, the two sentences: (1) "The teenager had already
acquired some small articles of furniture of modern design", and (2) "The teenager
had already acquired some small articles of modern furniture of her own", would
be understood by forming the complex concept "modern furniture" in each case.
Although it would be expected that the linguistic form "modern furniture" might
make it easier to form the complex concept, it should not actually make any
difference to the typicality ratings given by subjects. This is because subjects will
have to have understood the sentence (and hence formed the concept) before
judging which items are typical of it.
In order to test this prediction context sentences for Experiment 1 were of three
forms. The first, 'simple' form was to act as a baseline control and included the
category name without the context modifying word e.g. "The teenager had already
acquired some small articles of furniture of her own". The second 'complicated'
form included a modifying word which was in a separate part of the sentence from
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the category name (as 1 above). In the third 'complex' form the modifying word
and the category name formed a complex concept (as 2 above).
The reasons for this study are threefold: firstly, to allow the scale of contextual
changes on typicality to be assessed; secondly, to investigate the effects of two
linguistic forms on typicality; and thirdly, to provide a source of accurate typicality
norms for specific context situations. This last reason enables experimental
performance in specific contexts to be compared with known typicality ratings for
that context as well as typicality ratings obtained in a 'neutral' context. The study
was carried out in a similar fashion to the collection of GOE norms by Rosch
(Rosch, 1975a). Distributions were collected for several categories by embedding
the category names in a number of sentences.
METHOD
Stimuli
The categories for which ratings were obtained were chosen from the concrete
noun categories documented by Rosch (1975a) and Uyeda & Mandler (1980). All
those categories used by Rosch, save the category "TOY" with which she
experienced problems, were selected. In addition, two categories from Uyeda 8t
Mandler were chosen. This resulted in a total of 11 categories, namely: FURNITURE,
FRUIT, VEHICLE, WEAPON, VEGETABLE, TOOL, BIRD, SPORT, CLOTHING, INSTRUMENT
and CLOTH.
Participants
Participants were 88 young people who were either psychology undergraduates or
youth hostellers. All participants were native English speakers. The sexes were
approximately equally represented in the sample. All those who took part in the
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study did so voluntarily.
Materials
Each category name was incorporated in a sentence such that the sentence
intuitively denoted either a typical or an atypical member of the category.
Sentences were largely adaptations of those used by Potter & Fauiconer (1979).
Additional sentences were adapted from common books for older children. The
sentences had the special characteristic of being renderable in three forms. In the
most complex form the noun is qualified by a prenominal adjective; e.g. "The
woman screamed "Help!" as she stared at the bloody weapon in his hand". The
second, "complicated", form contains a noun qualified by a adjective in a different
clause or sub-clause; e.g. "The woman screamed "It's bloody!' as she stared at the
weapon in his hand". The simple form omits the adjective from the sentence
altogether; e.g. "The woman screamed "Help!" as she stared at the weapon in his
hand". These formats are particularly useful for investigating the difference
between adjectival qualification and noun-noun combination, as they provide
appropriate semantic and linguistic controls.
Three sentence lists were designed such that each list contained all three forms of
sentence but only one form of each sentence. There were 24 sentences in each
list. (After the start of the experiment an additional 15 sentences were included in
each list in order to increase the proportion of atypical sentences, which was
found to be less than half). The sentences were typed on A4 sheets, spaced so
that subjects could write responses underneath each sentence. There were
approximately 11 sentences per page.
Procedure
Participants were informed that the purpose of the experiment was to obtain
general normative lists of the category members people thought of when they
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read the sentences. Participants were given a list of sentences (lists were assigned
randomly) and asked to write down the category member they thought best fit the
context of the sentence. They were given an example of how they might complete
the task. Participants were also asked to write down the exemplar they felt was
second-best, in order to increase the variance in responses. The participants task
was to produce an instance, rather than order a set of given instances, as it was
reasoned that the former, while less usual in experiments, would better reflect
many experimental situations which utilize implicit category decisions. Once the
task had been explained, the participants completed the questionnaires in their
own time. Each sentence contained only one category name, and the category
was always central to the meaning of the sentence. The category names were not
marked in the sentences as it was reasoned that this might distract from a holistic
reading of the sentences. Participants found it obvious which word was the
category name.
An average of 23 people rated each form of a sentence. As 15 sentences had been
added after the start of the experiment 20 of the 88 participants rated only these
15 sentences, in order to balance the number of people rating each sentence. As
before, each participant rated all sentence forms but only one form of each





Exemplars listed by the participants were collated into a production frequency list
for each sentence form. The prototypical exemplar was deemed to be the exemplar
cited by most people as the best exemplar. However, in the case where three
forms of a sentence shared an exemplar in their three most typical exemplars of
the category, that exemplar was deemed to be the prototype for all three forms.
This rule was adopted so that obviously similar distributions would not be
represented as suggesting different prototypes. If there was a draw between two
exemplars, the prototype was deemed to be that exemplar which was most often
listed as second-best choice as well. The typicality rating for the sentence was the
rating given to the prototype in the wide listings of Uyeda & Mandler. In the case
where the exemplar was not included in these norms, its position in them was
estimated using the longer listings of Rosch. If the word did not exist in either
source it was given a rating equal to the worst instance cited in Uyeda and
Mandler's list for that category.
A sentence was given the label "Typical" or "Atypical" according to whether its
prototype fell above or below the typicality rating of 2.5. (This is approximately half
way between the two extremes listed in Uyeda & Mandler's norms). In the case
where the typicality rating of a sentence lay between 2.3 and 2.7 inclusive, it was
given a label "Typical" or "Atypical" only if the two next most frequently cited
exemplars also fell on the same side of 2.5, otherwise it was deemed a borderline
case unsuitable for use in future experiments.
Eight sentences were excluded from the study as participants had misunderstood
the modifier, or thought the sentences odd, or, in the case of "instrument", had
found the category too unconstrained.
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Thirty-one sentences, each of three forms, were considered appropriate for further
investigations. The average typicality rating for Typical sentences was 1.5 and for
Atypical sentences was 4.7. The average sentence length was 13 words. The
complete listings of the sentences can be found in Appendix 1.
Change in Linguistic Structure
The normative distributions for 31 context sentences were examined to see if the
linguistic form of a sentence has an effect on the typicality of instances, when the
sense of the sentence remains the same. In particular, are distributions obtained
for categories with prenominal modifiers (in which the reader is thought to have
formed a complex concept) the same as distributions obtained for categories with
modifiers in separate clauses? If so, this could imply that complex concepts are
routinely constructed when understanding sentences, and that context effects are
explicable in terms of a person forming different complex concepts in different
contexts.
In order to address this question prototypes for complicated and complex sentence
forms were compared for each sentence. (It was not appropriate to compare the
whole distributions obtained for each sentence form. This was because many of
the less typical items had been named by only 1 subject, and were thus unreliable).
For 26 of the 31 sentences the prototypes were identical and the distributions
similar. 4 sentences had very similar prototypes e.g. the second-best exemplar in
one form, might be the best exemplar in the other. For only one sentence were the
prototypes for the two sentence forms different. This was for the sentence: "The
retriever brought back the (scavenger) bird that the hunter had seen (scavenging)".
The prototype for the complicated form is "pheasant" but for the complex form is
"vulture". An explanation for why this case is different from the others could be
that for most people "scavenger bird" is a single concept, that is to say, it has
become lexicalized. Thus, participants may already have a stored meaning for
"scavenger bird" in a way they do not for "modern furniture".
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The findings of Experiment 1 are consistent with Barsalou's idea that people may
be forming complex concepts when encountering categories in context. The fact
that changing the linguistic form of sentences in the way described does not
affect the typicality of exemplars gives credence to the idea that complex concepts
might be a simplified case of context effects. The different result in the case of
"scavenger bird" indicates that very different effects should be expected from
common complex concepts, the meanings of which people may already have
stored - see section 4:6 for further discussion of this process.
Restructuring, Refocusing or Restriction?
The normative distributions obtained in Experiment 1 illustrate that context does
alter the perceived typicality of instances of a category. Many context sentences
made normally atypical exemplars the prototypical referent. Even in cases where
sentences were judged to be typical, the instances included in the distributions,
and their ordering varied for different sentences in this study, and from the norms
documented by Uyeda & Mandler and Rosch. For instance, the prototype for
"weapon" in the sentence "The woman screamed "Help! / It's bloody!" as she
stared at the (bloody) weapon in his hand" was "knife". However, the prototype for
"weapon" in the sentence "Though Sam had it with him (in a harness) he hoped
that the (harnessed) weapon wouldn't be necessary" was "gun".
These results cannot be explained by the refocusing hypothesis as (like Roth &
Shoben) sentences suggesting the same prototypes were not equally suggestive of
other instances. For example the sentence: "Charles carefully disassembled and
cleaned the instrument he had found" suggested "trumpet" as prototypical, "flute"
as quite typical and "trombone" as less typical. The simple form of this sentence:
"Charles carefully cleaned the instrument he had found" was more suggestive of
"flute" than "trumpet", and "trombone" was not mentioned in this distribution.
Thus, even slight changes in meaning can alter the GOE distribution and those
alterations cannot be explained in terms of changing the focus of a fixed
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distribution.
The fact that the typicality of "flute" and "trumpet" reversed in different contexts
also rules out the selection restriction hypothesis. Items are not simply being
omitted, their typicality is changing and they are emerging elsewhere in the
distribution. This restructuring cannot simply be explained in terms of a slight
instability of typicality judgements over time, or between people, because in some
contexts items that are normally atypical category referents become prototypical
category referents. For example the sentence: "He won the fairground fruit in a
competition" most strongly suggests the atypical fruit "coconut" over "apple" and
"orange".
The results of this study confirm that the total GOE distribution is altered by
context, as was suggested by the results of Roth & Shoben (1983). The question
which now has to be answered is whether these changes reflect conceptual
changes. Could the change in the typicality distribution be a result of inference
processes, or combination processes, that occur after the concept has been
accessed? Or does the change in typicality imply that there are no stable prototype
structures to concepts? These questions emphasize the importance of assessing
whether contextual restructuring occurs at a conceptual level on the one hand, or
an inferential level on the other. As these norms provide information about which
category instances are contextually appropriate in a number of different contexts it
is now possible to compare the explanatory power of context-dependent
prototypes with those obtained when context is unspecified.
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2.3. Is Similarity Enough?
Experiment 1 served to clarify the fact that the typicality structure of a category is
radically altered by changing the context in which the category name occurs.
Changes in the linguistic structure of a sentence (whether the noun was qualified
prenominally, or by a word in a different clause) did not cause a change in
typicality ratings. This is consonant with the view that context effects may be the
result of the combination of the key concepts in a sentence. A further study (see
Appendix 2) sought to discover whether contextual changes are a result of
changes at a conceptual level or a process of post-access inference. Neither
Rosch's prototypes or the context-appropriate prototypes of Experiment 1 were
able to predict performance on a Stroop task in this experiment. In this case, the
wide range of within and between subject variation suggests that context has
wider ranging effects than can be accounted for in terms of changes in a
goodness of example distribution. In Experiment 1, the goodness of example
distribution was found to be completely altered by context, disallowing a small
amendment to save the prototype views. If similarity to a prototype (even a
context-appropriate prototype) is not sufficient to explain context effects then
prototype theory cannot be an adequate theory of concepts.
There is a growing consensus that similarity to a prototype cannot adequately
account for conceptual structure. The notion that it is similarity which provides
conceptual coherence is appealing because it seems intuitively obvious that things
are grouped together in categories because they are fundamentally the same. This
intuition is supported to some extent by the perceptual similarity of basic level
categories. Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson & Boyes-Braem (1976) found that suitably
scaled and oriented drawings of members of basic level categories (e.g. different
sorts of chair) when superimposed had a high degree of overlap, and a discernable
(chair) shape. Neisser (1987) has pointed out that basic level categories also have
a high level of functional similarity. We "sit on" rocking chairs, sag bags, kitchen
chairs and umpire chairs; we "put things (we want to interact with) on" coffee
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tables, kitchen tables, dining tables, pasting tables. Similarity has thus provided a
suitable explanation for the salience of the basic level, and this success has made
plausible the theory that it is similarity that gives concepts, in general, coherence.
Many authors are now pointing out the limitations of similarity as a complete
account of conceptual coherence. Firstly, similarity weightings cannot represent
relations between concepts. For example, taxonomic relations between concepts
cannot be captured by similarity information. Secondly, perceptual similarity does
not always aid classification, as Robert McCauley (1987) has pointed out: "whales
are not fish, spiders are not insects, and palm trees are grasses". In these cases
perceptual similarity has to be ignored in order to make a correct classification.
However, the very fact that people find these cases difficult to classify shows that
perceptual similarity plays some role in categorization. Correct classification of
these items occurs when people pay attention to less salient attributes. As a
similarity model can provide no explanation for favouring an item's less salient
attributes, it cannot explain conceptual structure. It is an important point that
having a well-defined category does not solve the problem of coherence either. A
category might be defined as: "things that weigh more than a ton which are not
blue", this is well-defined, but it is not coherent.
The crucial question is how do people know which attributes are relevant in a
given categorization scenario? Any two items can be arbitrarily similar or dissimilar
depending on which attributes are compared. For instance, a person might say that
"whale" is a member of the category "fish" if they were concentrating on attributes
such as "lives in the sea", "eats plankton", and its perceptual similarity to other
items e.g. "is like a shark". If a person concentrated on other attributes such as "is
warm blooded", "breathes air" and "has a blowhole", "whale" would be categorized
as more similar to mammals than to fish. Thus similarity is not an explanation of
categorization, but a result of which attributes are chosen for comparison. This
point is reiterated in Barsalou's (1983) finding that ad hoc categories have a
similarity gradient although there is no a priori reason to think the category
members are more similar to each other than to non-members. For example items
such as "jewellery, coat, photograph, child, teddy bear, bank book" do not seem to
form a cohesive category until one is given the category name "Things to take
from a burning house". This information clarifies which attributes are important in
this context.
Thus it is not overall similarity between objects that is the important factor in
category structure, but similarity computed over the relevant attributes. Which
attributes are relevant for a given category will change with the context in which it
is used, and with the purpose it serves. What holds a category together is the
underlying processes responsible for selecting the appropriate attributes. Thus, the
notion of similarity to a prototype is no longer doing the work in explaining
category cohesion.
Similarity may, in fact, be a by-product of categorization. Items may appear to be
similar simply by virtue of the fact that they have been classified as members of a
category. Thus, similarity may not explain why an item is classified as a member of
a category, it may be the result of such a classification. The fact that category
membership does lead to an increase in perceived similarity within groups, and
perceived dissimilarity between groups, is a well known effect. For example, if
subjects are presented with a series of coins each increasing in size by a standard
amount, subjects will judge the difference between any two coins to be greater if
those coins are on the boundary of an arbitrarily labelled group. Thus, simply
drawing a line between the 4th and 5th coins, and labelling the first four coins "A"
and the second four "B", increases the perceived similarity of the coins within
groups "A" and "B", and increases the perceived difference between "A" and "B"
(Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963).
Medin & Watenmaker (1987) have also argued that similarity may be a by-product
of conceptual coherence rather than its determinant. They use the example that
winning basketball teams have in common the fact that they all score more points
than their opponents. In order to explain why the teams score more points one
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must turn to more basic principles. In the same way as scoring more points at
basketball is a by-product of being a winning team, Medin & Watenmaker argue
that similarity may be a by-product of category membership.
If similarity is not an adequate solution to category coherence what can replace it?
How do people select which attributes are relevant in a given situation? In the next
chapter I report an investigation of the integration of context information during
sentence reading. I address the question of how our understanding of a category
is affected by the context which precedes it. By answering the question of when
people correctly select context relevant attributes when processing categories in




THE MEANING OF NOUN PHRASES
3.1. Category Coherence
Conceptual coherence is thought to be important for two reasons. Firstly, it is
thought that coherence holds a clue to meaning. It is argued that items classified
as members of a category "belong together" independently of that classification.
Evidence for this view is provided by the fact that: (i) children will spontaneously
group these items together when asked to sort items into piles, and (ii) category
members often seem to be constrained ecologically, for example, they may afford
the same properties. Thus, it is thought that if the underlying representational
commonalities could be worked out (definitionalists), or the appropriate features
and their weightings could be discovered (prototype theorists), then the meaning
of category words would be clear. The second reason that coherence is thought to
be important is that it can provide constraints on reference. It is argued that even
if the meaning of category words is not fully known, and cannot be worked out,
coherence at least limits the meaning of the category name. It is firmly believed
that words must have a limited application, otherwise, it is assumed, effective
communication would become impossible.
In order to explain how people maintain coherent categories across many different
contexts it is important to investigate, in detail, the changes and modifications
people make as a result of alterations in context. For instance, if changes as a
result of context are made after a referent has been retrieved then it might be
expected that the root of coherence is conceptual. This is because the same
concept is accessed on ail occasions, and any modifications are made on the
same, underlying, basic units. The fact that concepts which occur in many contexts
seem coherent can be explained by the fact that the same concept is at the root
of all more developed meanings. Hence, it could be argued that concepts must
provide "rules", or means by which such modifications can be constrained.
The converse of this argument would apply if it were found that context influences
which concept is accessed. In this case, what provides category coherence across
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different contexts cannot be the conceptual representation as such. The solution to
coherence must be provided by relations; that is, in terms of what unites different
representations accessed in different contexts. Now the burden of explaining
coherence is removed from a conceptual level to a level of relations between
concepts.
The question I would like to raise is whether category coherence necessarily
constrains reference. It has already been noted that many arbitrary groups of items
can form coherent "ad hoc categories". This is because coherence is not a function
of the items being classified. It seems that there may be nothing intrinsic to the
items that makes the category coherent, or gives meaning to the word that names
them. Both meaning and coherence are imposed on categories by people (Medin &
Watenmaker, 1987). This leads me to the conclusion that categories are only
constrained by people's ability to relate things together. I am not arguing that the
environment can place no constraints on meaning, but that those constraints
operate on people, not on words.
Barsalou's study of ad hoc categorization shows that coherence does not exist
independently of categorization. It is only once a categorization has been made
that coherence emerges. This is an important point as it leads to the conclusion
that meaning and coherence do not exist independently of people: it is something
imposed on the environment. Thus it can be concluded that meaning is primarily
constrained from within. This means that a solution to the problem of coherence
cannot be found extensionally, it must be found in the intensions of words, or
theories concerning them.
The question that remains is whether concepts have an intensional structure which
can provide conceptual coherence. One possible means to answer this question is
to assess whether context exerts an influence at the conceptual level.
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3.2. Experiment 2
On-line Adjectival Modification of Nouns
Potter & Faulconer (1979) designed an experimental paradigm capable of teasing
apart whether context has an effect at the encoding or retrieval stage. They
compared recognition latencies for pictures which were typical of a noun with
pictures modified to fit the sentence context. For example, the time taken to
recognize that a picture of a house matched an object in the sentence: "It was
already getting late when the man first saw the burning house ahead of him" was
compared with the time taken to recognize that a picture of a burning house
matched the sentence. It was argued that the picture of a house (unmodified) is
more typical than the picture of a house on fire (modified), this was supported by
the short decision latencies for typical probes in sentences without a prenominal
adjective. Thus, subjects should be able to identify typical probes more rapidly
than modified probes if they are accessing the meaning of "house" without
reference to previous context. If, on the contrary, subjects find it easier to
recognize a picture of a "burning house" then context is already having an effect at
the moment the picture test is given.
Potter & Faulconer (1979) compared responses to probes presented immediately
after the target noun, with those presented at the end of the sentence. They found
that for sentences in which the noun was modified by a prenominal adjective,
subjects responded more quickly to modified pictures than typical pictures.
Moreover, this result did not change for probes presented immediately after the
target noun. This supports the proposition that word meaning is retrieved with
reference to the preceding context, or constructed online in a contextually
appropriate way.
One possible problem with the interpretation of this experiment is that it is unclear
that subjects are matching the picture with a meaning derived from the sentence
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in each case. When presented with a picture probe "burning house" subjects may
be able to make a quick match with the overall meaning of the sentence. When
presented with the probe "house" subjects may have an initial mismatch with the
meaning of the sentence as a whole, but use the strategy of echoing the sentence,
thus finding a phonetic match with "house". This is possible because the phonetic
recoding of pictures of common items is automatic (Snodgras & McClure, 1975;
Paivio, 1971). The possibility of the introduction of this kind of strategy is sufficient
to explain the longer response times for typical probes in the context of a
sentence.
This potential problem can be circumvented by asking subjects to make a match
between phonetically dissimilar probes and nouns. This can be achieved by asking
subjects to make category judgements. The parallel of Potter & Faulconer's task
would involve subjects judging whether a typical instance, or a modified typical
instance, matched a category noun in a context sentence. For example, subjects
presented with the sentence "'You found it' said Andy, noticing the broken tool in
the workshop" would be probed by a typical (unmodified) picture "hammer", or a
modified picture "broken hammer". The task would be to judge whether "hammer"
matched an object in the sentence, in this case "tool". In this experiment a
phonetic strategy could not work, and any matching must now be in terms of
semantics.
The question addressed by Experiment 2 is how Potter & Faulconer's result
transfers to decisions about category reference. When subjects are presented with
a category name in a sentence context suggesting a typical exemplar do subjects
find it easier to recognize a picture of a typical exemplar, or of an appropriately
modified exemplar? This paradigm allows the assessment of whether category
modification is immediate and automatic (i.e. outwith the requirements of the task)
by comparing the response latencies to unmodified and modified probes when
they are presented immediately after the occurance of the noun, or delayed until




The design and procedure followed Potter & Faulconer (1979) save that only
prenominal adjectival modification was studied. The design was mixed, the
independent variables were probe type and position of probe. Probe type was the
within subjects factor and had three levels: pictures that matched an object in the
sentence but not the meaning of the sentence as a whole, pictures that matched
both an object in the sentence and the meaning of the sentence as a whole, and
filler items where the picture and sentence were unrelated. Position of the probe
was the between subjects factor and had two levels: immediate - immediately
after the mention of the object in the sentence, and delayed - after the end of the
sentence. The dependent variable was the decision time in response to the picture
probe.
Sentences were presented in a random order, the same recording being used for
the immediate and delayed probe conditions to minimize differences between
conditions. All subjects used their dominant hand for the "Yes" response button.
Subjects
Subjects were sixteen volunteers of similar educational background. All subjects
were fluent English speakers. None of the men or women who took part in the
experiment had participated in previous experiments, and all subjects were naive to
the purposes of the experiment.
Stimuli
Thirty "complex" sentences from Experiment 1, plus 6 practice sentences were
recorded by a competent reader. Each sentence was preceded by the word "Ready"
and the beginning of the sentences were separated by 15s. Two copies of the tape
were made. On one copy pulses were recorded on a second channel directly after
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the noun (initial), on the other copy pulses were recorded on a second channel
directly after the final word of the sentence (final).
For each sentence a corresponding slide was produced such that 20 sentences
were paired with slides that were totally unrelated to them. The remaining 10
target sentences were paired with two corresponding slides; one was a typical
match to an object in the sentence (as determined by Experiment 1), the second
was a picture of the same object appropriately modified to fit the sentence
context. For example, the target sentence "Helen put it aside because she was in a
hurry, even though the half-eaten fruit appealed to her" was paired with (i) a
picture of an apple and (ii) a picture of a half-eaten apple. All subjects were
presented with items from both of these target conditions although each subject
was only presented with one picture from a particular pair, i.e. apple or half-eaten
apple Slides were photographs of simple colour drawings typically taken from
children's alphabet books and children's colour dictionaries. (A list of target
sentences and pictures is given in Appendix 3).
A test sheet was prepared which listed the 30 target nouns the subject had heard
in the sentences. Each noun was preceded with a space in which the subject could
write the adjective that had preceded it. The nouns were typed on an A4 sheet in a
random order in two columns of 15.
Apparatus
A reel-to-reel tape recorder with in-built pulse mechanism was used. This was
connected to a Kodak carousel slide projector via a standard t-scope. The pulse on
the tape signalled a ms timer to start and the t-scope to open the projector
shutter to display the slide for 1 sec. The carousel then automatically moved the
next slide into position. The timer stopped when the subject pressed the "Yes" or
"No" response button, and was reset manually by the experimenter.
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Procedure
Each subject was tested in one experimental session which lasted approximately
30 min. Subjects were seated behind a table on which the projector was mounted,
approximately 3m away from a blank wall onto which the image was projected.
The approximate size of the projected image was 1m2. Subjects were given the
response keys, the bigger "Yes" button they held in their dominant hand, the
smaller "No" button in their other (typically left) hand. Subjects were told that their
task was to decide if the picture displayed was a picture of an object in the
sentence, regardless of the other information in the sentence or the meaning of
the sentence as a whole. Subjects in the initial condition were also informed that
at the point of picture onset they would already have heard all the information
necessary to make a correct decision. This was to discourage subjects from
waiting until the sentence had been completed before making a response. The task
was made clear by example. The subject was then presented with six practice
trials with feedback, during which they were encouraged to answer as quickly and
as accurately as possible. The subject had an opportunity to ask any questions
after the practice before moving on to the experimental session of 30 trials.
After the experimental session was completed subjects were given a surprise recall
task. Subjects were presented with the 30 nouns from the experiment and asked to
write down as many prenominal adjectives as they could remember. Subjects
completed the recall sheets in their own time. As recall scores were often very
low, it was stressed to the subjects that the recall test was simply to provide a
measure of how much attention they had actually been paying to the sentences as
a whole. It was emphasised that it had not been necessary to attend to the whole
sentence in order to do the task as they had been asked, and thus a low recall




The average error rate was 4.6% (6.9% for positive probes and 3.4% for negative
probes). The tendency towards higher error rates for positive probes (also reported
by Potter & Faulconer) shows that subjects used strict criteria: being more likely to
reject a match mistakenly, than to make one mistakenly. A comparison of the mean
error rates presented in Table 1 shows that more errors were made in the initial
condition (5.8%) than in the final condition (3.3%). This difference is largely due to
more wrong "Yes" responses to filler items in the initial condition, and may be a
result of task pressures (for instance the infrequency of "Yes" answers may lead
subjects to predict when they are likely to occur). Errors were analysed by fitting
error rate to a 2 X 3 probe position (initial and final) X probe type (typical, atypical
and filler) logistic model. Thus, proportions of right and wrong answers were
compared with a binomial distribution. No main effects or interactions were
significant (Chi squared probe position = 3.74, df = 4; Chi squared probe type =
2.65, df = 3; Chi squared interaction = 0.91, df=2). All errors were excluded from
further analysis. As "No" responses were included in the experiment only as filler
items, so that there would be no incentive to combine the adjective and noun in
the task, all "No" responses were also excluded from the analysis. Decision times
for "Yes" responses were analysed in a 2 X 2 (probe type X probe position) mixed
ANOVA. Average response times and error rates for each condition are presented
in Table 1.
Analysis of variance showed that there was a significant main effect of probe
position (F(1,68) = 4.39, p < 0.05), indicating that decision times were significantly
faster overall when the probe was presented at the end of the sentence. This may
be partly explained by interference between the remainder of the sentence being
read while subjects were making a decision in the initial condition. Post-hoc
t-tests revealed that subjects responded significantly faster when the unmodified
probe was in the final position (t = 2.088, df = 70, p < 0.025), but that there was
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no difference for modified probes (t = 1.351, df = 70) - see Graph 1. This result is
due to the fact that subjects take substantially longer to respond to unmodified
probes in the initial condition. The fact that no significant difference was found for
modified probes in the final condition may be a result of responses in this
condition reaching a floor. This hypothesis is supported by the comparatively low
standard deviations found in this condition - see Table 1. The main effect of probe
type did not reach significance (F(1,68) = 3.70), this was probably the result of the
large standard deviations observed in the data. Neither was there a significant
interaction between probe type and probe position (F(1,68) = 1.47).





























Experiment 2: Average decision times (in ms) of
subjects to colour slides which matched (i) only
nouns (unmodified), and (ii) nouns and adjectives
(modified), in auditory presentation. Decision
times are for presentation of the slide
immediately after the noun (initial) and at the
end of the sentence (final). % proportion of














Decision speeds (in ms) for "Yes" responses to unmodified
and modified probes in initial and final positions.
These results confirm the main finding of Potter & Faulconer that subjects have
little difficulty matching the modified picture to the category name as it appears in
context. Subjects are able to make this match immediately after the presentation
of the category name.
Materials Analysis
It was not feasible to perform an ad hoc materials analysis for Experiment 2 due to
the small number of repetitions of each item, the fact that order was not random
across items, and the presence of a between subjects factor across relevant
comparisons. The average response times for each item in the Initial and Final
conditions are presented in Graph 2. The items are presented in pairs, "hammer"
then "broken hammer", for ease of comparison. It should be noted that different
subjects judged each member of the pair (e.g. "hammer" and "broken hammer"),
and different subjects judged the same item in the Initial and Final conditions. Thus
each point in the quadruple for "hammer" and "broken hammer" was contributed by
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a different group of subjects. Thus, any apparent differences between items may
simply be due to subject differences.
Despite these difficulties, inspection of the graph reveals a few trends. For all
items, decisions in the Final condition were faster than decisions in the Inital
condition. In general, decisions in the Final condition follow the same pattern as
decisions in the Initial condition, which agrees with the results reported earlier -
see Table 1. As can also be seen from Graph 2 there is considerable variation
between items with respect to the difference in responses in the Initial and Final
condition, and the relative difference being presented with a modified probe made.
All these variations may be caused by between subject factors, or order effects, as
outlined above. In Graph 2, no individual item stands out as an exceptional case.
Recall
Subjects were unexpectedly given a list of nouns at the end of the experiment and
asked to supply the relevant adjectives. The recall scores were analysed by fitting
the proportion of correctly recalled adjectives to a 2 X 3 probe position X probe
type logistic model. The analysis revealed that the main effect of probe position
was not significant (Chi squared = 0.58, df = 1). There was a significant main effect
of probe type (Chi squared = 105.12, df = 2, p < 0.001) and the interaction term
was also significant (Chi squared = 105.88, df = 3, p < 0.001). The significant
interaction is a result of recall scores for fillers improving in the final condition,
while recall scores for modified and unmodified probes were slightly worse in this
condition. The recall scores are summarised in Table 2.
Subjects report, and the results demonstrate, that it is easier to remember
adjectives for nouns if you have seen a picture of that noun. This is shown in
Table 2 where recall scores for unmodified and modified probes (60% and 72%)
were higher than recall scores for filler items (19%) which did not have a matching
picture. Recall scores for modified probes were highest, showing that subjects
found it easiest to remember the appropriate adjectives when shown a picture
65
GRAPH 2





which incorporated adjectival qualification. These results are in keeping with the
findings of Potter & Faulconer who point out that they can be explained in terms
of levels of processing. Thus, the more processing a stimulus is given the more
permanent the memory trace laid down by it, and so the easier it is to recall.
Contrary to that reported by Potter & Faulconer, in this experiment the position of
the probe had no significant effect on recall scores (33% vs 37%).
DISCUSSION
Experiment 2 demonstrated that context is taken into account at a very early stage
when making category decisions. There are, however, two possible explanations
that must be discounted before it can be asserted that context has as effect on
the retrieval of exemplars: the overall matching explanation, and the possibility of
swift post-access modification. Each of these alternatives will be discussed in
depth below.
Firstly, the results of Experiment 2 can be explained in terms of an overall
matching strategy. That is, modified pictures matched the meaning of the sentence
twice: one match with the noun, and one with the adjective. So, for example, the
picture "half-eaten apple" matches the adjective "half-eaten" as well as the
category "fruit". Similarly, the picture "broken hammer" matches the adjective
"broken" as well as the category "tool". Thus, the advantages of modified over
unmodified probes could be explained by saying subjects responded most quickly
to the picture that most matched the sentence, even although subjects were
instructed to ignore the sentence context, and Potter & Faulconer found no
advantage for modified probes where the adjective occurred in the clause prior to
the noun. The fact that there was no significant difference between modified and
unmodified probes in the final condition, cannot be taken as clear evidence against
the use of such a strategy because of the possibility that responses to modified
probes reached a floor in this condition. In order to completely rule out an overall
matching strategy, probes would have to be constructed in such a way that the
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modifier was not visually represented in the probe independently from the noun.
Unmodified Modified Fillers
Initial 62% 75% 16% 33%
Final 58% 70% 23% 37%
60% 72% 19% 35%
Table 2
Experiment 2: The percentage of matching adjectives
recalled when presented with nouns, displayed as a
function of probe type and probe position during
exposure.
A second possible problem with the interpretation of these results is the fact that
context may not have been involved in the retrieval of an exemplar, as the
exemplar suggested by each condition was the most typical category member.
Since there are good reasons to assume that all possible modifications (half-eaten,
broken, hanging, harnessed etc.) are not pre-stored, it is possible that the
modification required by the context can be quickly achieved after retrieval -
quickly enough to give modified instances a quicker response latency in the initial
stage. Or, as seems more likely, given the possibility of an overall matching
strategy, it is possible that the most typical exemplar (e.g. hammer) was retrieved
in both conditions, and that the advantage in the modified condition was solely
due to the fact that the picture also provided a good match for the adjective
"broken".
Before it can be asserted that context affects the immediate selection of
exemplars, it must be demonstrated that modified probes have an advantage over
typical probes where the modifier does not match the picture independently from
the noun. In addition, the selection of the appropriate category member in the
modified condition should be context dependent. That is, the context sentence
should suggest an atypical exemplar which would not be routinely accessed in the
presence of the category name.
68
3.3. Experiment 3
To What Do Modified Categories Refer?
Introduction
How does context affect people's understanding of category referents in on-line
processing? Are people quicker to recognise an atypical referent of the sentence,
or does the category name activate a fixed prototype in on-line processing
regardless of context? These are the questions that Experiment 3 is designed to
answer. Following closely from Experiment 2, this experiment considers category
reference in sentences suggesting atypical referents. The possibility of an overall
matching strategy being used in this experiment is ruled out in this task because
the adjective is not visually represented in the probe picture independently from
the noun (Note 6).
METHOD
Design
The design was identical to that in Experiment 2 save that unmodified instances
were replaced with pictures of the category prototype, and modified instances with
pictures of the atypical referent. E.g. for the sentence: "He won the fairground fruit
in a competition" the prototype for FRUIT is "apple" whereas the context modified
referent is, the normally atypical instance, "coconut". Information about prototypes
and context specific referents was found in Rosch (1975a), Uyeda & Mandler (1980)
and Experiment 1.
Subjects
Sixteen new subjects participated in this experiment none of whom had
participated in any previous experiments. One subject was excluded from the study
as she only gave 4 "Yes" responses; this subject was replaced.
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Stimuli
Stimuli were prepared in an identical way to Experiment 2. A new recording was
made of 30 sentences and 6 practice sentences. The 10 target sentences all
suggested atypical referents and were the same as those used in the experiment
reported in Appendix 2. (A list of the target sentences used, and their typical and
atypical referents can be found in Appendix 4). Filler sentences and target
sentences from Experiment 2 were used as filler sentences in Experiment 3. Thus
the filler sentences were of a similar construction to the target sentences, but
were not paired with matching pictures.
A test sheet was also prepared as in Experiment 2. The apparatus and procedure
were identical to those used previously.
RESULTS
Decision Times
The average error rate was 7.1% (12.5% for positive probes and 4.4% for negative
probes). The error rate for positive probes was double that found in Experiment 2.
This indicates that subjects found this task more difficult. A 2 X 3 probe position X
probe type logistic model was fitted to the data. Analysis revealed that there was
no difference between errors in the initial condition (6.2%) and final condition
(7.9%) (Chi squared = 1.2, df = 1). There was a significant main effect of probe type
(Chi squared = 12.21, df = 2, p < 0.01), and a significant interaction (Chi squared =
13.46, df = 3, p < 0.01). This shows that subjects made significantly more errors
when presented with a typical probe in the initial position. This is consistent with
the long decision times for probes in this condition, showing that subjects found it
difficult to reconcile a typical exemplar with the atypical context. All errors and
"No" responses (filler probes) were excluded from further analysis. Decision times
for "Yes" responses were analysed in a 2 X 2 (probe type X probe position) mixed
ANOVA. Average response times and error rates for each condition are presented
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in Table 3.
There was a significant main effect of probe position such that decision times
were significantly faster when the probe was presented at the end of the sentence
(F( 1,64) = 10.17, p < 0.01). As in Experiment 2 this difference may be partly
explicable in terms of an interference effect in the initial condition. Post-hoc
t-tests revealed that subjects responded significantly faster to both probe types in
the final position (typical: t = 1.986, df = 66, p < 0.05, atypical: t = 3.138, df = 66, p
< 0.005), but that subjects responded fastest when the probe was an atypical
referent (t = 1.726, df = 34, p < 0.05). As well as high error rates for target items
in the initial condition there were very high standard deviations, so although the
MS for the main effect of probe position was higher than in Experiment 2, the
variance was also much higher. Thus, the main effect of probe type on decision
time did not reach significance (F(1,64) = 1.57), and there was no significant
interaction (F(1,64) = 0.15).
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Experiment 3: Average decision times (in ms) of
subjects to colour slides which (i) matched the
typical category referent, and (ii) matched an
atypical referent which was context appropriate.
Decision times are for presentation of the slide
immediately after the noun (initial) and at the end of
the sentence (final). % proportion of errors per















Decision speeds (in ms) for "Yes" responses to typical
and atypical context relevant probes in initial and final
positions.
Thus, subjects responded most quickly when presented with a context relevant
probe at the end of the sentence - see Graph 3. In the initial condition subjects
respond more slowly to both typical and atypical probes than in Experiment 2.
This, in conjunction with the high error rates and standard deviations,
demonstrates that subjects found this task more difficult. It seems that context
relevant exemplars have enough influence to offset the normal advantage of
typical instances over atypical instances in categorization decisions. Thus it seems
that the subjects took the same amount of time to ignore the conflicting context
information for the typical exemplar, as to retrieve the atypical exemplar. When the
probe was presented in the final condition context had a stronger effect that
typicality. This might suggest that the influence of context increases over time to a
greater extent than the influence of typicality.
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Materials Analysis
A similar procedure for investigating materials effects to that used in Experiment 2
was adopted here, since the same conditions apply to both.
Inspection of Graph 4 shows that, as in Experiment 2, decisions times are faster
for items in the Final condition. One exception to this is for the item "carrots"
which is recognised more quickly in the Initial condition. In general, there is a lot
of variation in responses and no clear indication that Inital and Final conditions
mirror each other, as found in Experiment 2. This may reflect increases in variation
when people judge less typical items.
Recall
Subjects were unexpectedly given a list of nouns at the end of the experiment and
asked to supply the relevant adjectives. Recall scores were fitted to a 2 X 3 probe
position X probe type logistic model. The main effect of probe position was not
significant (Chi squared = 0.53, df = 1). There was a significant main effect of probe
type (Chi squared = 13.24, df = 2, p < 0.01) and a significant probe position X
probe type interaction (Chi squared = 13.71, df = 3, p < 0.01). The interaction is
different from that found for recall scores in Experiment 2, and seems to be
reflecting the fact that subjects recall a higher percentage of adjectives for typical
probes in the initial condition, and for atypical probes in the final condition. The
recall scores are summarised in Table 4.
The results for filler items are the same as those found in Experiment 2. Modified
and unmodified probes had a smaller effect on recall scores in this experiment.
The higher recall scores in Experiment 2 could be explained by the fact that the
category name "tool" was a good recall cue for the exemplar "hammer", since it is
a typical exemplar. In turn, "hammer" then served as an excellent recall cue for the
probe picture, from which the adjective "broken" could be inferred. Since adjectives
were not visually encoded in the picture probes in Experiment 3, it is unlikely that
73
GRAPH 4
Response times for typical and atypical Items in the Initial and Pinal conditions





























subjects inferred the adjective in this case. This could account for the lower recall
rates for typical (unmodified) instances in Experiment 3. The fact that category
names would not provide such good recall cues for atypical (modified) instances
could explain why these recall scores were lower. Analysis of the recall scores for
Experiment 3 provides some evidence that it is easier to remember adjectives for
nouns you have seen a picture of. There is also a tentative suggestion that typical
instances are more memorable when presented in the initial condition, whereas
atypical instances are more memorable for the final condition. As in Experiment 2,





Initial 48% 35% 17% 25%
Final
|
22% 42% 26% 28%
1
1 35% 39% 21% 26%
Table 4
Experiment 2: The percentage of matching adjectives
recalled when presented with nouns, as a function of
probe type and probe position during exposure.There were
no probe matches for filler items.
Discussion and Reanalysis
In Experiment 2 the only significant differences between the modified and
unmodified probes was when subjects responded significantly faster to the
modified probe in the initial condition. In this experiment, the only significant
difference between probes occurred when subjects responded fastest to the
modified probe in the final condition. In both experiments the fastest response
times are for the modified probe in the final condition, and the slowest response
times are for unmodified probes in the initial condition. One possible explanation
for the advantage of modified probes in the final condition in Experiment 3 is the
fact that more context information was present in the target sentences after the
occurrence of the target noun in this case. This was due to the constraints of
sentence construction, in conjunction with the fact that it is more difficult to make
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a sentence suggestive of an atypical exemplar than a typical one. Hence, more
context information had to be included in the target sentences of Experiment 3. It
was assumed that this additional context information would not change which
exemplar best fit the category in the context, as the extra information was always
consistent with the adjective-noun pair. Barsalou's idea of complex concept
formation in all contexts, consonant with the results of Experiment 1, lends some
support to this assumption (Note 7).
































Experiment 3: Average decision times (in ms) of
subjects to colour slides which (i) matched the
typical category referent, and (ii) matched an
atypical referent which was context appropriate.
Decision times are for presentation of the slide
immediately after the noun (initial) and at the end of
the sentence (final).
However, in order to assess the possible biasing effects of context information
included after the noun, a small normative study was done. Fifteen new subjects
were given a list of the 10 partially completed target sentences. Like Experiment 1,
they were asked to provide a best fit, and second best fit category instance for the
partially completed sentences. The formation of these norms provided the context
appropriate exemplar from the information available to the subject at the
occurrence of an initial probe. It was found that 4 sentences may have suggested
different referents (see Appendix 4) at the point of the occurrence of the noun,
while all other sentences suggested the same referent at this point as at the end
of the sentence. The responses for those sentences suggesting different referents
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were excluded, and the data reanalysed as before. There was no difference
between these ANOVA results and the ANOVA results for the whole data set: only
the main effect of probe position was significant (F(1,38) = 6.36, p < 0.025). The
only difference between the analyses is that post-hoc t-tests showed no
significant difference between typical and atypical probes in the final condition (t =
0.211, df = 20). This result suggests that such a difference may have been solely
due to the integration of context material in the final condition, which appeared at
the end of the sentence. The means and standard deviations for sentences
suggesting the same exemplars at the initial and final probes are presented in
Table 5. Thus, it can be concluded that in Experiment 3, subjects responded equally
quickly to typical and atypical probes, but much faster to probes presented at the
end of the sentence. Like the results reported for Experiment 2 the longest
response latencies were for the unmodified (typical) probe in the initial condition.
DISCUSSION
What has clearly emerged from these experiments is that context is automatically
taken into account even in tasks where subjects are instructed not to do so.
Experiment 3 has shown that the influence of context cannot be explained in terms
of an overall matching strategy. It has also demonstrated that context is involved
in the retrieval of category exemplars, as this task required the integration of
context information as a prerequisite for making the correct match quickly.
The surprising fact that has emerged from the experiments is that relatedness
appears to have no effect on categorization decisions, when the qualifying
information is not represented independently (as in Experiment 3). The atypical,
context-relevant exemplar, is matched as quickly as the category prototype, even
when the probe is presented immediately after the target word. The data from
experiments 2 & 3 seems best explained by arguing that current contextual
appropriateness is at least as important as previously learned appropriateness
which typicality represents. (This notion could be explored further by comparing
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how subjects respond to atypical items that are contextually inappropriate, and
typical items that are appropriate in context). The clear result that emerges from
these experiments is that context is integrated immediately a word is read, and is
involved in selecting a category referent.
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3.4. Context and Theories
Experiment 3 clearly demonstrated that context influences the understanding of a
category term, and that that influence cannot be ascribed to a post-access period.
This conclusion makes it unlikely that coherence is a result of conceptual
representation per se The alternative view, which is consistent with immediate
contextual modification, states that coherence is a result of the relations between
concepts that are computed relative to context.
Medin & Watenmaker (1987) argue that people not only notice the correlational
structure of the world (that fins and gills go together), but they also notice the
reasons behind such correlations (survival in an aquatic environment). This kind of
processing can also be used to explain social categorization phenomena like
illusory correlation. Hamilton & Gifford (1976) found that people wrongly infer that
two unusual events or stimuli which co-occur are causally related. Moreover,
people maintain beliefs supporting that connection over time.
Explaining coherence in terms of theories does not completely solve the problem
of context effects. This is because the selection of a theory in a particular situation
will be largely context dependent. As coherence emerges from the links between
items, it cannot be said to exist independently of the theory under consideration. It
does not follow from this that coherence no longer places any constraints on
possible concepts. On the contrary, coherence may well provide a test of which
theory generates the most likely meaning for a term in a particular context. As
theories are much more general than concepts they should not change much from
context to context, once they are fully developed. It is the theory which is chosen
that should vary with the demands of context. The fact that theories do not
undergo considerable change with context gives a sense of stability to word
usage.
I have argued that people ascribe membership to a category as a function of the
perceived relationship of that category to the current context. If this is accepted, it
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can be seen how Barsalou's notion, that complex concepts are routinely formed
when processing sentences, might hold. Firstly, when making membership
judgements about complex concepts like "pet fish" the fact that the two concepts
PET and FISH are in a relationship is made explicit. In a context sentence, for
example: "His fish was the best pet he had ever had", the relationship between PET
and FISH is implicit. In this second case it is our theory about the possible
meaning of the sentence that links PET and FISH together. In both these cases the
relationship is understood in terms of the same theory. Or, in other words, a
complex concept (explicitly acknowledging the relationship) is formed in both
cases. It may at first sight seem ridiculous to talk about linking concepts like PET
and FISH in a "theory" since they seem so obviously related. What is meant by a
theory is, however, the implicit assumptions and beliefs that have been collected
over time and built into a framework for understanding the world. If people did not
have such assumptions and beliefs about fish and pets they would simply fail to
understand what the sentence meant.
The question of how relevant attributes are selected in different contexts can now
be construed as the result of forming different complex concepts, or holding
different relational theories, in each case. An understanding of how complex
concepts are formed, that is, why certain attributes are relevant in that context,
now seems crucial for the development of a theory of concepts.
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CHAPTER 4
OVEREXTENSION OF CONJUNCTIVE CONCEPTS
4.1. Conceptual Combination 1
If, as argued previously, the solution to contextual change must be intensional then
looking at noun-noun combination may provide clues to how and why these
changes occur. This is because complex concepts can be conceived of as a special
kind of context effect where each word acts as context for the other.
Those who hold to a Classical View have attempted to explain concept
combination in terms of combinations of definitions. It has been argued from the
fact that language is compositional that semantic representations must also
combine compositionally (Dowty, Wall & Peters, 1981). Semanticists have further
argued that this provides the only adequate account of the productivity of
language and thought. The Classical View of concepts is that the formal semantic
account is an appropriate model of how people actually make categorization
decisions. In the specific case of conjunctive concepts, the Classical theorist
proposes the "Boolean" hypothesis. That is, that the members of the constituents
are set-theoretically conjoined to form the members of the conjunctive concepts.
Membership of the complex concept is a Boolean function of membership of the
constituent concepts. The Boolean hypothesis predicts that, for example, an item is
judged to be a SPORT WHICH IS ALSO A GAME if and only if it is judged to be
both a SPORT and a GAME.
In a Classical account, there is no room for graded membership: category
membership is construed as being all or none. Classical theorists thus claim that
the processes underlying typicality effects are separate from those underlying
membership judgements. For instance, Osherson & Smith (1982) have concluded
that "the theoretical machinery needed to explain typicality findings is different in
kind from that needed to explain compositionality" (p. 317). This has been called
the Binary view (Hampton, 1988). If the Binary view holds, then context no longer
Vhe work reported in this chapter was carried out in collaboration with Nicholas Chater, Centre for
Cognitive Science, University of Edinburgh.
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presents a major theoretical challenge. The underlying representational structure
can remain intact, and all that would be needed would be the inclusion of a
subsidiary process to adjust decisions to fit a particular context. If the Binary
hypothesis is false then the fact that typicality judgements change with context
has serious representational implications.
The second theory of conceptual combination commonly proposed is that of Fuzzy
Set Theory. This theory of combination is more acceptable to prototype theorists
as it allows that membership can be graded. In response to criticisms from
Osherson & Smith (1981) and others, Zadeh has clarified his conception of a
prototype in Fuzzy Set Theory: "A prototype is not a single object or even a group
of objects in A. Rather, it is a fuzzy schema for generating a set of objects which
is roughly coextensive with A" (p.293, Zadeh, 1982). Thus, Zadeh is emphasizing the
need to consider conceptual combination as intensions/ change.
James Flampton has argued against the Boolean position. In 1988 he reported
findings which suggest that subjects do not judge membership in conjuncts
according to a Boolean hypothesis. Rather, subjects include items as members of
a conjunct category they have previously excluded from one or both constituent
categories. On the basis of these findings Hampton proposes a Unitary view that
membership and typicality are "attributed to a single underlying factor" (p 12). I
shall now consider Hampton's experimental paradigm in some detail.
In Hampton's Experiment 4 subjects assessed the membership and relatedness of
lists of items to categories (stage 1). A week later subjects assessed the
membership and relatedness of the same items to a conjunction of two of the
categories (stage 2). For example, at stage 1, a subject might decide that
"skateboard" was a member of the category VEHICLE (+), but not of the category
MACHINE (-). At stage 2, the subject might decide that "skateboard" is not a
VEHICLE WHICH IS ALSO A MACHINE (-). This triple of responses is represented
(+-).
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Hampton instructed subjects to rate a number of items for typicality and
membership (using a seven point rating scale from -3 to +3) according to the
following instructions:
For each example first decide whether you would answer 'Yes'
or 'No' [membership], and then select one of the corresponding
positive or negative values to indicate the strength of your choice
[typicality of members and relatedness of non-members]. If you are
unable to decide, use the value zero, but avoid using this as much
as possible.
comments in [ ] mine
p. 16
The design of the experiment and the instructions pose problems for the
interpretation of Hampton's data. It is a serious criticism of this experiment that
the Unitary hypothesis (that typicality and membership are attributable to the same
underlying factor) is inadvertantly built in to the rating scale used in the
experiments. Hence it can be argued that Hampton's experiments assume the
Unitary hypothesis rather than confirm it. Further, it is unclear that these
experiments undermine the Boolean hypothesis because there are other possible
interpretations of Hampton's results. I will illustrate these alternative interpretations
below by examining the rating scale, design and the analysis of Hampton's original
experiments.
Rating Scale
The rating scale used may bias subjects' responses towards those predicted by
the Unitary hypothesis for the following reasons:
1. In order to assess whether or not typicality and membership are aspects of the
same phenomenon, it is necessary to have independent measures of both. Since
the rating scale measures typicality and membership together it might be expected
that the membership task will distort the typicality ratings, and the typicality task
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will distort the membership ratings in the following ways:
(i) The requirement to judge typicality may bias subjects to adopt a similarity
based categorization strategy. Hence, the results might be biased towards those
predicted by the Unitary hypothesis, as Hampton has since pointed out (personal
communication, 1988)
(ii) The scale does not allow items to be rated in a way which violates the Unitary
hypothesis. Thus it is impossible to give a non-member a typicality/relatedness
rating higher than -1. Similarly, it is impossible to give a member a
typicality/relatedness rating lower than 1. Hence members are necessarily given
higher typicality/relatedness ratings than non-members. A violation of the Unitary
hypothesis would be obtained if some non-member was rated as more
typical/related than some member. For example, subjects might want to rate
"tomato" as a typical VEGETABLE, although the subject knows it is a FRUIT. In
particular, they might want to give "tomato" a higher typicality/relatedness rating
than an atypical vegetable such as "yam". The subject cannot simultaneously
respect intuitions about typicality and membership. If membership takes
precedence, then the subject is forced to give a lower typicality/relatedness rating
to "tomato" (say, -1 for related non-member) than for "yam" (say, +1 for atypical
member). Alternatively, if typicality takes precedence, then "tomato" must be given
a higher typicality/relatedness rating than "yam". This means that if "yam" is
judged to be a vegetable, then "tomato" will be judged to be a more typical
vegetable. On the other hand, if "tomato" is judged to be related non-member of
VEGETABLE, then "yam" must also be a (less related) non-member. A Unitary
theorist might respond that there are no such cases. However, this just is the
Unitary hypothesis.
2. Whereas the previous point relates to judging membership of constituent
categories, a different problem emerges in judging membership of conjuncts. In
this case, subjects might feel unhappy about giving a negative rating if the item
was a good member of one of the conjunct categories. For example, "chess" might
85
be judged riot to be a member of SPORT. However, if the subject considered
"chess" a very good member of GAME it might be included by the subject in the
category SPORT WHICH IS ALSO A GAME. Subjects may overextend their
categories because they wish to express that an item which is a member of one
constituent category is a better member of the conjunct than an item which is not
a member of either constituent category (such as "watching television"). To guard
against this possible source of spurious non-Boolean effects a wider range of
response options could be given to subjects at Stage 2. For example, subjects
could be given the option of rating "chess" as: A GAME WHICH IS ALSO A SPORT,
JUST A GAME, JUST A SPORT, or NEITHER A GAME NOR A SPORT. This gives
subjects the opportunity to distinguish between items they consider to be
members of one category, and items that are not members of either category.
Thus, at stage 2, "chess" can be judged to be JUST A GAME.
Design and Analysis
In Hampton's experiment the number of responses expected in each response class
(e.g. ++-, -++) was estimated. As Hampton points out, certain non-Boolean
responses would be expected even if subjects use a Boolean combination rule,
given i) that subjects forget their previous responses with probability u < 1, and ii)
each membership judgement for the constituents may be probabilistic. For
example, a subject might judge an item to be a SPORT and a GAME at Stage 1. At
Stage 2, the subject might not remember the previous judgements, and now
decide that the item is not in fact a GAME. If the subject is using a Boolean
strategy, the item will not be judged a member of the conjunct. Hence,
non-Boolean results do not necessarily imply non-Boolean combination.
Since there is no direct measure of how much subjects remember, Hampton has
provided an estimate of a remembering parameter u. This is the probability of
subjects remembering their previous judgements. Hampton explains:
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The parameter u was estimated from the two observed
frequencies for +++ and ++-, and constrained to lie between 0 and 1.
If it could not be estimated it was set to zero.
P 17
Using his estimate for u, the probability of each fresh membership judgement, was
derived. For example, Hampton notes that the probability of classifying an item as
a member of the conjunct, when it had previously been classified as a member of
the first constituent but not of the second (+-+) is:
p(+-+) = Si(1-g2).[u2.(0) + u.O-uj.g! + (l-u).u.(O) + (1-u)2.s n .g n ]
p. 17
St = probability of an item being rated as a sport when rated first,
g-i = probability of an item being rated as a game when rated first.
g2 = probability of an item being rated as a game when rated second,
u = probability of remembering your classification at stage 1.
Using formulae of this sort Hampton was able to estimate the number of
responses that should be obtained in each response category, assuming subjects
use a Boolean conjuction strategy. This allowed a comparison of the results
obtained with estimates on the basis of the Boolean model, allowing an
assessment of the degree to which subjects actually used a Boolean strategy.
The estimate of u was based on the observed frequencies of (+++) and (++-)
responses alone. Thus, only a small fraction of the data was used in the
estimation, so it is unclear how reliable the estimate is. A further complication is
that Hampton claims that u "is also estimating the effects of individual differences
in concept definitions and any other factors which may reduce the independence
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of the subject's ratings at each stage" (p 17). It is unclear how u could
meaningfully fulfil these functions. These difficulties can be circumvented by
introducing an appropriate control condition, to estimate directly subjects'
performance given a Boolean strategy (see Experiment 6).
If the variable of rating order of s and g (which Hampton found to have no
significant effect) is omitted from the formulae, then it is found that the probability
of an underextension, p(++-), is equal to the probability of an overextension, p(—+)
+ p(-++) + p(+-+), independent of the particular values of s, g and u (Note 8).
Hence, if the number of overextensions and underextensions is significantly
different the Boolean hypothesis is disconfirmed. Of course, if the number of
overextensions and underextensions are not significantly different, this does not
allow the differentiation of the Unitary and Binary hypotheses, i.e. whether
typicality and membership decisions are independent or have the same underlying
basis. However, in as much as the overextensions and underextensions differ this
provides a simple measure of the degree of non-Booleanness. In the experiments
reported below, the significant differences between overextensions and
underextensions provide the basis for the argument that concept combination is
non-Boolean.
In Hampton's Experiment 4, a linear regression model, which predicts the rating of
a conjunction from the ratings of its constituents, is given. The validity of linear
regression depends on the data being approximately normally distributed along
each dimension. Since Hampton's data approximate to a 'U' shaped distribution (the
extreme values, -3 and +3, were the most popular responses and subjects were
discouraged from using the centre value 0), the large R values could be due to the
fact that the data points are clustered at each end of the regression line.
These points imply that further experimental work is required to firmly establish
Hampton's findings. The following set of experiments is designed to fulfil this role.
Experiment 4 is a replication of Hampton's Experiment 4. This is compared with
three further experiments. In Experiment 5, subjects make only typicality
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judgements for items. Judgements are made on a seven point scale where no
indications are given to where the membership boundary should lie. Hence,
subjects are given a free hand in judging typicality of items independently of
membership constraints in the task. In Experiment 6, subjects make membership
judgements only. This should obviate the confounding of membership and
typicality judgements. In Experiment 7, a wider range of response options is given,





Experiment 4 is a replication of the principle features of Hampton's (1988)
Experiment 4. The same task was used, and the rating scale and items were
identical to Hampton 1988, Experiment 4. Although Hampton reported an effect of
order in the category name (A BUILDING AND A DWELLING versus A DWELLING
AND A BUILDING) in this experiment the order of constituents in each conjunct
was counterbalanced. This was because the concern of this experiment is to
assess the magnitude of overextensions and underextensions, not to replicate
Hampton's work on the head-modifier relation. The order of rating of categories
at stage 1 and stage 2 was random. The analysis of the data is based on the
relative number of overextensions and underextensions, as argued above. The
purpose of this partial replication is to provide data consonant with Hampton's and
appropriate for comparison with the other experiments in this series.
METHOD
Design
The experiment is a within subjects design. The within subjects factor is response
type (underextensions and overextensions). The same subjects rated items at stage
1 and stage 2. Items were treated as a random factor. The same random order of
items within a list was used for all subjects at both stages. The order in which the
lists were rated was fully randomized across subjects. The role of categories as
head and qualifier was counterbalanced.
Subjects
10 subjects participated in Experiment 4. All subjects were in full time education
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in Edinburgh and took part in the experiment as a course requirement. Two
subjects were excluded from the experiment due to absence at one of the
sessions. The sexes were approximately equally represented in the group and
subjects were naive to the purposes of the experiment.
Materials
Materials were identical to those used by Hampton (1988). Six conjunctions were
used: Machines - Vehicles, Furniture - Household Appliances, Pets - Birds,
Buildings - Dwellings, Food - Plants (or part of a plant) and Weapons - Tools. For
each conjunction a list of 16 items was available. This list contained items
belonging to both conjuncts, neither conjunct, or only one conjunct. Items were
typed in random order on a sheet headed by the appropriate category name e.g.,
Machine, Vehicle, Machine which is also a Vehicle, Vehicle which is also a Machine.
To the right of each item was a seven point scale from -3 to +3. The instruction
sheet included an appropriate completed example not used in the experiment.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted in two stages, a week apart. In the first stage,
subjects were given a booklet containing 12 pages of test items, presented in a
different random order for each subject. Each page was headed by one of the
constituent categories e.g.. Bird. Subjects were asked to decide the membership
and typicality of the items. Firstly, subjects had to decide if the item was a
member of the category. If the item was judged to be a member, it was given a '+'
rating. If the item was judged not to be a member, it was given a rating. If
undecided the subject could use '0', but this was discouraged. Secondly, subjects
had to decide how typical members were of the category, by choosing +1, +2 or
+3, where +3 is a very typical member. If the item was a non-member, subjects
indicated how related it was to the category, by choosing -1, -2 or -3, where -1 is
the most related non-member. Subjects completed the ratings at their own pace.
Stage 2 was the same as Stage 1 save that subjects rated the 6 conjunctions
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rather than the 12 constituent categories. The ordering of the conjunctions ("Pets
which are also Birds" versus "Birds which are also Pets") was balanced across
subjects such that half the subjects received one random ordering and half the
reverse ordering.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As argued above, a significant difference between the number of over and
underextensions a subject makes is indicative of a non-Boolean combination
strategy. Summed over all subjects 2.9% of the responses were underextensions
and 15.8% were overextensions. That is, subjects were more likely to classify an
item as a member of a conjunct when not a member of a constituent, than to
classify an item as a non-member of a conjunct when a member of both
constituents. A within subjects t-test found this difference to be significant at p <
0.05 (t = 5.93 (5)). This clearly replicates Hampton's finding that subjects exhibit
non-Boolean responses to membership decisions in conjuncts. Subjects preferred
to overextend rather than underextend their concepts. The pattern of
overextensions and underextensions is summarized in Table 6. Each entry in the
table indicates the mean response to the conjunction for the corresponding values
of the head and qualifier. For example, all the responses in which the head was
rated -2 and the qualifier was rated +3 at stage 1 are considered together. The
mean value of the corresponding conjunctions at stage 2, in these cases, was
found to be 0.47.
A strictly Boolean model predicts that only items judged to be members of both
constituent categories (the entries in the top left quadrant of Table 6) should be
judged members of the conjunction (i.e. be given a positive rating). If subjects
showed a tendency to underextend, then items that were judged members of both
constituents would be given ratings for the conjunct. As can be seen from
Table 6, such a tendency was not evident. On the other hand, if subjects' tendency
was to overextend, then positive values would be found for conjunctions where
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one or both constituents were judged to be non-members. There are several
examples of overextensions in Table 6 where the head noun was given a rating of
-1 or -2, but the qualifier noun was judged to be a member.
Table 6
Mean ratings of the conjunction for each value of
the head constituent and the qualifier
constituent, collapsed across categories, for
Experiment 4. Only values for n > 4 are shown.
QUALIFIER
+ 3 +2 + 1 0 -1 -2 -3
+ 3 2.77 2.08 1.62 0.83 -0.03 -0.79 -1.9
+ 2 1.94 1.11 1.64 -0.8 -0.29 -1.5
+1 1.87 0.6 0 -0.6 -1.45
0
-1 0.2 0.54 0.11 -1 -2.71
-2 0.47 -1.57 -2.11
-3 -1.34 -1.18 -1.33 -1.78 -1.71 -2.82
HEAD
There is a marked assymetry between the influence of the categories depending
on whether they are in a head or qualifier position, similar to that reported in
Hampton (1988). Positive ratings for conjunctions are found when the head noun
had a rating of -1 or -2, and the qualifier noun had a positive rating. This
indicates that the qualifier is more important in determining conjunct membership
than the head. Thus, if an item is not a member of the qualifier category, it is
unlikely to attain membership of the conjunct. This effect is independent of the
particular categories rated, since all categories were presented in both qualifier
and head positions.
Hampton notes that the Guppy effect ( a Guppy is a better PET FISH than it is a
PET or a FISH) is hard to find. That is, membership rating in the conjunction is
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seldom greater than in either constituent. There were 33 instances of the Guppy
effect (4.3%) in Experiment 4, similarly a low figure.
As argued above, it is as yet unclear whether the source of these non-Boolean
effects is the use of a non-Boolean combination strategy. Experiments 5 and 6 are
designed to ascertain the possible contributions of typicality judgements and
membership judgements to non-Boolean effects.
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4.3. Experiment 5
Typicality Ratings of Conjuncts
Introduction
Experiment 4 provided a replication of Hampton's results, demonstrating that
overextension is a robust effect. The purpose of Experiment 5 is to examine
whether typicality judgements of an item in two constituent categories predicts the
typicality judgement for the item when the categories combine. The results from
this experiment are not directly comparable with those of Experiment 4, where a
clear category boundary is defined on the scale. Experiment 5 will give some idea
of the difference between this task, which has no membership constraints, and the
one used formerly. It will also provide a measure of how related typicality
judgements for constituents are to judgements for conjuncts.
METHOD
Design
The experiment is of a similar design to Experiment 4. The within subject factor is
typicality rating (1 - 7). The stimulus materials are identical in all other respects to
those used in Experiment 4.
Subjects
9 subjects participated in the experiment as part of a course requirement. All
subjects were naive to the purposes of the experiment, and had never given
typicality judgements previously.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as Experiment 4, only the instructions to subjects
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were different. Subjects were instructed as follows:
... For each example decide how well you think it fits the
category. Ring 7 if you think the item fits the category very well, and
ring 1 if you think it doesn't fit at all, using the intermediate values
as appropriate. If you are unfamiliar with any of the examples cross
them out.
Subjects were then given two examples from a category not used in the
experiment. These examples illustrated classification as 7 and 1 only. Subjects
completed the judgements in their own time.
RESULTS
Ratings
A simple method which set the category boundary to the mid-point on the scale
was adopted. This method rendered the decisions 7, 6 and 5 as denoting
membership, and 1, 2 and 3 as denoting non-membership. The typicality rating 4
was said to denote uncertainty of membership. When this method was used it was
possible to calculate the percentage of overextensions and underextensions as
14.6% and 1.2%, respectively. This figure is not meant to reflect the fact that
subjects were "overextending". It simply demonstrates that placing a simple
criterion on typicality judgements can produce results very similar to those found
when subjects judge membership and typicality (as reported in Experiment 4.
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Table 7
Mean typicality ratings of the conjunction for each
value of the head constituent and the qualifier
constituent for Experiment 5. Only values for n > 4
are shown.
QUALIFIER
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 6.86 6.29 5.46 5.64 4.85 3.08 3.67
6 6.4 3.33 3
5 6.15 4.86 4.13 2.09
4 6.2 5.75 5.8 1.75
3 4.25 3.8 2.4
2 3.44 4 2.38 2.67 3.5 2.1
1 2.64 2.37 2.85 3 1.43 2.17 1.07
HEAD
The number of triples which exhibited the guppy effect (that is typicality in the
conjunction was rated higher than typicality in both constituents) was 61 (7.1%).
That is considerably higher than was found in Experiment 4 (4.3%). A post-hoc
Mann-Whitney U test indicated that this difference was not significant at the 5%
level (U(8,9) = 19.5). Table 7 shows mean typicality ratings for conjunctions for
each typicality value of the head and qualifier.
In order to compare the results obtained with the pattern of results found in
Experiment 4, the typicality ratings were expressed as membership ratings on a
scale of +3 to -3. Thus the value for head and qualifier ratings of 7,7 = 6.86, is
expressed as a head qualifier rating 3,3 = 2.86. These expressions of the typicality
ratings can be found in Table 8.
It is interesting that, in a task where subjects are not asked to make membership
judgements, and where no category boundary was set, simply ascribing the
mid-point as the category boundary produces results so similar to those found in
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Experiment 4. This supports the notion that membership and typicality may indeed
be closely linked. Or that typicality ratings strongly bias membership judgements.
One difference which does emerge is that there is no head-qualifier effect (see
Table 8). Instead, positive judgements are overextended equally for head nouns and
qualifier nouns. The pattern of missing data which does not concentrate around
the centre value as it has done previously, may indicate a greater variation
between subjects in their criteria for category membership. It is possible that
between subject differences in the use of the scale may also be obscuring any
head-qualifier effect.
Table 8
Mean typicality ratings of the conjunction for each
value of the head constituent and the qualifier
constituent for Experiment 5, expressed on a scale
where 7 corresponds to +3, and 1 corresponds to -3.
Only values for n > 4 are shown.
QUALIFIER
+ 3 + 2 + 1 0 -1 -2 -3
+3 2.86 2.29 1.46 1.64 0.85 -0.2 -2 . 33
+2 2.4 -0.67 -1
+ 1 2.15 0.86 0.13 -1.91
0 2.2 1.75 1.8 -2.25
-3 0.25 -0.2 -1.6
-2 -0.56 0 -1.62 -1.33 -0.5 -1.9
-1 -1.36 -1.63 -1.15 -1 -2.57 -1.83 -2.93
HEAD
In conclusion, judgements for typicality are reasonable predictors of subjects'
judgements on a task incorporating membership and typicality. Typicality ratings
for constituents are fairly good predictors or typicality ratings in conjuncts.
Biasing effects extending positive values may have been exaggerated in the above
data due to subjects placing category boundaries at different typicality levels.
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4.4. Experiment 6
Are Membership Judgements Non-Boolean?
Introduction
In this experiment subjects are required to make membership judgements only.
This should eliminate any non-Boolean effects due to the confounding of typicality
and membership judgements. In addition, a control group is introduced at stage 2.
This allows a measure of how many overextensions would result if subjects were
using a purely Boolean combination strategy. Hence, the control group provides a
baseline measure of overextension and underextension with which the
experimental group can be compared. The control condition provides a direct
estimate of non-Boolean effects that are not a result of conceptual combination,
thus avoiding the problems of estimating u. It also provides an experimental check
on the formula which states that if subjects use a Boolean strategy there will be
no difference between the subjects' tendency to overextend and underextend.
METHOD
Design
The experiment is a 2 X 2 mixed design. The within subject factor is response type
(number of overextensions and number of underextensions). The between subject
factor is group (experimental group or control group). In all other respects the
design is the same as Experiment 4.
Subjects
18 subjects took part in the experiment. All subjects were full time students in
Edinburgh. One subject from the control group was absent at stage 2 and thus
excluded from the experiment. In order to keep the design balanced, a subject was
chosen at random from the experimental group, and excluded from the study. The
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sexes were approximately equally represented, and subjects were naive to the
purpose of the experiment.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 4, except that subjects were only asked
to make membership judgements, by circling "Yes" or "No" beside each item. If
subjects could not decide whether an item was a member of the category they
were instructed to leave the item blank. However, as in Experiment 4, this option
was discouraged. If a subjects did not understand a word, they were instructed to
cross it out. The control subjects completed stage 1 in the same way as the
experimental group, at stage 2 the control group simply repeated stage 1.
The control group's responses at stage 2 were Booleanly conjoined, after the
experiment, to yield response triples comparable to those in the experimental
group. Suppose that a subject rated an item as a member of one constituent
categories at stage 1, but not the other (+-), then rated the same item as a
member of both categories at stage 2 (++). A Boolean model of conjunction would
imply that the subject would rate the item as a member of the conjunct at stage 2
(+). The response triple (constituent 1, constituent 2, conjunction) can now be
constructed. In this case it is (+-+), which is an overextension. For example, at
stage 1 a subject might judge "snooker" to be a SPORT, and also a GAME (++). At
stage 2, the same subject might now judge "snooker" not to be a SPORT (-), but
still to be a GAME (+). Boolean conjunction of the subject's responses at stage 2
yields (-). Hence, the subject is deemed to have judged "snooker" to be a SPORT, a
GAME, but not a SPORT WHICH IS ALSO A GAME (++-). This is an underextension.
This procedure provided an estimate of the number of overextensions and
underextensions that might be expected to result from subjects forgetting their
previous responses and changing their minds. This allowed a comparison of the
number of overextensions and underextensions in the experimental and control
groups. Significantly more overextensions in the experimental group would imply
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that subjects were not using a Boolean method of conceptual combination.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A 2 X 2 (group X under/over extension) mixed ANOVA was performed. Percentage
overextensions and underextensions for each group are presented in Table 9. There
was a significant main effect of group (F(1,14) = 5.49, p < 0.05). The main effect of
response type was also significant (F(1,14) = 14.3, p < 0.01), demonstrating that
subjects made significantly more overextensions than can be accounted for by
factors such as forgetting previous responses and changing one's mind. There was
a significant interaction term (F(1,14) = 12.96, p < 0.01) as a result of the
experimental group making significantly more overextensions and significantly less
underextensions than the control group. The number of overextensions and
underextensions per category are shown in Table 10.
Table 9
Overextensions and underextensions for a control and
experimental group in Experiment 6. Overextensions
and Underextensions are expressed as a percentage of
the whole.
Overextensions Underextensions
Experimental Group 12.0% 3.1% 7.6%
Control Group 5.3% 4.2% 4.8%
8.7% 3.6%
As expected there was no difference between the number of overextensions and
underextensions in the control group (overextensions 5.3%, underextensions 4.2%,
post hoc t-test, t = 0.63, df = 5). The number of overextensions in the experimental
group was less than in Experiment 4 (15.8% vs 12%) which suggests that typicality
decisions may have influenced subjects' judgements in Experiment 4. If the
percentage of overextensions made in the control group is taken as a baseline, the
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suggestion is that subjects used a non-Boolean decision strategy for around 6% -
7% of responses. As discussed in section 4:1 a remaining source of task specific
"overextensions" may be the lack of response options at stage 2.
Table 10
Number of overextensions and underextensions per
category for Experiment 6.
Category Overextensions Underextensions
Furniture and
Household Appliances 31 3
Food and Plants 18 4
Weapons and Tools 19 6
Buildings and Dwellings 3 6
Machines and Vehicles 11 4




Choice Factors in Non-Boolean Categorization
Experiment 7 is designed to investigate possible effects on subjects' tendency to
overextend membership decisions for conjuncts. It has been argued previously that
subjects may make overextensions simply because they wish to express that an
item which is a member of one of the constituent categories is somehow more
related to the conjunct than an item which is not a member of either constituent
category, nor of the conjunction. In order to test for this possible source of
spurious non-Boolean effects a wider range of response options was introduced at
stage 2 of Experiment 7. Experiment 7 is a variant of Experiment 4, in this case
subjects were asked to make membership judgements, and were given four
response options at stage 2.
METHOD
The method and procedure were the same as those used in Experiment 4, save
that subjects made membership judgements (as in Experiment 6) and four
response options were introduced at stage 2. The task was amended as follows: as
before, at stage 1, subjects had two response options. For example, "1. is a
VEHICLE", "2. is not a VEHICLE". At stage 2 four response options for the
conjunction were given. For example, "1. is a VEHICLE WHICH IS ALSO A MACHINE",
"2. is just a VEHICLE", "3. is just a MACHINE" and "4. is neither a VEHICLE nor a
MACHINE". Subjects indicated their responses by circling the appropriate number.
Subjects
10 subjects participated in the experiment. All subjects were students in full time
education in Edinburgh, and participated in the experiment as part of their course
work. Two subjects were excluded from the experiment as they were not native
English speakers. The sexes were approximately equally represented in the group,
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and subjects were naive to the purpose of the experiment.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Giving the subjects more choice at stage 2 did not alter the number of
overextensions (9.4%) and underextensions (3.4%) from Experiment 6 (12% and
3.1%, respectively). (Mann-Whitney U tests between Experiments 6 & 7 showed no
significant differences for overextensions (U = 19.5, df = 8) or underextensions (U =
30.5, df = 8)). This result demonstrates that subjects' tendency to overextend
cannot be reduced by providing more response options at stage 2.
Subjects' tendency to overextend appears to be robust under the manipulation of
response option. This finding provides further evidence that overextensions are not
caused by response biases. Further, Hampton (1988) reports that manipulation of
the proportion of members and non-members, and therefore the proportion of
positive and negative responses made by subjects, seems to have little influence
on the tendency to overextend. These findings strongly suggest that
overextension is a result of the processes of conceptual combination.
Summary
To summarize, Hampton's non-Boolean results were replicated in Experiment 4
(overextensions 15.8%, underextensions 2.9%). When subjects were asked to make
typicality judgements for the same items on a 7 point scale, in Experiment 5, a
hypothetical category boundary at the midpoint of the scale suggested that
subjects "overextend" to a similar degree when making typicality judgements alone
(overextensions 14.6%, underextensions 1.2%) The tendency to overextend was
found to be robust when subjects were only asked to make membership
judgements (overextensions 10.2%, underextensions 3.1%). These results were
significantly different from those predicted by a Boolean model, as shown by
comparison with the control condition of Experiment 6 (overextensions 5.3%,
underextensions 4.2%). The residual difference of around 6% overextensions did
not diminish when a wider range of response options were given in Experiment 7.
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4.6. Intensional Combination and Theories
In Chapter 4 membership judgements in noun-noun combinations have been
considered in some detail, and it has been clearly demonstrated that the Boolean
model of conceptual combination is inadequate. The question that now has to be
answered is whether this suggests that concepts are non-compositional. A number
of authors are proposing that combination cannot be solved extensionally, which is
why the Boolean model fails, but that concepts may still be intensionally
compositional. I will consider below whether an intensional model of conceptual
combination that can fare better than a Boolean account.
Perhaps the most explicit account of how intensional combination might work has
been put forward in the "Inheritance of Attributes" model (Hampton, 1987). It is
appropriate that this model be considered, and an assessment made of its
appropriateness in explaining category combination, since the tendency for
subjects to overextend was first documented by Hampton. In the inheritance of
attributes model it is proposed that the intension of a conjunction is formed as the
union of the intensions of the constituent concepts. As a first step, this predicts
the same result as a Boolean model. That is, if the membership conditions for PET
and the membership conditions for FISH are taken together, then any item fulfilling
them would be a PET FISH. However, instead of assuming that intensions consist
of defining features (as a Boolean model does) it is proposed that attributes
(features) have a certain "importance" value for the category. It is predicted that
the importance of an attribute for the conjunction will rise predictably as its
importance in each of the constituent categories rises.
When an attribute is important for one constituent category, but not the other, it is
predicted that the attribute will not be "inherited" by the conjunction. This is
because the attribute has fallen below an average critical importance for the
compound concept. Similarly, if the attributes of the constituent concepts conflict
(e.g. PET might be said to have an attribute <animate>, LOG might be said to
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have the attribute <inanimate>, when the concepts combine to form PET LOG,
there is an attribute conflict) only one attribute can be inherited, if the concept is
to be coherent. (Here again coherence is invoked as a constraint in category
formation - see Section 3.1). As yet, there are no proposals about how this conflict
is resolved. Although it is not argued explicitly, presumably, it is the failure of
attributes to be inherited that could be used to account for overextension effects.
Thus, an item which was judged to be a non-member of a constituent category
because it did not satisfy the requirements of a particular attribute, could become
a legitimate member of the conjunct category if that attribute was not inherited.
This would be classified as an overextension.
A qualification to the notion of inheritance failure is that subjects' intuitions about
necessity and impossibility are always inherited. For example, subjects might think
it necessary that PETS chave an owner>, while this is not an attribute of FISH. So,
in the conjunction PET FISH the necessary attribute <has an owner> would be
inherited. Similarly, subjects might think it impossible that FISH are <warm and
cuddly>, although they might think that an important attribute for PETS, hence,
there would be an inheritance failure of the impossible attribute in PET FISH.
Finally, it is proposed that complex concepts can acquire new attributes through a
process of "extensional feedback", where experience in, and of, the world causes
an alteration in a concept. This process can provide an explanation for the fact
that in the Stroop Experiment, complex and complicated forms of sentence
containing the words "scavenger" and "bird" had different meanings - see
Appendix 2, Sectiion 2. This mechanism could also be used to account for the
phenomenon of underextension. Thus, an item could be judged a member of both
constituent categories but not a member of the conjunction, because the
conjunction has an additional attribute, the requirements of which, the item does
not fulfil. It seems to me, that the notion of extensional feedback could only work
if the conjunctive concept were "lexicalized". In this case, a new attribute could be
learned and incorporated into the concept. However, it is highly unlikely that many
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of the numerous possibilities of conceptual combinations are lexicalized. In these
cases, it is unclear that there would be processing time available for extensional
feedback to produce a new attribute in the intension of the compound, before the
category decisions and inferences the compound was being used for, had already
been resolved by some other method. Thus, I argue that extensional feedback is
only a useful proposal for explaining underextensions in lexicalized compounds.
Hampton acknowledges something of this argument when he puts forward the
prediction that extensional feedback will make familiar compounds less
compositional than unfamiliar ones.
Hampton conducted several experiments to test his model of intensional
combination. He asked a number of subjects to generate attribute lists for 12
categories. Having obtained a reliable list of attributes for each concept, he asked
a second group of subjects to assess the importance of the attributes for each
constituent category and both forms of the conjunction (A PET which is also a
FISH, and, A FISH which is also a PET). The inheritance of attributes model predicts
that an item's importance for the constituent categories is a predictor of its
importance for the conjunction. If a count is made from the average importance
ratings of attributes (see Table 11) it is found that there are 47 cases where an
attribute with a high average importance for both constituents also had a high
average importance for the conjunction. Whereas there are only 4 cases where an
attribute rated important for both constituents was not inherited by one form of
the conjunct, and 1 case where it was not inherited by either form. This confirms
the model's prediction that importance in the constituent is a good predictor of
importance in the conjunct. The number of attributes thought important for one
(but not the other) constituent which were thought important for both forms of the
conjunction was 42, those attributes only inherited by one form of the conjunction
numbered 10, while those not inherited by either form were 13. This lack of
attribute inheritance could be used to account for overextensions.
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Table 11
Number of attributes whose average importance (I)
> 1.5, for constituent categories and conjunctions.
Attributes with an importance rating equal to 1.5
were excluded from the count. (This data was
compiled from the average importance ratings for
attributes in the appendix of Hampton, 1987).
I in Both I in Only One I in Neither
Conjunctions Conjunct ion Conjunct ion
I in Both A and B 47 4 1
I in A or B 42 10 13
I in neither A nor B 4 6 27
There were 10 cases where the average importance for an item was low in both
constituent categories, but high for at least one form of the conjunct. Thus,
compound categories can inherit "unimportant" attributes from their constituents,
or acquire new "important" attributes. This is consonant with the fact that subjects
make underextensions. However, as no theoretical explanation is given of why
unimportant constituent attributes become important for the conjunction (save for
extensional feedback, but see above) this model does not provide an explanation of
underextension.
Hampton found that two other factors were involved in attribute inheritance. Firstly,
the head-qualifier effect was found to alter the relative contributions of
constituents to the conjunction. Thus, it seems that the concept "A PET which is
also a FISH" has a different intension from the concept "A FISH which is also a
PET". Secondly, concept dominance was an important factor in determining
attribute inheritance. That is, some concepts were found to be more important
than others in forming the intension of the conjunct. There is some suggestion
that concept dominance may result from having more important attributes than
other concepts. The head-qualifier effect and concept dominance effects interact
when concepts combine. Thus, the inheritance of attributes model provides an
account of how concepts might combine interactively. It proposes a weighted
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average importance for each attribute, with unimportant attributes usually being
excluded from the conjunction. A supplementary process of extensional feedback
may provide a means for compound concepts to acquire new attributes under
certain conditions.
The important thing to note about this account, is that the crucial determiners of
how concepts combine are the weightings on particular attributes. Moreover, these
weightings are not stable values, but change in different contexts e.g. with the
linguistic context of the head-modifier relation. It is also likely, that which attribute
is inherited when there is a conflict will be a result of the context. For example,
Hampton suggests that TOOL may have <is used for construction> as an
attribute, while WEAPON has <is used for destructions He argues that the
destructive aspect is more central, since tools can be used constructively or
destructively, and is hence more likely to be inherited in the compound A TOOL
which is also a WEAPON (or A WEAPON which is also a TOOL). While this may well
be true, which attribute is actually inherited in a given situation will be context
dependent. Thus, in the context: "The soldier used his weapon to dig an entrance
to the tunnel", the attribute <is used for construction> would be more likely to be
inherited.
This leads me to the conclusion that the explanation for interactive conceptual
combination is not provided in the intensions of concepts per se but in the
perceived relations between concepts in a particular context. In the inheritance of
attributes model, the real explanation lies in the change of feature weightings. As
yet, the reasons behind these changes have not been discovered. In Chapter 5 I
will consider an alternative explanation of overextension, and whether it can yield
any testable predictions about how concepts combine.
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CHAPTER 5
WHY OVEREXTEND: COMPENSATION BETWEEN DIMENSIONS?
5.1. Introduction 2
Chapter 4 showed that when subjects judge membership in conjunctive categories
they are biased in favour of overextending their categorizations. This finding raises
the question of why subjects overextend? In section 4.6 the inheritance of
attributes model of overextension was considered in some detail. It was noted that
an explanation of why subjects overextend, pitched at a higher level, was needed.
As I have argued elsewhere (Lyon & Chater, in press) a possible explanation of
overextension comes from an understanding of the way in which people judge
membership of conjunctive categories in everyday life. It seems that subjects are
more lenient in their membership judgements the more factors they have to take
into account. For example, suppose that you have the task of casting the lead role
in a local play. You are looking for a tall, handsome, blond male with a convincing
Scottish accent, and a retentive memory. Given that such people are rather rare
you will, of course, compromise on certain dimensions - you might settle for a
sandy haired man of medium height. This amounts to overextending the category.
Previously you would not have considered sandy hair an instance of the category
blond, nor medium height as tall; yet now you include this man in the compound
category "a tall, handsome, blond male with a convincing Scottish accent". You
would be especially likely to do this if he fulfilled the rest of your criteria.
I will refer to this explanation of overextension as the Compensation Hypothesis.
Such compensation effects can be seen in many uses of property conjunctions: for
example, when recognizing a stranger from a description (tall, dark and handsome
with a red carnation, under the clock in Paddington Station). Another example is
deciding what property fits the category "A house I would buy". When buying a
house a person may have a long list of criteria which must be simultaneously
2
The experiments reported in this chapter were carried out in collaboration with Nicholas Chater,
Centre for Cognitive Science, University of Edinburgh. Material contained in this chapter is also being
published (Lyon & Chater, in press).
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fulfilled. For instance: affordable price, two bedrooms, separate kitchen, central
location, garage, garden. Since there are so few houses for sale which meet all of
these criteria, most people have to compromise. It is interesting to note that there
is a tendency not to admit that the initial criteria have not been met. Instead,
people extend their categories to incorporate instances not previously included. For
example, what would previously have been described as a high price is now
construed as an affordable price (by borrowing up to the limit!). Similarly, a
concrete patio would not initially be described as a garden. If the house fulfils the
other criteria sufficiently well, a concrete patio may satisfy the demand for a
garden, as the buyer's category judgement becomes more lenient. In fact, buyers
are often adamant that they have fulfilled all their criteria. In a process of
rationalization they may argue that with house prices going up they wanted to take
on a large mortgage, and that a patio provides an excellent, easily maintained
garden with the addition of a few potted plants.
The tendency for people to alter their views to eliminate inconsistency, has been
widely recognized in social psychology (particularly, Festinger, 1957). When faced
with an instance that does not fulfil all of the desired criteria people may do one
of three things: 1) they can give up some of their criteria (they did not really want
two bedrooms); 2) they can admit that the instance is not the perfect house, and
does not meet all their criteria; 3) they can avoid either of these unpalatable
possibilities by widening their categories, so that their chosen house fulfils them
all. My suggestion is that this third option is the source of the tendency to
overextend conjunctive categories. Thus there is a motive for overextension in
many social categorization judgements. However, it is highly unlikely that such
motives are involved when making decisions such as whether or not "chess" is a
member of the conjunctive category "a sport which is also a game". What has
been documented is that people are highly motivated to order instances whatever
the circumstances:
People have in fact a fateful predilection for linear orderings.
They are prone to place elements in linear orderings to the exclusion
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of other structures and they handle linear orderings more facilely
than most other structures.
De Soto, London & Handel, 1965
Given such a prediliction, a possible motive for overextension in this case might
be the desire to ascribe a substantial proportion of the list to be rated to the
compound category. To the contrary this, and other, task features have been
shown in previous experiments not to be the cause of subjects overextending
(Hampton, 1988; Chapter 4). I propose the explanation for overextension is simply
that a subject's classification strategy is learned through everyday experience of
the world. As such experience includes making categorization judgements for
cases which do motivate the subject to overextend (in order to elliminate
uncomfortable inconsistencies) overextension becomes a generally effective
strategy when judging membership in complex categories.
The Compensation Hypothesis asserts that the more criteria an item must
simultaneously fulfil, the more leniently the subject will judge the item's
membership of the category. This leads to the prediction: the more constituent




This experiment is designed to test the Compensation Hypothesis by examining the
way subjects conjoin three categories. This experiment is an adaptation of
Experiment 6 where the rationale for the control condition was as follows: at stage
1, all subjects gave categorization judgements for single categories; at stage 2, the
experimental group gave judgements for the conjuctions, while the control group
repeated stage 1. The control group's responses at stage 2 were then conjoined
using a Boolean strategy. This provided an estimate of the overextensions and
underextensions resulting from forgetting and changing one's mind. Hence
providing a direct estimate of spurious non-Boolean effects. In a similar way,
appropriate controls for the conjunction of three categories were included in
Experiment 8. These controls enabled the number of overextensions for triple
conjunctions to be compared with the number of overextensions for binary
conjunctions.
According to the Compensation Hypothesis, the more constituent categories joined
together, the more category judgements should be overextended. Thus, judging
membership of the triple conjunctive category "A FOOD, A PLANT AND A
FLAVOURING", should lead to more overextensions than judging membership of any
two of its binary conjunctions (e.g. "A FOOD AND A FLAVOURING").
METHOD
Design
The design is a 2 X 3 mixed design. The within subjects factor is response type
(underextensions and overextensions). The between subjects factor is experimental
group (1, 2 or 3). Within a conjunct, the order of the constituents was
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counterbalanced across subjects, such that 2 subjects rated each of the 6 possible
orders in groups 2 and 3. Otherwise the design was identical to that of Experiment
4.
Subjects
36 subjects took part in the experiment, 12 in each of 3 groups. Subjects were
students resident in Edinburgh, and participated in the experiment voluntarily.
Materials
Stimuli were adapted from the items and categories used in the previous
experiments. A third category was added to every pair of categories. Six category
triples were used: Machine - Vehicle - Toy, Furniture - Household Appliance -
Luxury, Pet - Bird - Predator, Building - Dwelling - Business, Food - Plant -
Flavouring, Weapon - Tool - Farm Equipment. The parenthetical "or part of a plant"
used in the previous experiments (following Hampton) was omitted as unwieldy. A
slight difference in syntax was also employed. Extending the previous syntactic
form (A WEAPON WHICH IS ALSO A TOOL) would have been cumbersome (i.e. A
WEAPON WHICH IS ALSO A TOOL WHICH IS ALSO FARM EQUIPMENT). Hence, the
simpler form A WEAPON AND A TOOL was adopted for the binary case, and A
WEAPON, A TOOL AND FARM EQUIPMENT for triple conjunctions. A list of 16 items
was adapted from the previous list such that approximately equal numbers of
items likely to produce each kind of response were included (that is 2 items
considered to be likely members of all categories (+++); 2 items considered to be
likely members of the first two categories (++-) and so on, for all 8 possibilities).
Thus, the materials were such that roughly half of the items were judged to be
members of each single category (although, as noted above, Hampton (1988) found
that this proportion does not seem to effect membership judgements). Items were
typed in random order and headed by the appropriate category name, e.g. A
Machine; A Vehicle; A Toy; A Machine and A Vehicle; A Vehicle and A Machine; A
Machine and A Toy; A Toy and A Machine; A Vehicle and A Toy; A Toy and A
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Vehicle; A Machine, A Vehicle and A Toy; A Machine, A Toy and A Vehicle; A
Vehicle, A Toy and A Machine; A Vehicle, A Machine and A Toy; A Toy, A Machine
and A Vehicle; A Toy, A Vehicle and A Machine. Lists of all possible permutations
were prepared in order to counterbalance for order effects.
The lists and categories used in Experiment 8 overlap significantly with those in
Experiments 4-7. However, since new categories and items have been introduced,
and thus a different proportion of items will be judged to be members of each
category, the numbers of overextensions and underextensions are not directly
comparable with the experiments reported in Chapter 4.
Procedure
Each of the three groups made single category judgements at stage 1 (e.g. A
FOOD; A FLAVOURING; A PLANT). The design of the experiment at s
summarized in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2
Task Summary for Experiment 8
Stage 1 Stage 2
Group 1 ABC A B C
Group 2 ABC (A B) C
Group 3 ABC (A B C)
Categories within brackets are conjoined
all other conjunctions are Boolean and




2, (A B) denotes
Group 1
Group 1 served as a control group, and thus at stage 2 received single category
judgements as they had at stage 1. The stage 2 judgements for each category
triple were Booleanly conjoined, as in Experiment 6. For example, at stage 1, a
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subject might judge "tomato" to be a FOOD, a PLANT but not a FLAVOURING (++-).
At the second stage they might judge "tomato" to be a member of all three
categories (+++). The Boolean conjunction of the responses at stage 2 is
whereas the Boolean conjuction of the responses at stage 1 is This is an
overextension. This control provides an estimate of the number of overextensions
and underextensions expected, even if the subject always makes Boolean
judgements. Not all changes between responses at stage 1 and stage 2 will result
in an overextension or an underextension. Suppose that a subject responds (+-+)
at stage 1 and (++-) at stage 2. The Boolean conjunction of the responses at stage
2 is This is consistent with the Boolean conjunction of the stage 1 judgement.
Group 2
At stage 2, Group 2 combined two categories of the triple, e.g. A FOOD AND A
FLAVOURING, and judged the remaining category, A PLANT, separately. Equal
numbers of lists were headed by each possible pair of categories (in this case,
Food-Plant, Food-Flavouring, Plant-Flavouring). Some subjects judged the conjunct
A FOOD AND A PLANT and the single category A FLAVOURING, some judged the
conjunct A FLAVOURING AND A PLANT and the single category FOOD, and so on.
Thus the results are not biased by choosing one particular pair of categories.
The judgement for the conjunct (e.g. +) and the judgement for the single category
(e.g. -) were then Booleanly combined (-) to provide an estimate of the number of
overextensions and underextensions resulting from the combination of two
categories by the subjects. It is necessary to have subjects judge the single
category so that the results of all three groups are directly comparable. This .is
because some of the overextensions in the binary cases would not be picked up in
the triple conjunction.
Group 3
At stage 2, Group 3 judged the membership of the triple conjunction (e.g. A FOOD,
A PLANT AND A FLAVOURING). In all other ways the procedure was the same as
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that of Experiment 6.
Rationale for Controls
If a comparison is to be made between groups to assess non-Boolean effects, it is
crucial that the task is such that a strictly Boolean model of conjunction predicts
the same number of overextensions and underextensions in each group. Hence,
any difference in the number of overextensions or underextensions between
groups is evidence for non-Boolean combination. This consideration led to the
inclusion of single category judgements (for the remaining category of the triple)
in addition to binary judgements, at stage 2. Thus, subjects judged, for example,
the binary category A TOOL AND A WEAPON and also the single category FARM
EQUIPMENT. It may seem more natural to have subjects judge the binary
conjunction alone and compare the number of overextensions and underextensions
directly with those judging triple conjunctions in Group 3. However, if this strategy
were adopted a purely Boolean model would predict a greater number of
overextensions and underextensions in Group 2 than in Group 3. This is because
some overextensions and underextensions will be counted in Group 2, but hidden
in Group 3. Suppose that a subject uses a completely Boolean strategy. In this
case all overextensions and underextensions are due to forgetting, changing one's
mind and so on. At stage 1, this subject might judge a "hammer" to be A TOOL,
but not A WEAPON or FARM EQUIPMENT (+—). At stage 2, the subject might judge
a "hammer" A TOOL and A WEAPON but not FARM EQUIPMENT. We now show, that
using the attractive method of counting overextensions and underextensions
described above, leads to this perfectly Boolean subject being classified as an
overextender if in Group 2, but not in Group 3. If the subject is in Group 2,
"hammer" will be judged to be A TOOL AND A WEAPON at stage 2, though it was
not judged to be a WEAPON at stage 1. Hence, the subject would have
overextended. On the other hand, the same change of mind does not lead to an
overextension in Group 3. "Hammer" is rated as both A TOOL and A WEAPON at
stage 2, but since it is not FARM EQUIPMENT, "hammer" is judged not to be A
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TOOL, A WEAPON AND FARM EQUIPMENT. This is illustrated in Figure 2.
In order that overextensions in Groups 1,2 & 3 be comparable, it is necessary to
incorporate a judgement about the third category (FARM EQUIPMENT) in all groups.
Hence, for Group 2, it is necessary to compute the Boolean conjunction of
judgements for the binary category (A WEAPON AND A TOOL) and the single
category (FARM EQUIPMENT). The outcome of this procedure (in this case "-") is
then compared to the subject's stage 1 judgements to assess the number of
overextensions and underextensions appropriately. On a Boolean model of
conjunction, the number of overextensions and underextensions should be the
same across groups - see Figure 3.
The Compensation Hypothesis predicts that the more categories a subject conjoins
the greater the number of overextensions will be made. Thus, there will be more
overextensions in Group 3 than in Group 2, and more in Group 2 than in Group 1.
In contrast, as I have noted, the Boolean hypothesis predicts that there should be
no difference in the number of overextensions or underextensions in the three
groups. Furthermore, considerations analagous to those outlined above show that,
the number of overextensions should equal the number of underextensions in each
group.
FIGURE 3
A WEAPON A TOOL FARM EQUIPMENT
Group 2
Stage 1 +
Stage 2 ( + + )
Stage 2 (++) is Booleanly conjoined to give (+)
for A WEAPON AND A TOOL. This is an overextension.
Group 3
Stage 1 +
Stage 2 ( + +
Stage 2 (++-) is Booleanly conjoined to give (-)




A 2 X 3 mixed ANOVA was performed. A main effect of response type was found
(/^ 1, 33) = 16.7, p < 0.05). Inspection of the means showed that this was due to
subjects' tendency to overextend rather than underextend their categories (see
Table 12). The main effect of group was also significant (f\2,33) = 9.72, p < 0.05).
There is a significant interaction between response type (overextensions vs
underextensions) and group (single judgements, binary judgements, triple
judgements) (f{2,33) = 6.62, p < 0.05). Post hoc t-tests showed that, as expected,
there was no difference between the number of overextensions and
underextensions in Group 1 (t = 0.07 (11), p > 0.05) (See Table 12). In Groups 2
and 3, however, there were significantly more overextensions than underextensions
(t = 3.33 (11), p < 0.01 in Group 2; t = 3.56 (11), p < 0.01 in Group 3). As argued
above, if subjects used a Boolean combination strategy, the number of
overextensions and underextensions should be the same for all groups. A post-hoc
Joncqheere Trend test showed that there was a significant increase in
overextensions from Group 1 through to Group 3 (S=160 (12), p < 0.05). These
results show that the more constituents the subjects have to conjoin, the greater
their propensity to overextend. This finding is exactly what the Compensation
Hypothesis predicts.
Table 12
Overextensions and underextensions made in Experiment
8, as a function of the number of categories subjects
conjoined.
Overextensions Underextensions
Group 1 (single 34 33
judgements)
Group 2 (binary 53 19
conjunction)
Group 3 (triple 117 27
conjunction)
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5.3. Implications of a Compensation Model
I have proposed that conjunctive categorization judgements are a result of a best
fit strategy. Thus, when subjects have a number of criteria to meet simultaneously,
they tend to interpret these criteria more leniently than when they are judged
independently. So when a simple category is in the context of being a constituent
of a complex category, it is more likely to be overextended by the subject. Concept
combination can be construed as a particular sort of context effect where each
constituent of the compound acts as a context for the other. For example, in
understanding the complex concept PET FISH, the word "pet" influences the kind of
fish we expect, and the word "fish" influences the kind of pet we expect, because
of what we know about fish and pets. In this light the phenomenon of
overextension can be construed as another example of the context dependency of
category judgements.
Contextual influence in concept combination has been explained as a matter of
making best fit judgements to a number of criteria. This view may be extended to
the general problem of contextual influence on categorization. Categorization
judgements may be seen as "best fit" matches to the constraints context has
imposed. In such a view, just as the word "pet" provides a context which alters
what is judged to be a fish, the real life context of a pet shop alters what is
judged to be a fish.
If concept combination is a product of best fit matching, it will not be possible to
understand when and why particular concepts may be overextended without
adverting to world knowledge. Overextension, and conceptual flexiblity, is
constrained by general knowledge about the situation. Thinking back to the
example of choosing someone for a theatrical role, it may be allowable to construe
5'8" as tall, and an ordinary looking man as handsome. On the other hand, in the
context of a play about Edinburgh it may not be possible to overextend the
criterion that the actor has a Scottish accent. This is because a Scottish audience
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would find such a compromise unacceptable. However, this requirement too is
subject to context. If the production is touring Japan then an Irish accent might do
just as well. The compromises made in best fit matching appear to be a product of
understanding the immediate situation. Thus, in order to have a full account of
conceptual combination, it may be necessary to take account of subjects'
understanding of the world. A compensation account of concept combination is
thus consonant with the view that concepts must be understood in the context of
theories of world (e.g. Murphy & Medin, 1985).
Murphy & Medin (1985) and Lakoff (1986) have proposed an alternative to the
compositional account put forward in the inheritance of attributes model. Instead
they argue that concepts are not compositional in any simple sense. These authors
point out that conceptual features are not independent, but interrelated. Hence, we
know that fish are cold and slimy because we know they live in water, and so on.
Medin and others have proposed that conceptual combination is a process of
discovering, or inventing, a relation between concepts. He emphasizes the
importance of seeing concepts as embedded in theories. A theory based account
of conceptual combination can also explain the data accounted for in the
inheritance of attributes model. For instance, if people use relational theories to
organize meaning, then it might be expected that an attribute listing experiment
would not reflect the intensions of concepts, but the implications of the particular
theory the person had in mind. Thus, it is not intensions which combine when
words join, but different theories which are invoked, and which concentrate on
different relations.
Another cause of overextensions may be what Tversky & Kahneman (1983) have
called "the conjunction fallacy", when the generation of a theory links (perhaps
fallaciously) two previously unrelated concepts. Tversky & Kahneman have
demonstrated that people rate two unlikely events which are related together in a
theory as more likely to occur than either event independently. For example,
people thought it unlikely that "A massive flood somewhere in North America in
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1983, in which more than 1,000 people would drown", unlikely to occur. The same
people thought it more likely, however, that "An earthquake in California sometime
in 1983" would cause "a flood in which more than 1,000 people drown". This could
be described as an overextension: flood (-), earthquake (+), flood and earthquake
(+)•
The problem with a theory approach to concepts is that the approach has not
been clearly articulated. It is a theoretical notion which seems to be saying that in
order to understand any word we need to employ all our world knowledge.
Moreover, rather than that world knowledge being organized in concepts, as
previously thought, it seems that it is unstructured and we must access all or
nothing! In Chapter 6, I will argue that knowledge can be represented in a way
consonant with a theory approach. The idea that concepts are the result of
theories is, I believe, a major step forward in trying to address the real questions
of why concepts combine in the way they do.
A possible objection to using the facts of overextension as support for the
appropriateness of a theory based approach, might be that Hampton's Inheritance
of Attributes model (see section 4.6) is also capable of explaining the increase in
overextension with triple conjunctions. Such an explanation would be that as more
categories are introduced, more attributes conflict. When these conflicts are
resolved in the conjunction, items previously excluded from the constituent
category are admitted to membership in the conjunction. What is not clear is what
effect increasing the number of categories to be conjoined would have on other
response options. For example, it might be that a new category introduces new
attributes which were not required for any of the other constituents, this may lead
to an increase in the number of consistent responses, by excluding previous
overextensions (see Figure 3). Since this is possibly the case, it is unclear that an
Inheritance of Attributes model predicts a substantial increase in overextensions in
Experiment 8. This is because in a study of 16 items the introduction of a third
category is just as likely to increase the number of additional new attributes
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(leading to more consistent responses, and thus excluding possibilities to
overextend) as additional attribute conflicts (leading to overextensions). Thus,
although the Inheritance of Attributes model can provide an ad hoc explanation of
the increase in overextensions with triple conjunctions, it does not clearly predict
such a change.
Moreover, the Compensation Hypothesis has several theoretical advantages over
an Inheritance of Attributes model. Firstly, it does not require the decomposition of
each category into attributes which are subsequently combined according to a set
of combination rules. As has been noted elsewhere, such a proposition has serious
drawbacks (see Sections 4.6 and 6.2). Secondly, the Compensation Hypothesis has
the advantage of not having to construe overextensions as by-products of
processing, but has a theoretical framework in which an investigation of their
strategic value is appropriate. As I have argued previously it may be more
productive to view context effects as "normal" categorization rather than as
complicated exceptions. Similarly, overextension may not be most profitably
investigated as an exception to "normal" logical combination. Both phenomena are
central to our categorization processes, and may well be highly motivated. The
Compensation Hypothesis provides a framework in which it is appropriate to
investigate what may be an important classification strategy.
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CHAPTER 6
CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTS: A FUTURE PERSPECTIVE
6.1. Conspectus
The aim of this thesis has been to investigate the structure of concepts, the effect
of contextual change on that structure and, in particular, the process of conceptual
combination.
In Chapter 1, four functions that concepts are used to fulfil are described. Firstly,
concepts are used to explain stability in response to particular stimuli, and thus to
enable effective communication. Secondly, concepts are thought to represent
ontological and linguistic information which enables simple inference. Thirdly,
concepts are thought to contain the information people use to make simple
categorization decisions, to be an intrinsic part of how those decisions are made.
Fourthly, concepts are similarly used to explain complex categorizations.
Three major theories of concepts were assessed with respect to these four
conceptual functions. It was noted that the Classical View could not provide an
adequate explanation of categorization phenomena, because of its reliance on
defining features. Thus, the need for the inclusion of characteristic features in the
conceptual representation was highlighted. This amended position is close to the
Probabilistic Views which provide a more satisfactory account of simple
categorization. However, the Probabilistic Views find it difficult to explain complex
categorization, particularly since Fuzzy Set Theory has been heavily criticized. The
third theory of concepts considered was the Exemplar View. This theory differs
from the others, by rejecting the notion of a summary category concept, and
insisting on a holistic representation. The Exemplar View provides a good account
of simple categorization phenomena, but seems to imply that concepts are
completely non-compositional. It was noted that the adoption of a holistic
representation excludes the concept from fulfilling any linguistic/ontological role.
The first chapter concluded with a discussion of the possible implications of
categorization on conceptual theories, in light of the debate on epistemology
versus metaphysics.
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In Experiment 1, the question of conceptual stability was addressed. An
assessment was made of the changes in GOE as a result of context. Changes in
context were found to completely restructure the GOE distribution. Differences in
sentence structure were found to have little effect on meaning, supporting the
notion that complex concepts are routinely formed in contexts where the qualifier
does not occur immediately prior to the noun. Chapter 2 concludes with an
assessment of the usefulness of the notion of similarity in explaining conceptual
structure. The close relationship between similarity and conceptual coherence is
noted, although it is argued that similarity alone is not sufficient to explain
coherence. The question was raised of how context relevant attributes, over which
similarity can be computed, are selected.
The issue of conceptual coherence was explored further in Chapter 3. It was
concluded that coherence may be one measure people use to constrain meaning.
The question of whether concepts can provide conceptual coherence was
assessed, by examining the range of context effects on an on-line reading task.
Experiment 2, demonstrated that context is immediately taken into account when
making categorization decisions while reading. It was found that in the context of a
target sentence (e.g "You found it!" said Andy, noticing the broken tool in the
workshop) modified picture probes (broken hammer) are identified as members of
the category (tool) more quickly than more typical, unmodified pictures (hammer).
The possibility that this was the result of subjects using an overall matching
strategy, in which the adjective and the noun were matched to the picture
independently, was assessed in Experiment 3. In this case, the adjective was not
represented in the picture independently from the noun (e.g. fairground fruit). The
conclusion from Experiment 3, was that the effect of context could not be
explained simply in terms of an overall matching strategy, but that context
influenced the retrieval of category exemplars. The fact that context effects cannot
be ascribed to a post-access period, make it unlikely that coherence is a result of
conceptual representation alone. Medin's suggestion that coherence results from
theories is considered in this light. The idea, that the process by which relevant
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attributes are selected in different contexts results from the formation of different
complex concepts, was proposed. An understanding of the process of concept
combination was seen as vital for the development of conceptual theory.
In Chapter 4, the process of conceptual combination was studied. Although it is
the prevailing view of conceptual combination that concepts combine
compositionally, it was demonstrated that subjects do not form conjunctions
according to a Boolean model. Rather, it was found that subjects overextend their
categories; that is, they include items in conjuncts they have previously excluded
from constituent categories. This tendency was found to be robust under several
manipulations. Since the Boolean account of conceptual combination seemed
inadequate, an alternative account, proposing intensional compositionality, was
examined. Although an intensional account seemed to hold more promise in
describing conceptual combination, and explaining overextension, it was noted that
most of the explanatory work was being done by changes in feature weightings,
that were peripheral to the theory. It was concluded that the explanation for the
interactive combination of concepts, could not be provided in the intensions of
concepts alone, but rather, must include the relationships between concepts in a
particular context.
In Chapter 5, an alternative account of overextension is considered. It is suggested
that people have a motive to overextend in many everyday categorization
decisions, and that this tendency is carried over to decisions where no such
motive is obvious. Use of such a best fit strategy, predicts that the larger the
categories conjoined, the greater the tendency to overextend. In Experiment 8,
subjects judging membership of triple conjuncts overextended considerably more
than those judging membership of binary conjuncts. In considering the implications
of this effect, the Inheritance of Attributes model was reconsidered, but the
importance of adopting a theory based approach was reiterated. It was noted that
a possible problem with such an approach, is the conception of how theories
might be represented.
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In this chapter I will conclude that most conceptual theories have a very limited
applicability. I will argue that this is so, because of the assumption that concepts
have localized representations. An argument for a globalist view of representation
is presented, and it is demonstrated that it is consonant with Medin's theory based
approach. I conclude by outlining how localist and globalist approaches might be
distinguished experimentally.
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6.2. Localism and Globalism 3
With the exception of a theory based approach to meaning, current theories of
concepts all hold the implicit theoretical assumption that concepts are
psychologically localised. That is, a concept corresponds to a unit which contains
the information necessary to understand that concept (Collins & Quillian, 1969;
Glass & Holyoak, 1975; Katz & Postal, 1964; Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974; Miller &
Johnson-Laird, 1976; McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1979; Fodor, 1981; Barsalou, 1982).
For instance, many theorists ascribe to each lexical item of natural language an
entry in a mental lexicon, which must be accessed to understand the word. Thus,
to have a concept is to have the appropriate 'packet' of information. Intuitively it
seems that the meaning of a phrase (e.g. "black cat") is typically derived from the
meaning of its parts (the words "black" and "cat"). Correspondingly, complex
concepts (e.g. BLACK CAT) are derived from their constituent concepts (BLACK and
CAT). According to the localist view, concept combination is a matter of putting
simple packets together. I argued in Section 4:1 that many theorists hold such a
compositional view of meaning, although there appears to be no satisfactory
account of how constituent prototypes can be combined compositionally to
produce complex prototypes (although see section 4.6 for a contender). In order to
develop a theory which can adequately account for the flexibility and context
sensitivity of prototypes, and prototype combination, the implicit localism of
current views may have to be rejected.
Why is a New Account Needed?
In chapters 2 and 3 it was demonstrated that prototype views fail to provide an
inkling of how concepts may be combined. Hence, it seems unacceptable to
identify concepts with prototype representations. To capture compositionality it
appears necessary to invoke the Definitional view of the structure of concepts, and
3
Material contained in this section is currently being published (Lyon & Chater, in press)
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to explain prototype effects as side effects of processing rather than as functions
of the representation per sa It was demonstrated in Chapter 4 that a Definitional
account, which seems able to capture the apparent compositionality of phrases
such "black cat", cannot provide an adequate explanation of membership decisions
for simple conjunctions. Thus, it was concluded that a Definitional account alone
cannot provide a complete theory of concepts.
One reason why it may have been so hard to develop a theory of concepts
capable of handling concept combination is the implicit localism of many current
theories. That is, the problem of concept combination is thought to be that of
providing a function which somehow composes the packets of information
corresponding to the constituents into a packet of information corresponding to
the complex concept. However, as I have claimed, the problem of concept
combination may in fact be a special case of the more general phenomenon of
contextual influence on concepts. If this is the case then just as context effects are
generally agreed to depend upon world knowledge, world knowledge may be
crucially implicated in concept combination. I shall consider below evidence
against the localist notion of concepts. I will argue that no localist account of
concepts can be maintained, and propose that a globalist alternative, in which
prototype effects are knowledge driven expectations, must be developed.
According to a globalist view, concepts are a function of high level knowledge of
the world, computed on the fly.
Problems with Localism
A localist view is intuitively appealing - when we say that a child has the concept
DOG it sounds as if that child possesses some fixed mental structure (the concept
DOG), which the child accesses when dogs are recognized. Once the structure is in
place, it can be used to construct memories about dogs, generate and understand
sentences involving the word "dog" and so on. Thus the localised concept provides
a building block for the mental operations of recognition, memory, and language.
However, the localist view has difficulty in accounting for a wide range of
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well-known data. In particular it is hard to explain the facts that (i) concepts are
highly flexible and context sensitive; and that (ii) as has just been shown, concepts
do not appear to combine compositionally. I propose that it is the localised notion
of concepts which makes these ubiquitous phenomena so difficult to explain.
In order to explain prototype effects some notion of typicality, or similarity to a
prototype is used. This is problematic for the localist because the prototype and
the notion of similarity used appear to be a function of the context. Thus, at the
fishmonger my prototypical fish might be close to a cod; and my similarity
judgements might be based on flavour, appearance and price. On the other hand,
at the pet shop my prototypical fish might be near a goldfish; and my similarity
metric might be based on size, shape and living conditions. There only seem to be
two explanations for this phenomenon which appear to be available to the localist.
The first is that these uses of the term 'fish' are simply polysemous: that is that
these uses correspond to distinct lexical entries in the same way as (river) bank
and (high street) bank. That lexical items have a finite set of distinct senses in the
mental lexicon is the "sense selection assumption" (Clark, 1983). However,
polysemy is an inadequate explanation of context sensitivity since there appear to
be as many goodness of fit distributions as there are contexts (Roth & Shoben,
1983). Further it appears that prototypicality effects can be obtained for
completely novel concepts like people from London with green hair (Barsalou,
1983). It seems most plausible that rather than retrieving stored goodness of fit
distributions from memory we create them on line. Indeed, the goodness of
example distribution seems to be a reflection of what the subjects expect an
instance to be like, given their knowledge of the world. Hence prototypes are a
function of the whole cognitive process, rather than being building blocks out of
which such processes can be constructed. It is simply the recognition of these
facts that distinguishes the globalist view.
The other explanation of the flexibility and context dependence of prototypicality,
open to the localist, is that changes in the goodness of example distribution are a
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result of post-access inferences. That is, the same conceptual representation is
retrieved on all occasions of use, but subsequent inferences then determine the
contextual plausibility of an instance (Gumenik, 1979; Whitney & Kellas, 1984). As
reported in Chapter 2, Whitney & Kellas (1984) claimed to provide empirical support
for this point of view, by using a Stroop paradigm. They found, for example, that
"bird" will prime the word "robin" more than the word "chicken", even in a context
such as "the guest saw the bird that roasted on the grill", which strongly suggests
the less typical bird. However, I did not replicate these results in a similar
experiment reported in Chapter 2. Subsequent experiments reported in Chapter 3
(after Potter & Faulconer, 1979) appear to show immediate contextual modification
in a picture recognition task, given a sentential context. This implies that
contextual modification is immediate and not reliant on post access reasoning.
It is a central task for a theory of concepts to explain how it is that inference and
world knowledge can influence the goodness of example distribution in response
to context. So, even if there is an underlying localist mechanism of combination
which is not sensitive to context (which is an unresolved question), a complete
explanation of the data will require a detailed consideration of world knowledge
rich effects. Until there is firm evidence to the contrary, parsimony surely dictates
that a 'two tier' explanation of prototype phenomena is not postulated.
A Globalist Alternative
Murphy & Medin (1985) have pointed out the role of naive theories of the world in
conceptual coherence. Even in the early prototype views (Rosch, 1973) it was
postulated that the prototype is a function of the way in which the structure of the
world is described within a particular culture. This shared cultural knowledge was
held to determine the prototype that an individual must have in order to possess a
concept. Thus the theories by which the world is understood are crucially
implicated in determining the structure of prototypes. According to this picture,
world knowledge is distilled into a localisable packet, the fixed prototype. This
approach must be extended, however, to account for subjects' rapid construction
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of contextually appropriate goodness of example distributions. For example, if the
words "musical instrument" are heard at a Classical concert hall my prototype
might be close to violin; if I am going to a rock concert my prototype might be
close to electric guitar.
The primary goal of a theory of concepts must be to explain the everyday use of
words in real contexts. Even in cases where context is underspecified (e.g. hearing
the words "musical instrument" as the radio is switched on) people attempt to
provide their own contexts using their common sense theories about what makes
most sense in the circumstances (for example, what radio station it is). Thus,
context effects are the rule rather than the exception. Context effects cannot be
viewed as limited deformations of some fixed, stored, conceptual representation
which applies in the alleged 'null' context.
In this thesis, I have demonstrated that neither Prototype nor Definitional views
appear to provide an adequate explanation of context effects. Rather than localising
the representation of the meaning of a word in some packet of information, the
process of understanding seems more likely to be a matter of the generation of
expectations on the basis of our world knowledge, rather than assessing similarity
to a prototype. Consider the analogy of a landmine. States of the world can be
'categorized' as: those in which the mine detonates, and those in which it does
not. Thus, the mine can be considered as a categorizor - dividing the world into
two. The states of the world in which the mine detonates (distant earthquakes,
nearby tanks, floods causing water to leak in, electric storms, and so on) need
have nothing in common other than that they detonate the mine. Further, which
states detonate the mine is a function of the structure of the whole mine (how
shock resistant, waterproof, and resistant to electrical activity it is). The
'categorization' of the world into detonating and non-detonating circumstances
cannot be explained by saying that the mine possesses some localisable structure
which corresponds to the 'concept' DETONATE (Note 9). Analogously, human
categorization judgements cannot be understood without considering the cognitive
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system at large. Thus, I propose that concepts cannot be identified as
psychologically localised structures but are globally determined by the cognitive
system.
The problem of deploying our world knowledge appropriately has been found to be
crucially implicated in a wide variety of cognitive domains (Minsky, 1975). Some
workers in Artificial Intelligence have attempted to understand the way in which
our theories of the world are represented using fixed primitive concepts as
building blocks (Schank & Abelson, 1977; Hayes, 1978). Perhaps one reason why
such approaches have been so unsuccessful (Fox & McDermott, 1986) is that they
treat concepts as rigid blocks, where in fact they are as mysterious, unstable, and
flexible as the processes they are used to model. Current successes of PDP
models may be due in part to their utilization of the principle of distributed
representation.
A globalist theory of concepts may seem alarming since it seems that to
understand concepts our common sense theories of the world must also be
understood. However, difficult problems cannot be solved by providing simple
solutions to easy problems. The theory approach to concepts as proposed by
Medin and others, seems compatible with a globalist approach to concepts. I
believe it is only with this type of theory that real progress can be made in
understanding conceptual representation.
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6.3. A Developmental Perspective on Localism and Globalism
In the previous section I proposed a globalist hypothesis in which concepts are
characterized as being generated on line as a function of the whole cognitive
system (see also Lyon & Chater, in press). Globalism emphasizes the constructive
nature of concepts, and the central role of world knowledge in such constructions.
This view is consonant with a change of emphasis currently advocated by some
researchers (e.g. Douglas Medin, Ulric Neisser, George Lakoff, Benny Shanon). This
position is radically different from traditional "localist" theories of representation
which rely on the retrieval of "stored packets of meaning". Context effects and
conceptual combination have proved stumbling blocks for all localist theories, this
may indicate that a conceptual jump, such as adopting a globalist view, is needed
to provide the necessary apparatus to tackle these phenomena. Although the
dispute between localist and globalist theories of representation is a high level
one, the approaches do predict differences with regard to concept acquisition.
According to the globalist view, the possession of a concept is a direct function of
the ability to apply world knowledge. In this way, categorization is directly tied to
the theory of the domain in which the categorization is being made. Thus,
globalism predicts that the concept a child uses in a particular situation will
depend on the theory the child has of that situation. This yields an important
prediction for newly acquired concepts. This prediction can be illustrated with the
example of a child learning the concept FISH. In the fish shop, the child's concept
is based on the kind of fish usually found there: cod fillets, whole trout, smoked
kippers, shellfish. So, in this context, the child learns to categorize fish using
criteria appropriate to the domain (such as fillets vs whole fish, smell, colour of
flesh, taste etc). For the globalist, even at the earliest stages of development,
concepts will be context sensitive, as the concepts used to make a categorization
are created relative to the domain.
The globalist predicts that to be able to extract uniformity across contexts is more
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difficult than to understand a concept in a particular context. Thus, the abstract
theories which draw out the similarities between words in different contexts
should be a late cognitive development. The realization that fish in the fish shop
share many properties with fish in the pet shop, for example, should only arise
when the child's theory is sufficiently well developed. For the child to use some of
the same criteria to judge fish in the fish shop and fish in the pet shop, demands
that the child's theory must be broad enough to relate together pet fish and fish
for tea. Thus, the globalist predicts that to be able to extract uniformity across
contexts is more difficult than to understand a concept in a given context. Since
context sensitivity is the norm, and stability across contexts is a late development,
the globalist prediction is that children's categorization judgements will be more
context dependent than those of adults.
The globalist prediction is in direct contradiction to more traditional localist
accounts; which assume that to possess a concept is to possess a stored packet
of meaning. The localist perceives concepts as simple building blocks, and context
effects as producing complicated modifications of these basic units. In the same
way, complex concepts are characterized as the result of a process which puts
simple packets together. The localist explains the context sensitivity and flexibility
of concepts by claiming that the concept is first accessed, then modified in a
contextually appropriate way. Thus, the application of world knowledge to produce
appropriate contextual changes is seen as a high level addition to the basic
categorization process. Hence, the ability to manipulate these stored concepts,
producing conceptual flexibility, should gradually evolve during development.
Although it should be expected that children's concepts are extremely variable over
time, and between individuals, the localist view suggests that children's concepts
will not be as flexible in response to context as those of adults. Thus, the localist
prediction is that children's categorization judgements will be less context
sensitive than those of adults.
The differing predictions of localist and globaiist theories with respect to concept
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acquisition, presents a welcome possibility of testing the appropriateness of a
globalist view experimentally.
CONCLUSION
The issues of conceptual representation cannot hope to be solved in a thesis, and
many aspects of the whole notion of representation are unsatisfactory. There are
still no clear answers to how world knowledge is stored and utilized in thought
and language. Investigating the notion that world knowledge is stored in concepts
has led me to the conclusion that large amounts of world knowledge must be
fundamentally involved in the interpretation of every "concept". The fact that
theory approaches concentrate on the relational aspects of meaning, might make




1. CAPITAL LETTERS are used to denote concepts. "Inverted
commas" are used to denote words or phrases. Normal type is
used to denote referents in the world.
2. Rey (1983) draws an important distinction between
metaphysical and epistemological function which will be
discussed later in the chapter (see section 1:5).
3. It may be noted that this approach makes no attempt to explain
what it is that makes some instances more similar to the
prototype than others. This is a just criticism but it is
important to bear in mind that the ad hoc postulation of
underlying features is not an explanation either, but the
displacement of the problem to a lower level.
4. This point may be criticised by pointing out that concepts like
APPLE and ORANGE are themselves abstracted from the total
set of apples and oranges. A logical extension of the Exemplar
View would simply state that the concept APPLE has a holistic
prototypical representation consisting of a small group of best
instances.
5. Weak versions of the Exemplar View simply allow for the
representation of some abstract information in concepts.
Theories of this form are subject to similar criticisms as the
Probabilistic approaches.
6. There were two possible exceptions to this in the case of "pale
vegetable" and "colourful bird". In these examples the
"paleness" and "colourfulness" of the unmodified and modified
pictures was matched. Hence any relative difference in
response to modified probes could not be a result of how well
the probe matched the adjective.
7. Potter & Faulconer's finding that modified probes did not have
shorter response latencies than unmodified probes when the
context sentence contained a modifying adjective separated
from the noun, does not necessarily contradict Barsalou's
notion. This is because Potter & Faulconer's task specifically
encouraged subjects to ignore the sentence, while in real-life
sentence processing, context is a central component.
8. Proof that the probability of overextensions and
underextensions is equal. In Hampton's original formulae, there
are separate parameters (s-] and s^which denoted whether the
category was rated first or second. In these experiments order




= s.g.[ u2.(0) + u.(1 - u).(1 - g) + (1 - u).u.(1 - s) + (1 -
u)2.(1 -s.g) ]
= s.g.[ (u - u2).(2 - s - g) + (1 - 2.u + u2).(1 - s.g) ]
= s.g.[ (u2(s + g - 1 - s.g)
+ u.(2.s.g - s - g)
+ (1 - s.g) ]
Overextensions:
p(+-+) + p(-++) + p(—+)
= s.(1 - g).[u2.(0) + u.(1 - u).g + (1 - u).u.(O) + (1 -
u)2.s.g]
+ (1 - s).g.[u2.(0) + u.(1 - u).(0) + (1 - u).u.s + (1 -
u)2.s.g]
+ (1 - s).(1 - g).[(1 - u)2.s.g]
(u - u2).[s.g.(1 - g) + s.g.(1 - s)]
+ (1 - 2.u + u2).[s2.g.(1 -g) + s.g2.(1 - s) + s.g.(1
" s).(1 - g)]
= s.g.[ (u2.(s + g - 1 - s.g)
+ u.(2.s.g - s - g)
+ (1 " s.g) ]
9. Thanks to Nick Chater who provided this example.
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APPENDIX 1
TABLE A1: FREQUENCY LISTS OF EXAMPLES FOR THREE FORMS OF TEN TYPICAL
SENTENCES.
EXEMPLAR FREQ % EXEMPLAR FREQ %
The woman screamed "Help" as she stared at the weapon in his hand.
FIRST Gun 13 56.5 Sword 1 4.3
Knife 6 26.0 Blade 1 4.3
Revolver 1 4.3 Sawn-Off Shotgun 1 4.3
SECOND Knife 9 39.1 Dagger 2 8.7
Gun 7 30.4 Pistol 1 4.3
Axe 2 8.7 Long knife 1 4.3
The woman screamed "It's blood/ as she stared at the weapon in his hand.
FIRST Knife 12 54.5 Gun 1 4.5
Dagger 3 13.6 Machete 1 4.5
Sword 3 13.6 Bread Knife 1 4.5
SECOND Knife 4 18.2 Pitchfork 1 4.5
Axe 4 18.2 Gun 1 4.5
Hammer 3 13.6 Crowbar 1 4.5
Club 3 13.6 Razor 1 4.5
Sword 2 9.1 Hatchet 1 4.5
Chainsaw 1 4.5
The woman screamed "Help" as she stared at the bloody weapon in his hand
FIRST Knife ll 50 Axe 3 13.6
Dagger 7 31.8 Scalpel 1 4.5
SECOND Axe 5 22.7 Truncheon 1 4.5
Sword 3 13.6 Gun 1 4.5
Knife 2 9.1 Poker 1 4.5
Blade 2 9.1 Club 1 4.5
Dagger 2 9.1 Broken Bottle 1 4.5
Chainsaw 1 4.5 Spear 1 4.5
Cudgel 1 4.5
Though Sam had it with him he hoped that the weapon wouldn't be necessary.
FIRST Gun 15 71.4 Switchblade 1 4.8
Knife 4 19 Penknife 1 4.8
SECOND Knife 7 33 Rifle 1 4.8
Dagger 2 9.5 Revolver 1 4.8
Gun 2 9.5 Pipe 1 4.8
Pistol 2 9.5 Grenade 1 4.8
Cudgel 1 4.8 Baton 1 4.8
Flick knife 1 4.8 Truncheon 1 4.8
Though Sam had it with him in a harness he hoped that the weapon wouldn't be
necessary.
FIRST Gun 9 42 .9 Bow l 4.8
Machine gun 3 14.3 Cosh l 4.8
Crossbow 3 14.3 Sawn-off shotgun 1 4.8
Pistol 1 4.8 Tank l 4.8
Lunger 1 4.8
SECOND Sword 5 26.3 Revolver l 4.8
Knife 4 19 .0 Machete l 4.8
Rifle 2 9.5 Catapult l 4.8
Harpoon Gun 1 4.8 Anti-aircraft gun 1 4.8
Flame thrower 1 4.8 Dagger 1 4.8
Bazooka 1 4.8
Though Sam had it with him he hoped that the harnessed weapon wouldn't be
necessary.
FIRST Gun 8 36.4 Bow & Arrow l 4.5
Crossbow 3 13.6 Dagger 1 4.5
Rifle 2 9.1 Pistol 1 4.5
Missile 2 9.1 Sword 1 4.5
Machine gun 2 9.1 Hatchet 1 4.5
SECOND Knife 6 31.6 Truncheon 1 5
Gun 3 15 Rifle 1 5
Bomb 2 10 Bow & Arrow l 5
Pistol 2 10 Sword 1 5
Crossbow 1 5 Icepick 1 5
Cannon 1 5
Attempting to complete the job, Dick moved the vehicle across the site.
FIRST Lorry / Truck 8 36.4 Car 1 4.5
Bulldozer 6 27.3 Earthmover 1 4.5
J.C.B. 2 9.1 Tractor 1 4.5
Excavator 1 4.5 Digger 1 4.5
Dumper Truck 1 4.5
SECOND Lorry / Truck 5 22.7 Combine Harvester 1 4.5
Tractor 4 18.2 Wheelbarrow 1 4.5
Dumper 3 13.6 Fork-Lift Truck 1 4.5
Van 2 9.1 Car 1 4.5
Crane 2 9.1 Caterpillar Truck 1 4.5
Bulldozer 1 4.5
Attempting to complete the job, Dick loaded and moved the vehicle across the
site.
FIRST Truck / Lorry 11 52 . 4 Dump Truck 1 4.8
Fork-Lift Truck 3 14.3 J.C.B. 1 4.8
Van 2 9.5 Digger 1 4.8
Car 2 9.5
SECOND Van 6 28.6 Tractor 2 9.5
Lorry / Truck 6 28.6 Fork-Lift Truck 2 9.5
Car 2 9.5 Bike 1 4.8
Crane 2 9.5
Attempting to complete the job, Dick moved the loaded vehicle across the site.
FIRST Lorry / Truck 8 38.1 Trailer 1 4.8
Van 4 19.0 Pick-Up Truck 1 4.8
Dump Truck 3 14.3 Car 1 4.8
Wheelbarrow 2 9.5 Bulldozer 1 4.8
SECOND Van 5 23.8 Cart 1 4.8
Truck / Lorry 4 19.0 Bus 1 4.8
Wheelbarrow 3 14.3 Articulated Lorry 1 4.8
Tractor 3 14.3 J.C.B. 1 4.8
Digger 2 9.5









Spade 3 13,0 Saw 1 4.3
Spanner 2 8.7
SECOND Hammer 8 34.8 Saw 2 8.7
Screwdriver 6 26.1 Pliers 1 4.3
Chisel 3 13.0 Spanner 1 4.3
Drill 2 8.7
"It's hanging over there" directed Mark, hoping Harry would find the tool where he
left it.
FIRST Hammer 10 45.5 Screwdriver 2 9.1
Saw 6 27.3 Hoe 1 4.5
Spanner 2 9.1 Spade 1 4.5
SECOND Hammer 9 40.9 Hedge Clippers 1 4.5
Screwdriver 3 13.6 Chainsaw 1 4.5
Saw 4 18.2 Garden Fork 1 4.5
Spanner 2 9.1 Hatchet 1 4.5
"It's over there" directed Mark, hoping Harry would find the hanging too! where he
left it.
FIRST Hammer 9 40.9 Rake 1 4.5
Saw 7 31.8 Spanner 1 4.5
Spade 2 9.1 Grass Cutters 1 4.5
Hoe 1 4.5
SECOND Saw 8 36.4 Screwdriver 1 4.5
Hammer 2 9.1 Fork 1 4.5
Spade 2 9.1 Wooden Spoon 1 4.5
Axe 2 9.1 Spanner 1 4.5
Scythe 1 4.5 Drill 1 4.5
Shovel 1 4.5 Shears 1 4.5
"You found it!" said Andy, noticing the too! in the workshop.
FIRST Hammer 10 43.5 Saw 1 4.3
Spanner 3 13.0 Screwdriver 1 4.3
Lathe 2 8.7 Spade 1 4.3
Chisel 2 8.7 Plane 1 4.3
Drill 2 8.7
SECOND Saw 4 18.2 Spanner 1 4.5
Screwdriver 4 18.2 Car Jack 1 4 . 5
Chisel 3 13.6 Axe 1 4 . 5
Fork 2 9.1 Chainsaw 1 4.5
Hammer 2 9.1 Stanley Knife 1 4.5
Plane 2 9.1
"You broke it!" said Andy, noticing the too! in the workshop.
FIRST Screwdriver 4 18.2 Drill 1 4.5
Hamme r 3 13.6 Plane 1 4.5
Spanner 3 13.6 Spirit-Level 1 4.5
Saw 2 9.1 Vice 1 4.5
Chisel 2 9.1 Axe 1 4.5
Hacksaw 2 9.1 Hatchet 1 4.5
SECOND Hammer 3 14.3 Plane 1 4.8
Hacksaw 2 9.5 Drill 1 4.8
Screwdriver 2 9.5 Clamp 1 4.8
Saw 2 9.5 Workmate 1 4.8
Chisel 2 9.5 Spanner 1 4.8
Chainsaw 1 4.8 Rivet Gun 1 4.8
Set Square 1 4.8 Axe 1 4.8
Power drill 1 4.8
"You found it!" said Andy, noticing the broken too!\n the workshop.
FIRST Hammer 6 27.3 Saw 1 4.5
Screwdriver 5 22.7 Screw 1 4.5
Spanner 2 9.1 Spade 1 4.5
Chisel 2 9.1 Lathe 1 4.5
Scythe 1 4.5 Corkscrew 1 4.5
Shovel 1 4.5
SECOND Saw 5 22.7 Nail 1 4.5
Hammer 4 18.2 Fork 1 4.5
Chisel 4 18.2 Spanner 1 4.5
Screwdriver 3 13.6 Spade 1 4.5
Mallet 1 4.5
Helen put it aside because she was in a hurry, even though the fruit appealed to
her.
FIRST Banana 7 31.8 Pineapple 1 4.5
Peach 6 27.3 Grapefruit 1 4.5
Apple 4 18.2 Passion Fruit 1 4.5
Orange 2 9.1
SECOND Apple 8 38.1 Nectarine l 4.8
Banana 5 23.8 Orange 1 4.8
Grapes 2 9.5 Kiwi Fruit 1 4.8
Pear 1 4.8 Lychee 1 4.8
Pineapple 1 4.8
Helen put it aside half-eaten even though the fruit appealed to her.
FIRST Apple 15 68.2 Orange 1 4.5
Pear 3 13.6 Melon 1 4.5
Peach 1 4.5 Banana 1 4.5
SECOND Banana 5 22.7 Peach 2 9.1
Apple 5 22.7 Strawberry 1 4.5
Orange 5 22.7 Grapefruit 1 4.5
Pear 3 13.6
Helen put it aside because she was in a hurry, even though the half-eaten fruit
appealed to her.
FIRST Apple 16 72.7 Banana l 4.5
Orange 2 9.1 Pineapple l 4.5
Pear 2 9.1
SECOND Orange 6 27.3 Grapefruit l 4.5
Banana 5 22.7 Pear l 4.5
Peach 3 13.6 Strawberry l 4.5
Apple 3 13.6 Plum l 4 . 5
Apricot 1 4.5
"They are all there" said Linda, as her mother viewed the fruit in the hall.
FIRST Banana 6 26.1 Mixed Fruit 1 4.3
Orange 5 21.7 Grapes l 4.3
Apple 5 21.7 Grapefruit 1 4.3
Pear 3 13.0 Pineapple 1 4.3
SECOND Banana 5 22.7 Pineapple 2 9.1
Grapes 2 9.1 Coconut 1 4.5
Apple 2 9.1 Pawpaw 1 4.5
Orange 2 9.1 Melon 1 4.5
Grapefruit 2 9.1 Lemon 1 4.5
Pear 2 9.1 Peach 1 4 . 5
"They are all piled' said Linda, as her mother viewed the fruit in the hall.
FIRST Apple 9 40.9 Melon 2 9.1
Orange 6 27.3 Pear 1 4.5
Banana 3 13.6 Mango 1 4.5
SECOND Orange 6 28.6 Lemon 1 4.8
Apple 4 19.0 Pear 1 4.8
Pineapple 2 9.5 Cherries 1 4.8
Grapes 2 9.5 Guava 1 4.8
Peach 1 4.8 Grapefruit 1 4.8
Banana 1 4.8
"They are all there" said Linda, as her mother viewed the piled fruit in the hall.
FIRST Orange 6 27.3 Coconut 2 9.1
Apple 5 22.7 Melon 1 4.5
Banana 4 18.2 Grapefruit 1 4.5
Grapes 2 9.1 Sharon Fruit 1 4.5
SECOND Apple 8 36.4 Watermelon 1 4.5
Orange 3 13.6 Grapefruit 1 4.5
Pineapple 2 9.1 Tomato 1 4.5
Coconut 2 9.1 Grapes 1 4.5
Banana 2 9.1 Cherries 1 4.5
Although it was on loan, Kathy used the piece of furniture all the time.
FIRST Table 6 28.6 Wheelchair 1 4.8
Chair 4 19.0 Hairbrush 1 4.8
Desk 2 9.5 Hi-fi 1 4.8
Sofa 2 9.5 T.V. 1 4.8
Armchair 2 9.5 Bed 1 4.8
SECOND Chair 6 28.6 Desk 1 4.8
Table 5 23.8 Mirror 1 4.8
T.V. 2 9.5 Arm Chair 1 4.8
Piano 2 9.5 Sofa 1 4.8
Bed 1 4.8 Cooker 1 4.8
Although it was an antique Kathy used the piece of furniture all the time.
FIRST Chair 8 34.8 Chest of Drawers 1 4.3
Table 3 13.0 Writing Desk 1 4.3
Piano 2 8.7 Armchair 1 4.3
Desk 2 8.7 Crockery 1 4.3
Rocking Chair 1 4.3 Chamber Pot 1 4.3
Wardrobe 1 4.3 Porcelain Jug 1 4.3
SECOND Table 7 30.4 Upright Chair 1 4.3
Desk 3 13.0 Bed 1 4.3
Chair 3 13.0 Sideboard 1 4.3
Bureau 2 8.7 Silverware 1 4.3
Cupboard 2 8.7 Chaise Longue 1 4.3
Sofa 1 4.3
Although it was on loan, Kathy used the piece of antique furniture all the time.
FIRST Chair 5 25 Bookcase 1 5
Chest of Drawers 3 15 Dressing Table 1 5
Table 3 15 Tea Chest 1 5
Desk 2 10 Chest 1 5
Dresser 1 5 Mirror 1 5
Couch 1 5
SECOND Table 6 30 Bed 1 5
Chest of Drawers 3 15 Lamp 1 5
Chair 3 15 Sideboard 1 5
Spinning Wheel 1 5 Coffee Table 1 5
Oil Lamp 1 5 Wardrobe 1 5
Piano 1 5
The teenager had already acquired some small articles of furniture of her own.
FIRST Table 4 33.3 Welsh Dresser 1 8 . 3
Chair 1 8.3 Lamp 1 8 . 3
Painting 1 8.3 Bedside Table 1 8.3
Dressing Table 1 8.3 Bean Bag 1 8.3
Desk 1 8.3
SECOND Chair 3 25 Stereo Cabinet 1 8.3
Table 2 16.7 Stool 1 8.3
Bean Bag 2 16.7 Water Bed 1 8.3
Cutlery 1 8.3 Bookshelf 1 8.3
The teenager had already acquired some small articles of furniture of modern
design.
FIRST Chair 3 37.5 Table 1 12.5
Lamp 2 25 Coffee Table 1 12.5
Desk 1 12.5
SECOND Chair 2 25 Table 1 12 .5
Bed 2 25 Lamp 1 12 . 5
Shelves 2 25
The teenager had already acquired some small articles of modern furniture of her
own.
FIRST Chair 3 23.1 Couch 1 7.7
Lamp 3 23.1 Wardrobe 1 7.7
Coffee Table 1 7.7 Bean Bag 1 7.7
Table 1 7.7 Hi-fi 1 7.7
Stool 1 7.7
SECOND Lamp 3 23.1 Table 1 7.7
Desk 2 15.4 Chair 1 7.7
Sofa Bed 1 7.7 Bookcase 1 7.7
Bean Bag 1 7.7 Stool 1 7.7
Bedside Table 1 7.7 Video 1 7.7
Although it was borrowed, Jill thought that the clothing would be adequate.
FIRST Coat 6 27.3 Jumper 1 4.5
Dress 4 18.2 Ball Gown 1 4.5
Waterproofs 3 13.6 Skirt 1 4.5
Trousers 2 9.1 Tracksuit 1 4.5
Jacket 1 4.5 Wedding Dress 1 4.5
Dungarees 1 4.5
SECOND Ski Suit 2 9.1 Habit 1 4.8
Trousers 2 9.1 Jacket 1 4.8
Hat 2 9.1 Overall 1 4.8
Jumper 2 9.1 Skirt 1 4.8
Dress 1 4.8 Coat 1 4.8
Nightdress 1 4.8 Gown 1 4.8
Blouse 1 4.8 Scarf 1 4.8
Shoes 1 4.8 Suit 1 4.8
Boots 1 4.8 Jacket 1 4.8
Although it was old, Jill thought that the clothing would be adequate.
FIRST Dress 4 18.2 Thermal Vest 1 4.5
Coat 3 13.6 Anorak 1 4.5
Jumper 3 13.6 Cloak 1 4.5
Ball Gown 2 9.1 Fur Coat 1 4.5
Jacket 2 9.1 Shawl 1 4.5
Bikini 1 4.5 Suit 1 4.5
Jeans 1 4.5
SECOND Coat 7 31.8 Hat 2 9.5
Jumper 4 18.2 G-string 1 4.5
Dress 2 9.5 Fur Coat 1 4.5
Skirt 2 9.5 Shirt 1 4.5
Boots 2 9.5
Although it was borrowed, Jill thought that the old clothing would be adequate.
FIRST Dress 6 26.1 Dungarees 1 4.3
Jumper 4 17.4 Trousers 1 4.3
Shawl 2 8.7 Jacket 1 4.3
Cardigan 2 8.7 Skirt 1 4.3
Coat 2 8.7 T-shirt 1 4.3
Raincoat 1 4.3 Hat 1 4.3
SECOND Skirt 4 17.4 Boned Blouse 1 4.3
Trousers 3 13.0 Raincoat 1 4.3
Shirt 3 13.0 Dress 1 4.3
Coat 2 8.7 Hat 1 4.3
Cardigan 2 8.7 Jacket 1 4.3
Jumper 1 4.3 Climbing Boots 1 4.3
Jeans 1 4.3 Cloak 1 4.3
APPENDIX 1 Continued
TABLE A2: FREQUENCY LISTS OF EXAMPLES FOR THREE FORMS OF TEN ATYPICAL
SENTENCES.
EXEMPLAR FREQ % EXEMPLAR FREQ %
The state authorities used their chosen weapon to execute criminals.
FIRST Electric Chair 5 25 Political
Hanging 5 25 Pressure 1 5
Rifle 2 10 Hobnail Boots 1 5
Gun 2 10 Machine Gun 1 5
Guillotine 2 10 Noose 1 5
SECOND Electric Chair 5 25 Thumbscrew 1 5
Guillotine 2 10 Gas Chamber 1 5
Noose 2 10 Firing Squad 1 5
Rifle 2 10 Shooting 1 5
Hanging 1 5 Axe 1 5
Gun 1 5 Drug Injection 1 5
Pill 1 5
The state authorities used their chosen weapon to execute criminals humanely.
FIRST Electric Chair 7 41.2 Gun 1 5.9
Rifle 3 17.6 Guillotine 1 5.9
Hanging 2 11.8 Injection 1 5.9
Revolver 1 5.9 Gas 1 5.9
SECOND Gun 7 41.2 Guillotine 1 5.9
Electric Chair 3 17.6 Gas 1 5.9
Needle 2 11.8 Poison 1 5.9
Hanging 2 11.8
The state authorities used their humane weapon to execute criminals.
FIRST Electric Chair 5 33.3 Chainsaw 1 6.7
Guillotine 3 20 Axe 1 6.7
Injection 2 13.3 Execution Method 1 6.7
Gas 1 6.7 Noose 1 6.7
SECOND Injection 2 15.4 Gas Chamber 1 7.7
Drugs 2 15.4 Gun 1 7.7
Anaesthetic 2 15.4 Rope 1 7.7
Guillotine 2 15.4 Electric Chair 1 7.7
The young rioter spotted a weapon in the street and hurled it at the policeman.
FIRST Brick 5 29.4 Bomb 1 5.9
Stone 5 29.4 Hand Grenade 1 5.9
Petrol Bomb 4 23.5 Bottle 1 5.9
SECOND Bottle 6 33.3 Tomato 1 5.6
Brick 3 16.7 Petrol Bomb 1 5.6
Grenade 2 11.1 Tyre 1 5.6
Flick Knife 1 5.6
Conveniently, the young rioter spotted a weapon in the street and hurled it at the
policeman.
FIRST Brick 11 64.7 Stone 1 5.9
Bottle 2 11.8 Projectile 1 5.9
Dustbin Lid 1 5.9 Scaffolding Clip 1 5.9
SECOND Bottle 5 31.2 Plank l 6.2
Brick 3 18.8 Fence Post l 6.2
Stick 2 12.5 Pick l 6.2
Stone 1 6.2 Gun 1 6.2
The young rioter spotted a convenient weapon in the street and hurled it at the
policeman.
FIRST Brick 8 40 Rock 1 5
Bottle 7 35 Metal Bar 1 5
Stone 2 10 Pipe 1 5
SECOND Brick 7 35 Stick 1 5
Bottle 3 15 Iron Bar 1 5
Milk Bottle 2 10 Can 1 5
Stone 1 5 Piece of Wood 1 5
Boulder 1 5 Chain 1 5
Dustbin Lid 1 5
Nick thought that the bird he saw at the zoo was very tame.
FIRST Penguin 3 12.5 Macaw 1 4.2
Eagle 3 12 .5 Canary 1 4.2
Ostrich 3 12 .5 Cockatoo 1 4.2
Robin 2 8.3 Buzzard 1 4.2
Emu 2 8.3 Budgie 1 4.2
Owl 2 8.3 Minah Bird 1 4.2
Parakeet 1 4.2 Parrot 1 4.2
Flamingo 1 4.2
SECOND Parrot 5 22.7 Robin 1 4.5
Ostrich 3 13.6 Parakeet 1 4.5
Eagle 2 9.1 Falcon 1 4.5
Peacock 2 9.1 Stork 1 4.5
Emu 2 9.1 Canary 1 4.5
Budgie 2 9.1 Pigeon 1 4.5
Chicken 1 4.5
Nick thought that the bird he saw at the zoo was very colourful.
FIRST Parrot 6 50 Parakeet 1 8 . 3
Cockatoo 2 16.7 Bird of Paradise 1 8.3
Peacock 2 16 .7
SECOND Parrot 2 18.2 Cock 1 9.1
Puffin 1 9.1 Peacock 1 9.1
Quetzal 1 9.1 Canary 1 9.1
Flamingo 1 9.1 Humming Bird 1 9.1
King Penguin 1 9.1 Budgie 1 9.1
Nick thought that the colourful bird he saw at the zoo was very tame.
FIRST Parrot 8 50 Peacock 2 12.5
Flamingo 5 31.2 Pelican 1 6.2
SECOND Parrot 4 26.7 Toucan 1 6.7
Peacock 3 20 Puffin 1 6.7
Cockatoo 2 12 .5 Humming Bird 1 6.7
Flamingo 2 12 .5 Budgie 1 6.7
The retriever brought back the bird that the hunter had seen.
FIRST Pheasant 6 46.2 Grouse 1 7.7
Pigeon 5 38.5 Duck 1 7.7
SECOND Pheasant 3 23.1 Partridge 1 7.7
Duck 3 23.1 Hawk 1 7.7
Pigeon 2 15.4 Goose 1 7.7
Grouse 2 15.4
The retriever brought back the bird that the hunter had seen scavenging.
FIRST Pheasant 4 33.3 Vulture 2 16.7
Partridge 2 16.7 Jackdaw 1 11.1
Grouse 2 16.7 Chaffinch 1 11.1
SECOND Pheasant 3 25 Crow 1 11.1
Grouse 3 25 Quail 1 11.1
Rook 2 16.7 Capercaillie 1 11.1
Duck 1 11.1
The retriever brought back the scavenger bird that the hunter had seen.
FIRST Vulture 4 44.4 Crow 1 11.1
Falcon 1 11.1 Magpie 1 11.1
Seagull 1 11.1 Hawk 1 11.1
SECOND Vulture 2 22.2 Seagull 1 11.1
Gull 1 11.1 Crow 1 11.1
Starling 1 11.1 Eagle 1 11.1
Raven 1 11.1
Although it was unusual the vegetable was served with the meal.
FIRST Courgette 3 17 .6 Artichoke 1 5.9
Aubergine 1 5.9 Tomato 1 5.9
Sweet Potato 1 5.9 Beansprouts 1 5.9
Celeriac 1 5.9 Silverbeet 1 5.9
Lentil 1 5.9 Kumara 1 5.9
Swede 1 5.9 Broccoli 1 5.9
Asparagus 1 5.9 Choko 1 5.9
SECOND Aubergine 2 11.1 Pumpkin 1 5.5
Artichoke 2 11.1 Fennel 1 5.5
Broccoli 2 11.1 Leek 1 5.5
Asparagus 2 11.1 Pepper 1 5.5
Parsnip 1 5.5 Mango 1 5.5
Toro 1 5.5 Mung Beans 1 5.5
Soya 1 5.5 Tomato 1 5.5
Although it was pale the vegetable was served with the meal.
FIRST Parsnip 4 25 Marrow 1 5.5
Potato 4 25 Red Pepper 1 5.5
Turnip 3 18.8 Cabbage 1 5.5
Cauliflower 2 11.1
SECOND Swede 6 37.5 Cauliflower 1 5.5
Turnip 3 18.8 Parsnip 1 5.5
Cabbage 2 11.1 Tomato 1 5.5
Potato 1 5.5 Spinach 1 5.5
Although it was unusual the pale vegetable was served with the meal.
Swede 4 19.0 Potato 1 4.8
Turnip 3 14.3 Cauliflower 1 4.8
Cabbage 2 9.5 Yam 1 CO•
Radish 2 9.5 Parsnip 1 4.8
Aubergine 2 9.5 Cucumber 1 4.8
Celery 1 4.8 Lettuce 1 4.8
Mango 1 4.8
Cabbage 3 15 Kohlrabi 1 5
Turnip 3 15 Avocado 1 5
Parsnip 3 15 Yam 1 5
Potato 2 10 Squash 1 5
Shallot 1 5 Leek 1 5
Summer Cabbage 1 5 Courgette 1 5
Because the vegetable was used, the meal went further.
FIRST Potato 10 76.9 Turnip 1 7.7
Rice 1 7.7 Lettuce 1 7.7
SECOND Rice 4 33.3 Greens 2 16.7
Cabbage 2 16.7 Lettuce 1 8.3
Potato 2 16.7 Pasta 1 8.3
Because the vegetable was cheap the meal went further.
FIRST Potato 13 76.5 Carrot 1 5.9







5 29.4 Rice 1 5.9
3 17.6 Peas 1 5.9
3 17.6 Cabbage 1 5.9
1 5.9 Beans 1 5.9
1 5.9
Because the cheap vegetable was used the meal went further.
FIRST Potato 17 68 Carrot 1 4
Turnip 3 12 Beans 1 4
Rice 2 8 Cabbage 1 4
SECOND Cabbage 9 36 Baked Beans 1 4
Carrot 5 20 Beans 1 4
Potato 4 16 Turnip 1 4
Rice 2 8 Lentils 1 4
Soya Bean 1 4
The tool the fireman used to break into the locked room was a last resort.
FIRST Axe 16 64 Hammer l 4
Hatchet 3 12 Iron Bar l 4
Crowbar 2 8 Hand 1 4
Gun 1 4
SECOND Crowbar 8 32 Chainsaw 1 4
Hammer 5 20 Pick l 4
Axe 3 12 Metal Rod l 4
Brick 2 8 Mallet i 4
Hose 1 4 Hatchet 1 4
Spade 1 4
The tool the fireman used to break into the locked room was heavy.
FIRST Axe 10 58.8 Hammer l 5.9
Pick Axe 2 11.8 Crow Bar 1 5.9
Sledge Hammer 2 11.8 Chainsaw l 5.9
SECOND Sledgehammer 4 26.7 Iron Rod l 6.7
Crowbar 3 20 Battering Ram 1 6.7
Hammer 2 13.3 Fire Hose l 6.7
Axe 1 6.7 Wrench 1 6.7
The heavy too/ the fireman used to break into the locked room was a last resort.
FIRST Axe 7 53.8 Chair 1 7.7
Crowbar 2 15.4 Truncheon 1 7.7
Hammer 1 7.7 Technical Tool 1 7.7
SECOND Axe 5 38.5 Crowbar 2 15.4
Sledge Hammer 2 15.4 Parking Meter 1 7.7
Hammer 2 15.4 Blunt Object 1 7.7
Keith was not allowed to participate because his parents thought the sport was
unhealthy-
FIRST Rugby 6 33.3 Swimming 1 6.2
Jogging 2 12 .5 Motorcycling 1 6.2
Boxing 2 12.5 Competitive
Mountaineering 1 6.2 Activity 1 6.2
Chess 1 6.2 Cockfighting 1 6.2
SECOND Football 4 25 Mountaineering 1 6.2
Rugby 2 12.5 Squash 1 6.2
Games 1 6.2 Racing Driving 1 6.2
Swimming 1 6.2 Darts 1 6.2
Wrestling 1 6.2 Karate 1 6.2
Cr icket 1 6.2 Badger Baiting 1 6.2
Keith was not allowed to participate because his parents thought the sport was
cruel.
FIRST Fox Hunting 9 40 .9 Grouse Shooting 1 4.8
Hunting 4 19.0 Snipes 1 4.8
Deer Stalking 2 9.5 Rugby 1 4.8
Boxing 2 9.5 Shooting 1 4.8
SECOND Fishing 3 13.6 Otter Culling 1 4.5
Cockfighting 3 13.6 Shooting 1 4.5
Fox Hunting 2 9.1 Gang Fights 1 4.5
Deer Hunting 2 9.1 Rugby 1 4.5
Bull Fighting 2 9.1 Polo 1 4.5
Hare Baiting 1 4.5 Horse Racing 1 4.5
Mouse Dissection 1 4.5 Beagling 1 4.5
Badger Baiting 1 4.5
Keith was not allowed to participate because his parents thought the cruel sport
was unhealthy.
FIRST Foxhunting 6 33.3 Bullfighting 1 5.5
Rugby 3 16.7 Fishing 1 5.5
Hunting 2 11.1 Duck Shooting 1 5.5
Boxing 2 11.1 Grid Iron 1 5.5
Football 1 5.5
SECOND Shooting 4 22 .2 Football 1 5.5

















He won the fruit in a competition.
FIRST Coconut 6 35.3 Basket of Fruit 1 5.9
Pineapple 4 23.5 Breadfruit 1 5.9
Melon 2 11.8 Apple 1 5.9
Pomegranate 1 5.9 Goods 1 5.9
SECOND Pineapple 6 37.5 Guava 1 6.2
Melon 3 18.8 Strawberries 1 6.2
Banana 2 12 .5 Grapes 1 6.2
Pomegranate 1 6.2 Mango 1 6.2
He won the fruit in a competition at the fairground.
Coconut 17 70.8 Melon 2 8.3
Apple 3 12.5 Pineapple 2 8.3
Pineapple 7 29.2 Toffee Apple 1 4.2
Coconut 4 16.6 Nuts 1 4.2
Orange 4 16.6 Pomegranate 1 4.2
Apple 2 8.3 Banana 1 4.2
Melon 1 4.2 Passion Fruit 1 4.2
Grapes 1 4.2
He won the fairground fruit in a competition.
FIRST Coconut 7 50 Pineapple 1 7.1
Apple 2 14.3 Banana 1 7.1
Toffee Apple 2 14.3 Strawberries 1 7.1
SECOND Orange 3 27.3 Toffee Pear 1 9.1
Apple 2 18.2 Melon 1 9.1
Pineapple 2 18.2 Cherries 1 9.1
Coconut 1 9.1
Mark got out his instrument to play at the lively parade.
FIRST Trumpet 4 28.6 Flute 1 7.1
Trombone 2 14.3 Piccolo 1 7.1
Guitar 1 7.1 Tuba 1 7.1
Drum 1 7.1 Bugle 1 7.1
Saxophone 1 7.1 Harmonica 1 7.1
SECOND Trumpet 5 35 .7 Bassoon 1 7.1
Trombone 2 14.3 Piccolo 1 7.1
Tuba 2 14.3 Harmonica 1 7.1
Drum 1 7.1 Saxophone 1 7.1
Mark got out his instrument to play at the Scottish parade.
FIRST Bagpipes 14 82 .4 Trumpet 1 5.9
Tin Whistle 1 5.9 Drum 1 5.9
SECOND Drum 8 50 Tuba 1 6.2
Fiddle 2 12 .5 Bugle 1 6.2
Bagpipes 2 12 .5 Flute 1 6.2
Mouth Organ 1 6.2
Mark got out his Scottish instrument to play at the lively parade.
FIRST Bagpipes 23 95.8 Accordion 1 4.2
SECOND Accordion 7 30.4 Bagpipes 1 4.3
Fiddle 5 r-i—iCM Whistle 1 4.3
Drum 3 13.0 Flute 1 4.3
Clarsach 2 8.7 Fife 1 4.3
Chanter 1 4.3 Spirtle 1 4.3
APPENDIX 1 Continued
TABLE A3: FREQUENCY LISTS OF EXAMPLES FOR THREE FORMS OF TEN MIXED
SENTENCES.
EXEMPLAR FREQ % EXEMPLAR FREQ %
Although it was pleasant he had never tasted the fruit before in his life.
FIRST Kiwi Fruit 6 50 Breadfruit 1 8.3
Passion Fruit 4 33.3 Guava 1 8.3
SECOND Kiwi Fruit 4 33.3 Pomegranate 1 8.3
Mango 2 16.7 Papaya 1 8.3
Passion Fruit 1 8.3 Raspberry 1 8.3
Melon 1 8.3 Cumquat 1 8.3
Although it was exotic he had never tasted the fruit before in his life.
FIRST Mango 3 33.3 Loquat 1 11.1
Pawpaw l 11.1 Cumquat 1 11.1
Avocado 1 11.1 Lychee 1 11.1
Pomegranate 1 11.1
SECOND Passion Fruit 2 22.2 Lychee 1 11.1
Pawpaw 1 11.1 Pineapple 1 11.1
Avocado 1 11.1 Carambola 1 11.1
Mango 1 11.1 Coconut 1 11.1
Although it was pleasant he had never tasted the exotic fruit beforei in his life.
FIRST Mango 5 38.5 Passion Fruit 3 23.1
Kiwi Fruit 4 30.8 Melon l 7.7
SECOND Passion Fruit 4 30.8 Pawpaw l 7.7
Kiwi Fruit 3 23.1 Melon l 7.7
Mango 2 15.4 Pineapple 1 7.7
Pomegranate 1 7.7
Bob handled the bird with care.
FIRST Sparrow 4 16 .7 Kestrel 2 8.3
Canary 3 12.5 Raven 1 4.2
Dove 3 12.5 Chicken 1 4.2
Seagull 3 12 .5 Blackbird 1 4.2
Budgie 2 8.3 Penguin 1 4.2
Parrot 2 8.3 Robin 1 4.2
SECOND Parrot 3 14.3 Starling 1 4.8
Dove 3 14.3 Duck 1 4.8
Budgie 2 9.5 Mynah 1 4.8
Pigeon 2 9.5 Eagle 1 4.8
Sparrow 2 9.5 Hen 1 4.8
Falcon 2 9.5 Canary 1 4.8
It was large so Bob handled the bird with care.
FIRST Eagle 7 31.8 Owl 1 4.5
Ostrich 2 9.1 Emu 1 4.5
Seagull 2 9.1 Kestrel 1 4.5
Swan 2 9.1 Chicken 1 4.5
Vulture 2 9.1 Hawk 1 4.5
Penguin 1 4.5 Pigeon 1 4 . 5
SECOND Eagle 5 22.7 Hawk 1 4.5
Seagull 3 13.6 Parrot 1 4.5
Albatross 3 13.6 Pelican 1 4.5
Flamingo 2 9.1 Pigeon 1 4.5
Osprey 2 9.1 Crow 1 4.5
Kestrel 1 4.5 Duck 1 4.5
Bob handled the large birdwWh care.
FIRST Eagle 6 26.1 Seagull 1 4.3
Ostrich 3 13.0 Crow 1 4.3
Parrot 3 13.0 Sparrow 1 4.3
Swan 2 8.7 Vulture 1 4.3
Emu 2 8.7 Owl 1 4.3
Falcon 1 4.3 Pelican 1 4.3
SECOND Osprey 3 13.0 Owl 1 4.3
Ostrich 3 13 .0 Dove 1 4.3
Seagull 2 8.7 Albatross 1 4.3
Crow 2 8.7 Flamingo 1 4.3
Parrot 2 8.7 Falcon 1 4.3
Swan 2 8.7 Pheasant 1 4.3
Emu 1 4.3 Chaffinch 1 4.3
Duck 1 4.3
Carol examined it and decided that the instrument could be fine.
Flute 4 18 .2 Oboe 1 4.5
Piano 4 18.2 Harp 1 4.5
Scalpel 4 18.2 Scissors 1 4.5
Violin 3 13 .6 Compass 1 4.5
Trumpet 1 4.5 Pick Axe 1 4.5
Syringe 1 4.5
Violin 3 14.3 Saxophone 1 4.8
Guitar 2 9.5 Trombone 1 4.8
Scalpel 2 9.5 Clock 1 4.8
Drum 2 9.5 Kitchen Knife 1 4.8
Recorder 1 4.8 Tuning Fork 1 4.8
Needle 1 4.8 Screwdriver 1 4.8
Clarinet 1 4.8 Organ 1 4.8
Tuba 1 4.8 Oboe 1 4.8
Carol examined it unstrung and decided that the instrument could be fine.
FIRST Violin 10 43.5 Viola 2 8.7
Guitar 6 26.1 Banjo 1 4.3
Cello 3 13.0 Microscope 1 4.3
SECOND Violin 7 30.4 Piano 1 4.3
Cello 7 30.4 Microwave 1 4.3
Guitar 3 13 .0 Double Bass 1 4.3
Harp 2 8.7 Banjo 1 4.3
Carol examined it and decided that the unstrung instrument could be fine.
FIRST Guitar 9 40.9 Cello 1 4.5
Violin 7 31.8 French Horn 1 4.5
Harp 2 9.1 Fiddle 1 4.5
Piano 1 4.5
SECOND Violin 7 31.8 Viola 2 9.1
Guitar 4 18.2 Double Bass 1 4.5
Cello 4 18.2 Tuba 1 4.5
Harp 3 13.6
Charles carefully cleaned the instrument he had found.
FIRST Flute 5 23.8 Hatchet 1 4.
Trumpet 3 14.3 Watch 1 4.
Gun 3 14.3 Screwdriver 1 4.
Tin Whistle 2 9.5 Telescope 1 4.
Sword 1 4.8 Fyfe 1 4.
Scalpel 1 4.8 Euphonium 1 4.
SECOND Recorder 3 14.3 Gun 1 4.8
Flute 2 9.5 Icepick 1 4.8
Knife 2 9.5 Blender 1 4.8
Microscope 2 9.5 Compass 1 4.8
Clarinet 2 9.5 Scales 1 4.8
Guitar 2 9.5 Lute 1 4.8
Trumpet 1 4.8 Trombone 1 4.8
Charles carefully disassembled and cleaned the instrument he had found.
FIRST Trumpet 5 22 .7 Chisel 1 4.5
Flute 4 18.2 Chainsaw 1 4.5
Saxophone 2 9.1 Microscope 1 4.5
Clarinet 2 9.1 Gun 1 4.5
Oboe 1 4.5 Shotgun 1 4.5
Pipe 1 4.5 Clock 1 4.5
Drum 1 4.5
SECOND Trumpet 5 22 .7 Hornet 1 4.5
Clarinet 3 13.6 Watch 1 4.5
Trombone 3 13.6 Plane 1 4.5
Oboe 2 9.1 Camera 1 4.5
Flute 2 9.1 Gramophone 1 4.5
Saxophone 2 9.1
Charles carefully cleaned the disassembled instrument he had found.
FIRST Flute 5 21.7 Car 1 4.3
Clarinet 4 17.4 Watch 1 4.3
Clock 2 8.7 Violin 1 4.3
Gun 2 8.7 Trombone 1 4.3
Bicycle 1 4.3 Theodolite 1 4.3
Stethoscope 1 4.3 Saxophone 1 4.3
Piano 1 4.3 Pen 1 4.3
SECOND Clarinet 6 26.1 Bicycle 1 4.3
Trombone 2 8.7 Toy train 1 4.3
Microscope 2 8.7 Violin 1 4.3
Flute 2 8.7 Bagpipes 1 4.3
French Horn 1 4.3 Saxophone 1 4.3
Recorder 1 4.3 Guitar 1 4.3
Telescope 1 4.3 Motorbike 1 4.3
Watch 1 4.3
Although he was still by himself, the animal was entertaining.
FIRST Monkey 6 28.6 Sealion 1 4.8
Dog 4 19.0 Orangutan 1 4.8
Kitten 2 9.5 Zebra 1 4.8
Elephant 2 9.5 Seal 1 4.8
Lamb 1 4.8 Mouse 1 4.8
Lion 1 4.8
SECOND Dog 3 13.6 Penguin 1 4.5
Monkey 2 9.1 Parrot 1 4.5
Kitten 2 9.1 Chimpanzee 1 4.5
Cat 2 9.1 Seal 1 4.5
Elephant 2 9.1 Polar Bear 1 4.5
Budgie 1 4.5 Dolphin 1 4.5
Gorilla 1 4.5 Child 1 4.5
Horse 1 4.5 Puppy 1 4.5
Although he was still dangling by himself, the animal was entertaining.
FIRST Monkey 13 56.5 Bear 1 4.3
Chimpanzee 2 8.7 Mouse 1 4.3
Puppy 1 4.3 Seal 1 4.3
Bat 1 4.3 Gibbon 1 4.3
Lemur 1 4.3 Orangutan 1 4.3
SECOND Sloth 4 17.4 Koala Bear 1 4.3
Gibbon 3 13.0 Marmoset 1 4.3
Gorilla 2 8.7 Lion 1 4.3
Snake 2 8.7 Cat 1 4.3
Orangutan 1 4.3 Chimpanzee 1 4.3
Ape 1 4.3 Dog 1 4.3
Hummingbird 1 4.3 Bear 1 4.3
Bat 1 4.3
Although he was still by himself, the dangling animal was entertaining.
FIRST Monkey 9 40.9 Chinchilla 1 4.5
Chimpanzee 3 13.6 Gibbon 1 4.5
Bat 3 13.6 Rabbit 1 4.5
Baboon 2 9.1 Hamster 1 4.5
Sloth 1 4.5
SECOND Chimpanzee 3 13.6 Orangutan 1 4.5
Snake 3 13.6 Parrot 1 4.5
Spider 3 13.6 Penguin 1 4.5
Koala Bear 2 9.1 Bat 1 4.5
Sloth 1 4.5 Monkey 1 4.5
Gibbon 1 4.5 Possum 1 4.5
Clown 1 4.5 Dog 1 4.5
Bushbaby 1 4.5
Capturing everyone's attention the animal was the main attraction.
FIRST Lion 8 36.4 Arab Horse 1 4.5
Monkey 3 13.6 Zebra 1 4.5
Dog 3 13.6 Penguin 1 4.5
Chimpanzee 2 9.1 Seal 1 4.5
Panther 1 4.5 Elephant 1 4.5
SECOND Monkey 3 13.6 Lion 1 4.5
Elephant 3 13.6 Ostrich 1 4.5
Dolphin 2 9.1 Cheetah 1 4.5
Seal 2 9.1 Gorilla 1 4.5
Dog 2 9.1 Polar Bear 1 4.5
Tiger 2 9.1 Dolphin 1 4.5
Baboon 1 4.5 Bull 1 4.5
Making a noise and capturing everyone's attention the animal was the main
attraction.
FIRST Lion 7 33.3 Sea Lion 1 4.8
Monkey 4 19.0 Dog 1 4.8
Elephant 2 9.5 Tiger 1 4.8
Chimpanzee 2 9.5 Cat 1 4.8
Parrot 2 9.5
SECOND Lion 5 23.8 Tiger 2 9.5
Monkey 4 19.0 Baby 1 4.8
Elephant 4 19.0 Hyena 1 4.8
Seal 3 14.3 Bird 1 4.8
Capturing everyone's attention the noisy animal was the main attraction.
FIRST Lion 4 17.4 Chimpanzee 1 4.3
Monkey 4 17.4 Hyena 1 4.3
Dog 4 17.4 Baboon 1 4.3
Elephant 2 8.7 Puppy 1 4.3
Sealion 1 4.3 Gorilla 1 4.3
Cheetah 1 4.3 Walrus 1 4.3
Bear 1 4.3
SECOND Lion 5 23.8 Cat 1 4.8
Tiger 3 14.3 Seal 1 4.8
Elephant 1 4.8 Giraffe 1 4.8
Cow 1 4.8 Baby 1 4.8
Gorilla 1 4.8 Hyena 1 4.8
Seagull 1 4.8 Monkey 1 4.8
Dog 1 4.8 Orangutan 1 4.8
Chimpanzee 1 4.8
"He's over there" indicated the keeper, pointing at the animal in the field.
FIRST Horse 4 17.4 Highland Cow 1 4.3
Cow 4 17.4 Tiger 1 4.3
Lion 3 13.0 Stag 1 4.3
Bull 2 8.7 Zebra 1 4.3
Camel 2 8.7 Donkey 1 4.3
Deer 1 4.3 Dog 1 4.3
Sheep 1 4.3
SECOND Horse 5 21.7 Donkey 1 4.3
Cow 4 17.4 Dog 1 4.3
Zebra 3 13.0 Bull 1 4.3
Giraffe 2 8.7 Goat 1 4.3
Cat 2 8.7 Sheep 1 4.3
Tiger 1 4.3 Deer 1 4.3
"He's hiding over there" indicated the keeper pointing at the animal in the field.
FIRST Fox 4 18 .2 Deer l 4.5
Dog 2 9.1 Tiger l 4.5
Lion 2 9.1 Buffalo l 4.5
Goat 2 9.1 Penguin 1 4.5
Horse 2 9.1 Leopard 1 4.5
Cow 2 9.1 Pheasant 1 4.5
Giraffe 1 4.5 Bull l 4.5
SECOND Dog 3 13.6 Bear l 4.5
Rabbit 2 9.1 Cow l 4.5
Sheep 2 9.1 Elephant l 4.5
Horse 2 9.1 Goat 1 4.5
Ewe 1 4.5 Wolf l 4.5
Badger 1 4.5 Polar Bear 1 4.5
Tiger 1 4.5 Hedgehog l 4.5
Rat 1 4.5 Fox l 4.5
Pig 1 4.5
"He's over there" indicated the keeper, pointing at the hiding animal in the field.
FIRST Rabbit 6 27.3 Wolf l 4.5
Fox 5 22.7 Koala Bear l 4.5
Dog 2 9.1 Bull 1 4.5
Tiger 2 9.1 Lion 1 4.5
Deer 1 4.5 Horse 1 4.5
Badger 1 4.5
SECOND Rabbit 5 22 .7 Elephant i 4.5
Racoon 1 4.5 Lion l 4.5
Hyena 1 4.5 Ram l 4.5
Sheep 1 4.5 Rat 1 4.5
Tiger 1 4.5 Hedgehog 1 4.5
Antelope 1 4.5 Horse 1 4.5
Goat 1 4.5 Deer l 4.5
Fox 1 4.5 Badger 1 4.5
Ferret 1 4.5 Pheasant 1 4.5
Seldom as it was, Sam played the sport well.
FIRST Football 8 34.8 Badminton 1 4.3
Tennis 4 17.4 Golf 1 4.3
Cricket 3 13.0 Fencing 1 4.3
Squash 2 8.7 Croquet 1 4.3
Rugby 2 8.7
SECOND Cricket 6 27.3 Volleyball 1 4.5
Tennis 5 22.7 Ice Hockey 1 4.5
Squash 2 9.1 Bowls 1 4.5
Rugby 2 9.1 Snooker 1 4.5
Badminton 2 9.1 Football 1 4.5
Difficult as it was, Sam played the sport well.
FIRST Squash 4 19.0 Badminton 1 4.8
Football 3 14.3 Lacrosse 1 4.8
Tennis 3 14.3 Volleyball 1 4.8
Polo 2 9.5 Basketball 1 4.8
Golf 2 9.5 Canoeing 1 4.8
Fives 1 4.8 Rugby 1 4.8
SECOND Rugby 3 15 Volleyball 1 5
Cricket 3 15 Basketball 1 5
Table Tennis 2 10 Squash 1 5
Hockey 2 10 Judo 1 5
Tennis 2 10 Badminton 1 5
Golf 2 10 Football 1 5
Seldom as it was, Sam played the difficult sport well.
FIRST Polo 5 23.8 Cricket 2 9.5
Squash 4 19.0 Volleyball 1 4.8
Rugby 3 14.3 Snooker 1 4.8
Lacrosse 2 9.5 Croquet 1 4.8
Tennis 2 9.5
SECOND Hockey 3 14.3 Billiards 1 4.8
Squash 3 14.3 Lacrosse 1 4.8
Rugby 2 9.5 Badminton 1 4.8
Tennis 2 9.5 Croquet 1 4.8
Snooker 1 4.8 Volleyball 1 4.8
Cricket 1 4.8 Football 1 4.8
Fencing 1 4.8 Chess 1 4.8
The season encouraged brisk sales of clothing.
FIRST Jumper 3
I
COCO1—1 T-shirt 1 4^ to
Coat 3 COCOI—1 Swimwear 1 4.2
Shoes 2 12.5 Hat 1 4.2
Shorts 2 12 .5 Pullover 1 4.2
Summer Clothes 1 4.2 Blouse 1 4.2
SECOND Swimwear 3 18.7 Raincoat 1 6.2
Coat 2 12.5 Hat 1 6.2
Boots 2 12.5 Sun Hat 1 6.2
Gloves 2 12.5 Shirt 1 6.2
Sandals 1 6.2 Trousers 1 6.2
Suit 1 6.2
The summer season encouraged brisk sales of clothing
FIRST T-shirt 5 22.7 Cotton Dress 2 9.1
Bikini 4 18.2 Skirt 1 4.5
Swimming Costume 3 13.6 Jacket 1 4.5
Shorts 3 13.6 Umbrella 1 4.5
Trunks 2 9.1
SECOND T-shirt 6 27.3 Overcoat 1 4.5
Swimwear 4 18.2 Jean Shorts 1 4.5
Shorts 4 18 .2 Shirt 1 4.5
Shoes 2 9.1 Skirt 1 4.5
Underwear 1 4.5 Wellies 1 4.5
The season encouraged brisk sales of summer clothing
FIRST Shorts 6 30 Shoes 1 5
T-shirt 5 25 Skirt 1 5
Shirt 3 15 Hat 1 5
Dress 2 10 Swimsuit 1 5
SECOND T-shirt 5 25 Hat 1 5
Bikini 4 20 Blouse 1 5
Swimming Trunks 2 10 Shirt 1 5
Dress 2 10 Skirt 1 5
Shorts 2 10 Sun Top 1 5
The vegetable tasted very strange when eaten raw.
FIRST Potato 9 40.9 Marrow 1 4.5
Cauliflower 3 13.6 Parsnip 1 4.5
Onion 2 9.1 Chilli (pepper) 1 4.5
Courgette 2 9.1 Garlic 1 4.5
Cabbage 2 9.1
SECOND Potato 5 23.8 Onion 1 4.8
Cauliflower 3 14.3 Celery 1 4.8
Carrot 2 9.5 Courgette 1 4.8
Beetroot 1 4.8 Asparagus 1 4.8
Peas 1 4.8 Pumpkin 1 4.8
Turnip 1 4.8 Runner Beans 1 4.8
Leek 1 4.8 Cabbage 1 4.8
The vegetable tasted very strange when eaten raw from the garden.
FIRST Carrot 5 21.7 Brussels Sprout 2 8.7
Turnip 4 17.4 Spinach 1 4.3
Potato 3 13.0 Marrow 1 4.3
Beetroot 3 13.0 Courgette 1 4.3
Radish 2 8.7 Cabbage 1 4.3
SECOND Potato 5 21.7 Cabbage 1 4.3
Parsnip 3 13.0 Beans 1 4.3
Carrot 3 13.0 Celery 1 4.3
Beetroot 2 8.7 Rhubarb 1 4.3
Turnip 2 8.7 Lettuce 1 4.3
Broccoli 1 4.3 Brussels Sprout 1 4.3
Peas 1 4.3
The garden vegetable tasted very strange when eaten raw.
FIRST Potato 5 22.7 Marrow 1 4.5
Carrot 3 13.6 Green Pepper 1 4.5
Peas 2 9.1 Parsnip 1 4.5
Cabbage 2 9.1 Spinach 1 4.5
Onion 1 4.5 Broad Beans 1 4.5
Turnip 1 4.5 Leek 1 4.5
Rhubarb 1 4.5 Courgette 1 4.5
SECOND Turnip 5 22.7 Carrot 1 4.5
Potato 5 22.7 Brussels Sprout 1 4.5
Spinach 2 9.1 Broccoli 1 4.5
Lettuce 1 4.5 Cauliflower 1 4.5
Asparagus 1 4.5 Tomato 1 4.5
Parsnip 1 4.5 Pumpkin 1 4.5
Beans 1 4.5
Although it was the nearest one to hand the weapon proved effective.
FIRST Club 1 11.1 Candlestick 1 11.1
Axe 1 11.1 Gun 1 11.1
Cannon 1 11.1 Knife 1 11.1
Kitchen Knife 1 11.1 Vase 1 11.1
Plate 1 11.1
SECOND Iron Bar 1 11.1 Hammer 1 11.1
Cleaver 1 11.1 Gun 1 11.1
Stone 1 11.1 Screwdriver 1 11.1
Chair 1 11.1 Shoe 1 11.1
Although it was the nearest one to hand the weapon proved deadly.
FIRST Knife 4 30 .8 Poker 1 7.7
Gun 2 15.4 Paper Weight 1 7.7
Screwdriver 1 7.7 Stone 1 7.7
Letter Opener 1 7.7 Bottle 1 7.7
Fork 1 7.7
SECOND Wooden Beam 1 7.7 Crossbow 1 7.7
Poison Dart 1 7.7 Gun 1 7.7
Spade 1 7.7 Penknife 1 7.7
Poker 1 7.7 Vase 1 7.7
Knife 1 7.7 Paper Knife 1 7.7
Bo 111 e 1 7.7 Beer Can 1 7.7
Although it was the nearest one to hand the deadly weapon proved effective.
FIRST Knife 5 45.4 Scissors 1 9.1
Bomb 1 9.1 Tank 1 9.1
Gun 1 9.1 Dagger 1 9.1
Letter Opener 1 9.1
SECOND Gun 2 18.2 Machine Gun 1 9.1
Knife 1 9.1 Samurai Sword 1 9.1
Garden Shears 1 9.1 Cheese Wire 1 9.1
Dagger 1 9.1 Iron Bar 1 9.1
Knitting Needle 1 9.1 Lamp 1 9.1
APPENDIX 2
Are Contextual Changes Conceptual Changes?
Introduction
Many authors have reported that context affects which exemplars are considered
prototypical of a category, and Experiment 1 served to clarify the wide extent of
these contextual alterations. A possible implication of this finding is that concepts
themselves alter with context. If concepts do change with context then we would
expect contextual prototypes to affect cognitive processes to a similar extent to
Rosch's prototypes. That is, if prototypes, as documented by Rosch, had an effect
on cognitive decisions and problem solving, these context specific prototypes
should have similar cognitive effects. Rosch examined the cognitive effects of
intuitive goodness of example distributions experimentally, in order to establish
their credibility as important psychological variables. If similar claims are to be
made about context specific prototypes, experimental verification of their
explanatory power is essential. The question which needs to be addressed
experimentally is whether the change in reported prototypicality with context is a
result of change at the conceptual level.
Whitney & Kellas (1984) published a paper in which they claimed that there are no
contextual changes of prototypicality at the conceptual level. That is to say if, for
example, a subject was primed with a sentence suggesting an atypical instantiation
of a category name that sentence would prime the category prototype rather than
the context dependent prototype. So, if presented with a sentence such as: "The
State authorities used their chosen weapon to execute criminals humanely",
Whitney & Kellas argue that the prototype "gun" would be primed rather than the
atypical, but context-appropriate, "electric chair". It is argued that context effects
such as those documented in Experiment 1 are the result of "post-access
inferences" (also suggested by Gumenik, 1979): that is inferences about likely
referents and meaning made after the concept has been accessed. Whitney &
Kellas argue that inferences are not routinely made during the encoding of
individual sentences, and cite Dosher & Corbett (Corbett & Dosher, 1978; Dosher &
Corbett, 1982) in their defence.
Previous to Dosher & Corbett it had been argued that highly likely implicit
referents were routinely inferred during reading (Paris & Lindauer, 1976). For
example for sentences such as: "The lawyer cooked dinner on a stove" and "The
lawyer cooked dinner", "stove" was an equally good recall cue. Thus, implicit
instances serve as equally good recall cues as instances that are mentioned
explicitly. Corbett 8i Dosher (1978) argued that this effect was a result of
post-access inference, rather than a result of the implicit instance being encoded
when the sentence is first read. They argued instead that implicit instances "may
serve as effective cues by virtue of their representation in... abstract schemata".
Dosher 8i Corbett conducted an experiment which included a third form of
sentence which incorporated a low probability instrument; e.g. "The lawyer cooked
dinner on a campfire". Paris & Lindauer would predict that "campfire" would be
encoded in place of "stove" when the sentence was read, and that "stove" would
not act as a retrieval cue. Corbett & Dosher found, however, that "stove" acted as
a recall cue for the sentence in which a low probability item was encoded as the
instance. Thus they concluded that inferences (of this sort) are not routinely made
during encoding. It follows from this that changes in typicality due to context may
also be a result of post-access inference.
Whitney & Kellas use this rationale to argue that if context effects are present at
the encoding stage then a conceptual change must have taken place. Conversely, if
context effects only emerge at a later stage of processing they must be the result
of post-access inference or, as Barsalou suggests, post-access combination.
Whitney & Kellas (1984) designed an experimental paradigm in which individual
sentences served as context dependent primes. Thus, context sentences were
presented to subjects in order to test whether they primed typical or atypical
context-relevant exemplars. Whitney & Kellas utilized a Stroop task (Stroop, 1938)
after Warren (1972) and Conrad (1974) who had shown that the greater the
association between the word printed in coloured ink and the prime the longer
subjects take to name the colour. For the Stroop effect to occur it is unnecessary
for the target word to be another colour name, the activation from the prime of an
entirely separate word is sufficient to cause interference. The Stroop paradigm has
proved a sensitive measure of priming, and was used by Whitney & Kellas to
investigate whether context specific prototypes were routinely primed when
encoding sentences which intuitively suggested them.
Whitney 8i Kellas reported that when this test was used context specific prototypes
were found to have no effect on cognition. Moreover, prototypes documented
without context (i.e. those reported by Rosch and others) were still primed by
atypical sentences. This effect could not be explained by saying that subjects were
simply not attending sufficiently to the sentence context because subjects were
informed that they would be given a sentence recognition test at the end of each
block. Thus subjects were motivated to direct their attention to understanding the
whole sentence. If reliable, Whitney & Kellas' result is an important one because it
strongly supports theories of semantic memory which suggest concepts have a
prototypical structure. If context effects are just a result of post-access inference
processes, then documenting and understanding prototypes obtained in a 'neutral'
context, where context is unspecified, is an important basis on which a theory of
meaning can be built. It would imply that we have stable concepts which form the
building blocks of cognition, and that all we need discover in addition are the
appropriate rules of manipulation (or perhaps of concept conjunction) to fully
understand how and why word meanings change in context. A post-access
inference explanation thus displaces the role of context, one of the most difficult
and challenging factors to models of language and meaning, to the status of a side
issue with regard to theoretical questions.
The question of whether or not contextual changes necessitate conceptual
changes has been shown to be theoretically important. This experiment is
therefore designed as a replication in kind of Whitney & Kellas (1984). Slightly
modified conditions are used to ascertain whether the effects previously found are
robust enough to generalize to new sentences and new equipment.
METHOD
Design
The design of the experiment was within subjects. The independent variables were
sentence type and target type. Sentence type had three levels: sentences
suggesting typical category members, atypical category members, and control
sentences (which contained a category name which was unrelated to the target
word). Target type had two levels: words normally considered typical category
members and words normally considered atypical category members. Although
target words varied in length and frequency, factors which might have been
expected to affect response latency, these differences were controlled for in the
experimental design by including control sentences. A prime facilitates response
times by providing a warning of the stimulus onset, and a clue about the
information to come (Rosch, 1975a). The signal, or warning function of the prime in
this case was taken to be the response time of a subject to a target in the control
condition (when the target is preceded by an unrelated sentence). This provides
information about how factors such as word frequency and word length might
affect reaction times. The information function of the prime was taken to be the
the response times for the same target word when primed with a related sentence,
minus the response time when the target was preceded by a control sentence.
Priming increases response latency by setting up a response competition between
the expected target and the name of the colour. Thus we would expect the
decision time to be longer when the target word was preceded by a related
sentence than when it was preceded by a control sentence.
Targets were printed in four colours red, blue, yellow and purple. Colours were
chosen to maximize distinctiveness between colours when displayed on the
computer screen. As target colour might be expected to affect colour identification
latencies due to colour preference, or even fluke associations with sentence
stimuli, possible effects were controlled by randomly assigning the four colours to
targets. Randomization was such that each colour was presented equally often. A
different random order of target colours was used for each subject.
Subjects
Eighteen people volunteered to take part in the experiment. Subjects were
students at the University of Edinburgh. None of the subjects had participated in
Experiment 1. The sexes were approximately equally represented. All subjects were
native English speakers. Subjects reported to have normal, or corrected to normal,
vision and normal colour vision.
Stimuli
20 target sentences used in the experiment were taken from the norms of
Experiment 1. 10 typical and 10 atypical sentences were chosen. Sentences from
the "instrument" category were only selected if the sentence unambiguously
suggested a musical instrument. In addition 30 control sentences were constructed
in the same way as the sentences used in Experiment 1. The control sentences
were thus similar in linguistic form to, but different in semantic meaning from, the
experimental sentences. 10 control sentences were used to form a practice run
prior to the experiment. The target and control sentences reflected the three
linguistic forms used in Experiment 1.
Sentence-word pairs were constructed for typical, atypical and control sentences.
Typical sentences were paired with typical target words cited as good exemplars
in Experiment 1, making sentence and target highly related. The same sentences
were also paired with atypical category members (taken from Uyeda & Mandler,
1980) these pairings were thus poorly related. Similarly, atypical sentences were
paired firstly with typical category members (from Uyeda & Mandler, 1980) and
forming low-related pairs; and secondly with atypical category members cited as
good examples for atypical sentences in Experiment 1, and thus highly related.
Sentence-target pairs were divided into two lists such that each sentence
appeared only once per list.
Twenty control sentences were paired with the typical and atypical target words
from the opposite list so that target words only appeared once per list. The 10
control sentences for the practice run were paired with 10 new nouns, the control
sentences were unrelated to the targets in the practice session. List 1 contained:
20 control sentences paired with 10 unrelated typical category instances and 10
unrelated atypical category instances; and 20 priming sentences: 10 typical
sentences half paired with related typical targets, half with related atypical targets;
and 10 atypical sentences half paired with related typical targets, half with related
atypical targets. List 2 was the mirror image of List 1: typical sentences previously
paired with typical instances were now paired with atypical instances. 20 control
sentences were also repeated, now paired with the alternative unrelated word.
Controls and sentences were randomized and presented to the subject alternately
(after Beller, 1971; Rosch, 1973, 1975a). The same order of presentation was used
for each subject.
Apparatus and Materials
The experiment was conducted on a BBC Master microcomputer with a colour CUB
microvitec 452 monitor. A four key response box was connected to the computer.
The response keys were 2cm wide and were labelled with four colour names which
read from left to right: RED, BLUE, YELLOW and PURPLE. Colour names were
stencilled in normatype 22.12 CLN, 3.2mm capital letters on a white background.
Subjects used their dominant hand to press the keys. All those who took part in
the experiment were right handed.
Four recognition sheets were prepared. Each sheet contained 10 sentences, 5 were
priming and control sentences from the experiment and 5 were distractor
sentences. Distractor sentences were constructed in the same way as control
sentences for the experiment but had never been seen before by the subjects.
Sentences were typed in a random order on a sheet of A4 paper.
Procedure
Each subject was tested in one experimental session which lasted approximately
30 minutes. Each session consisted of 10 practice trials and 40 experimental trials.
Subjects were tested singly in a laboratory. They were seated at a table 44 cm
wide on which the response keys lay. The monitor was placed on a bench behind
the table, the midpoint of the monitor screen was 106 cm high, that is
approximately eye-level to the seated subject. Subjects were randomly assigned to
List 1 or List 2.
The room was darkened to reduce reflection on the monitor screen. The
experimenter explained to the subject that the aim of the research was to
investigate the effects of one task upon another. Subjects were told their first
task was to read, understand and remember the sentences which appeared on the
screen; and their second task was to respond as quickly and accurately as possible
to the colour of the word displayed after each sentence by pressing the
appropriately labelled response key. The subject was told that a recognition sheet
would be presented at the end of each block.
The experiment was divided into a practice session and 4 experimental sections
each of 10 sentences. After the practice block the decision times and errors for
the practice were displayed on the computer screen, and the subjects encouraged
to respond more quickly or accurately as appropriate. After each block subjects
were given a recognition sheet on which they indicated which sentences they had
seen in the previous section. The computer was programmed to stop
automatically at the end of each section, and was restarted by the experimenter
after the recognition sheet was completed.
Subjects were given as long as necessary to complete the recognition sheets.
Sentences were displayed in the centre of the monitor screen for 6s, in normal
white print. There was a 500ms delay between sentence erasure and target onset.
Targets were displayed in capital letters in the centre of the screen in one of four
colours, and remained there until a response was made. There was a 500ms delay
before the next sentence was displayed. Colour identification latencies were
recorded by the computer.
RESULTS
Sentence Recognition
All subjects performed very well on the recognition task, indicating that close
attention was paid to priming sentences. Average error rates were 6.4%. When
errors were made they were almost always errors of omission, that is a failure to
identify sentences which were presented rather than wrongly selecting new
sentences. This suggests that where errors occurred they may have been due to
strict selection of sentences rather than complete lack of recall.
Colour Identification Latencies
Average error rates were 3% and did not vary significantly for conditions. Errors
were excluded from further analyses. Following Whitney & Kellas (1984) mean
response times for each subject were analysed in a 3 X 2 (sentence type X target
type) within subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA). Average response times for
lists 1 and 2 were 827ms and 839ms; this difference was not significant.
Average response times and error rates for each condition are presented in Table
1. No main effects or group differences were found to be significant.




841 (1.1) 852 (6.6) 837 (3.3)
815 (4.4) 826 (0) 827 (3.3)
TABLE 1
Average response times (in ms) of subjects to colour
identification with different priming and target
conditions. (Average % error rates are shown in
parenthesis).
Materials Analysis
The possibility of carrying out ad hoc analysis of materials was investigated but
was found to be inappropriate in this particular case. This was partly because
individual words were only repeated across subjects (and then only once).
Materials were random across conditions, but order effects could be expected to
have a significant influence on the response times for particular items. These
factors prohibited a statistical analysis on materials to be performed, but it was
felt that some idea of the possible contribution of individual items could be gained
from the presentation of mean reaction times for each word, providing the above
qualifications are taken seriously.
The average decision time for each word in control (paired with an unrelated
sentence) and target (paired with a related sentence) conditions are presented in
Graph 1. Note that the graph includes materials from both lists 1 and 2 (a between
subjects factor) and, in particular, that subjects received each word either in a
control condition or a target condition. Words are ordered in groups so that
between group variation can be compared with within group variation, and any
main effects clearly demonstrated. An inspection of Graph 1 confirms that there
was considerable variation within conditions and no clear pattern between
conditions.
There is no indication in Graph 1 that any particular items generated an unusual
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reponse from subjects. Examination of how response times to individual words
varied in the control and target conditions reveals no effect: 22 items had a faster
average response time when in the target condition, while 18 had a faster average
response time in the control condition. There is, however, a suggestion that the
target type is a significant factor for typical sentences. Eight out of ten typical
words had longer decision times when primed by a related typical sentence, while
seven out of ten atypical words had longer decision times when primed by an
unrelated typical sentence. This pattern was not seen in the data for atypical
priming sentences, where target and controls are equally likely to be responded to
quickly. Further study is needed to decide whether this pattern has simply occurred
by chance.
Discussion
This experiment did not provide a replication of Whitney 8t Kellas' finding that
context sentences primed "neutral" prototypes rather than context dependent
prototypes. When these results are compared with those of Whitney & Kellas
(1984) it can be seen that the pattern of results obtained (see Table 1) is very
similar to the pattern they report (see Table 2). Results for this experiment were on
average 104ms faster than found by Whitney 8i Kellas. This difference can be
attributed to task differences, such as the voice onset delay effect incorporated in
Whitney & Kellas' naming task. Error rates are similar in both experiments. The
one striking difference between these results and those reported by Whitney 8t
Kellas occurs in the control - typical condition. Whitney & Kellas report that this
response time is 890ms, which is 20ms faster than when the control was paired
with an atypical instance (910ms). Here, however, the control - typical time
(841ms) is 26ms slower than the control - atypical time (815ms). Neither of these
differences between responses to typical and atypical words in the control
condition are statistically above chance. The difference between the experiment
reported here and that of Whitney & Kellas can be interpreted as the result of a
speed accuracy trade off, supported by the fact that corresponding error rates for
control - typical conditions in Whitney & Kellas and this experiment are 7% and
1.1% (the highest and one of the lowest) respectively. As this difference occurred
in the control condition, which is used as a plumb-line to judge the effects of
context it may have biased the results of Whitney & Kellas in a positive direction
and/or those of this experiment in a negative direction.
TARGET TYPE SENTENCE PRIME
Control Typical Atypical
Typical 890 (7) 985 (5)




Mean Color-Naming Latencies and Percentage Error Rates (in Parenthesis)
by Prime Type and Typicality.
In Whitney & Kellas, 1984.
More interestingly, in theoretical terms, are the very large variations that were
noted in subjects responses to different words and sentences. Even the controls of
asking subjects which category members were suggested by the sentences used
was not effective in predicting response times. It is apparent that some more
complex process is coming into play with the introduction of context than changes
in the similarity structures of concepts. It may be that if context is not working in
a bottom-up way attempts to understand it cannot succeed by building theories
from the bottom up either.
In summary, this experiment did not confirm the conclusions of Whitney & Kellas
(1984) suggesting that the effects they reported are not robust enough to
generalize to different experimental tasks and context sentences. The adequacy of
the amended Stroop task as an appropriate experimental paradigm in which to
study online context effects must thus be reassessed. The large variation in
subjects' response times in this experiment suggests that the Stroop paradigm is
aimed at too simplistic a level to yield relevant information about context effects.
APPENDIX 3
Sentences with Typical/Modified Targets for Experiment 2
"You found it" said Andy, noticing the broken tool in the workshop.
HAMMER BROKEN HAMMER
Although it was borrowed, Jill thought that the old clothing would
be adequate.
CLOTHES OLD CLOTHES
Although it was on loan, Kathy used the piece of antique furniture
all the time.
CHAIR (swivel) ANTIQUE CHAIR
"They are all there" said Linda as her mother viewed the piled fruit
in the hall.
ORANGE PILED ORANGES
Attempting to complete the job, Dick moved the loaded vehicle across
the site.
LORRY LOADED LORRY
"It's over there" directed Mark, hoping Harry would find the hanging
tool where he left it.
HAMMER HANGING HAMMER
Helen put it aside because she was in a hurry, even though the half-
eaten fruit appealed to her.
APPLE HALF-EATEN APPLE
Though Sam had it with him he hoped that the harnessed weapon wouldn't
be necessary.
GUN HARNESSED GUN
The woman screamed "Help!" as she stared at the bloody weapon in
his hand.
KNIFE BLOODY KNIFE
The teenager had already acquired some small articles of modern
furniture of her own.
CHAIR (dining-room type) MODERN CHAIR
APPENDIX 4
Sentences with Typical/Atypical Referent Targets
for Experiment 3
He won the fairground fruit in a competition.
PEAR (T) COCONUT (AR)
Keith was not allowed to participate because his parents thought the cruel
sport was unhealthy.
FOOTBALL (T) FOXHUNTING (AR)
The young rioter spotted a convenient weapon in the street and hurled it at
the policeman.
PISTOL (T) BOTTLE (AR)
*The state authorities used their humane weapon to execute criminals.
RIFLE (T) ELECTRIC CHAIR (AR)
*The retriever brought back the scavenger bird that the hunter had seen.
ROBIN (T) VULTURE (AR)
*The heavy tool the fireman used to break into the locked room was a last
resort.
SAW (T) AXE (AR)
♦Although it was unusual the pale vegetable was served with the meal.
SPINACH (T) TURNIP (AR)
Mark got out his Scottish instrument to play at the lively parade.
GUITAR (T) BAGPIPES (AR)
Nick thought that the colourful bird he saw at the zoo was very tame.
DOVE (T) PARROT (AR)
Because the cheap vegetable was used the meal went further.
CARROT (T) POTATO (AR)
♦Excluded in the reanalysis of Experiment 4.
